



I must stress that it is only my body that is weak and not my spirit. I am as determined to fight for the liberation of Azania today as I was the day I joined the liberation struggle as a young man.

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AZANIA COMBAT

OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE AZANIAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (APLA)

PAC REJECTS TALKS and WAR CONTINUES



INTRODUCING **GRENADE WARFARE**
INSIDE

- PAC says no to talks
- Two PAC founding members die but...
- The war continues as...
- PAC asserts itself on the ground

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ONE SETTLER! ONE BULLET

EDITORIAL

Talks are out

OPPRESSED and dispossessed people of Azania, you are once more being called upon by certain quarters to negotiate with your oppressors and dispossessors of your land. And such calls, in certain instances indirectly by the enemy itself, have of late become even louder, with our Soviet "friends" having added their voice to the chorus.

Our position, as the PAC and true custodian of your aspirations remains firmly the same. Negotiations, to us, mean capitulation.

We believe all calls for negotiations fall flat on the crucial question of the basic purpose for such an exercise. We ask:

Would negotiations be aimed at returning the land of Azania to its rightful owners and thereby enable the African masses to exercise their right to self-determination on that land? Or would negotiations be for the settler-colonial regime's high purpose of diffusing the African masses' current militant struggle being led by the PAC?

We believe the latter is true and we, therefore, reject all the current calls for dialogue between us and Pretoria. And in the same vein, we warn those who have joined or intend to join Pretoria's reform programme that the liberation struggle will soon bury them.

We say to them that the struggle will sooner or later throw them into the garbage can of history.

We, members of the Azanian People's Liberation Army, are fully behind our leadership, the leadership of the PAC led by President Zeph Mothopeng and Chairman Johnson Mlambo, in its total rejection of any form of negotiation with Pretoria.

We pledge ourselves to remain on the battlefield and, in doing so, we are assured that you, the African masses of Azania, are with us.

Fear for guerillas

THE South African Defence Force and the puppet defence force of the Venda bantustan were recently expected to hold joint military exercises to work out joint procedures to be taken in the event of what was called "terrorist infiltration".

This is a tacit indication that there is Azanian guerilla activity in and around the "Republic of Venda", which like all the other bantustans, forms part of what the PAC regards in its military strategy as South Africa's countryside.

The joint military exercise, code-named "Monarch 2" was expected to take place in the north-eastern South African corridor between Zimbabwe and the Venda border area. — Azania Combat Reporter.

MADZUNYA DIES PAC pays tribute

THE Pan Africanist Congress of Azania has expressed "deep sorrow and sadness" at news of the death of one of its founding and leading members, Cde Josias Madzunya, recently.


Cde Madzunya (72) died after a long illness at Siloam hospital in the South African "bantustan" of Venda, where he had been banished.

In a press release, PAC Administrative Secretary Joe Mkwana said Cde Madzunya had been a driving force in the formation of the PAC on April 6, 1959.

"Since 1960 (after the anti-pass laws campaign) up to the day of his death, Cde Madzunya has been a victim of detentions and banishments for believing in and cherishing the cause of the liberation and independence of his African people.

"He was a dedicated, modest, honest and devoted revolutionary. He gave himself in service to the Azanian nation and mankind. He firmly believed that the only solution of Africa's threat from imperialist and capitalist forces was the total unity of the African continent," said Cde Mkwana.

CDE Edwin Makoti, a long-serving PAC member and former Secretary for Defence, has died in Harare.



Cde Edwin Makoti 1921 — 1989
(See Page 6)

42 SA cops are hit as APLA brings in a new-type warfare

THE GRENADE WARFARE

IN what is clearly a new type of warfare, first introduced to South Africa by APLA when it launched the spectacular grenade attack on Tladi police ground in 1987, two policemen were killed and forty others wounded in two recent attacks outside Johannesburg and Cape Town respectively.

Once more, Pretoria and the white liberal Press sought to either attribute responsibility for the two attacks to some other guerilla force or to deliberately leave doubt as to who exactly had carried out the attacks.

But they are too late because the guerilla pattern being seen in South Africa today was long established and had one trademark, that of the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA). It is this trademark that is clearly evident in the two grenade attacks in question as with similar previous APLA attacks.

But what are the basic elements of this trademark? They are:

- Typical guerilla attacks;
- Only hand-grenades were used;
- The targets were security forces;
- The attacks were well-conceived, well-planned and well-executed;
- The guerillas involved were mainly those trained and armed inside the country;
- Their attacks were not followed by arrests and invited no reprisals against innocent people in the immediate vicinity;
- And there was no claim of responsibility.

In the first attack, grenades flung from a moving vehicle seriously wounded ten policemen near a police station in Nyanga, an African township some fifteen kilometres south-east of Cape Town.

In a similar attack in 1987, sixty five policemen were wounded and one was killed at Tladi municipal police training camp in Soweto when an APLA unit threw hand-grenades from a moving vehicle onto the college's parade ground, where the policemen had been drilling.

The sixty five policemen went on record as the biggest number of security forces ever to be hurt in a single guerilla attack in South Africa.

Dozens of policemen and other members of the South African security forces have been killed and scores wounded since the PAC declared at the beginning of 1986 that it had selected racist security forces as its main targets.

In the second major grenade attack this year (1989), two policemen were killed and thirty others wounded when hand-grenades exploded on the grounds of a police station in Katlehong, an African township east of Johannesburg.

The attackers, believed to be APLA guerillas who are known for their spectacular grenade raids, tossed the grenades over the wall surrounding the police station while the police were taking part in a marching parade.

This attack, like the one at Nyanga police station, also reflects the general pattern of APLA attacks — the use of grenades, targeting of security forces, clean operation, involvement of internally trained fighters, no post-attack arrests and no claim of responsibility.

Explaining what has come to be known as PAC's grenade warfare, APLA's Chief Information Officer Cde Jonny Majosi said "This is not a substitute for guerilla warfare, but a new element to it, introduced to South Africa, developed and perfected by APLA combatants."

Latest APLA grenade gains

Two grenade attacks were carried out along the now widely recognised APLA tactic of "grenade warfare" just two days before this issue of Azania Combat went to Press.

In one of the April 20 attacks, carried out on military barracks in Thokoza, five South African soldiers were injured. The other attack, carried out two hours previously in Katlehong, resulted in the injury of two soldiers.

Few weeks earlier, in the same township, one policeman was killed and nine others were seriously injured in yet another attack carried out with typical APLA efficiency.

Around the same period, four policemen were injured in a police training college in Dube, Soweto, as a result of the "grenade treatment".

'Our internal wing is far more important than the external' says PAC Chairman Mlambo

THE Pan Africanist Congress of Azania regards its internal wing as more important than its external mission, the PAC Chairman and APLA Commander-in-Chief, Cde Johnson Mlambo, has said.

He told a (Johannesburg) *Weekly Mail* journalist, Shaun Johnson, that "the people inside Azania, as well as the internal wing of the PAC, are the mainstay of the movement for the liberation of our country".

Cde Mlambo is successor to the late former Chairman and APLA Commander-in-Chief, Cde John Pokela, who, on becoming PAC leader in 1981, set out to "create a permanent and effective link between the internal and the external wing" of the organisation.

Even PAC's most negative critics admit that under Cde Mlambo's leadership, this link has continued to be firmly maintained and consolidated.

A statement to the *Weekly Mail*, in which Cde Mlambo spoke of the relationship between the PAC's two main wings, refers to the release of President Zeph Mothopeng, who is described as "the PAC supremo".

Cde Mlambo said: "All members of the PAC, at home and abroad, are happy with uncle Zeph's bold, principled and consistent re-statement of our policy.

"At one stroke he has consolidated the already-existing unity of the PAC, where dissension and strife within the organisation are a thing of the past".


The *Weekly Mail* in its article headlined "Troubles or Not, a PAC Show of Confidence", notes that the PAC was entering 1989 "exuding unusual confidence about its prospects".

The paper's observations clearly contradict those by South African journalist and so-called political analyst Howard Barrell, who is about the only observer in the world seeing "chronic internal problems" in the PAC.

About elements like Howard Barrell, Cde Mlambo says: "Our critics and detractors... have become habitual pedlars of many a tale about the imagined impending doom of the PAC, but this cannot destroy or deter us in our march to victory".

The *Weekly Mail* admits that Cde Mlambo's statement..

By Peter Domingos



The Commander-in-Chief

reveals several previously unknown (or ignored) features of the PAC and shows that the current generation of externally-based leaders:

- * Attach great importance to the existence of an internal wing, to which they ascribe primacy;
- * Maintain that not only has the Azanian People's Liberation Army survived, but say that its armed operations have increased markedly of late; and
- * Clearly do not regard President Mothopeng as a figurehead but as the "PAC Supremo who can assign us tasks".

PAC becomes stronger as APLA strikes harder

THE struggle for liberation and self determination in Azania has entered a new era and is moving at a different tempo following bold measures taken by the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), both politically and militarily.

Frequent comments by Pretoria, its revolutionary and military "experts" and independent political observers concede that the organisation is highly active in South Africa. This activity has manifested itself in heightened political mobilisation and military offensives.

Yet the same comments are not a complete measure of the organisation's strength and level of activity.

Most of the PAC activities, which the courts through trials continue to associate with priests, publishers, journalists, trade unionists, workers and ordinary people, have received negligible and inconsistent media coverage.

To mind comes the heavy casualties Pretoria suffered in Alexandra township where it lost up to 15 security force members at the hands of the "Scorpion Gang" in 1986, and the 1987 Tladi Police Training centre attack.

Recently APLA Director of Operations Cde Enock Zulu was jailed with six others, among them Muslim and Christian priests (Achmed Cassim and Daniel Nkopodi), to a total of one hundred and thirty-four years in jail. In another case Skotaville editor-in-chief Jaki Seroke was found "guilty" of belonging to the propaganda section of the PAC.

Although Pretoria has denied some of the claims by either the PAC or independent sources that APLA is engaging it intensely, the government has hardly proved the claims untrue.

For example, while it denied it suffered casualties that could be up to 12 in the Litchenburg Battle of July 23, the South African Police headquarters have failed to produce survivors of that fierce confrontation between the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) and its security forces.

In addition it refused to disclose where the "slightly injured" security force members were admitted for more than a week for treatment.

Perhaps the extent of the PAC and APLA activities were better summed up by its chairman, Cde Johnson Mlambo when he said: "Some of these actions are quite well known, while others will only be admitted by the enemy after liberation."

The scattered pieces of information surfacing about the PAC indicate it is gradually assuming the position of dictating the pace, terms and nature of the struggle.

From Azania News

Yes, the regime admits, grudgingly though, that PAC guerrillas are locked in combat battles with its security forces. To this end, it mentions few of those combat battles, tries to credit some to others, and keeps quite about a great deal more.

Dispite years of alleged inactivity, PAC supporters are expressing their loyalty openly. Workers are changing their political vocabulary and terminology, and are replacing them with the traditional PAC ones. In accompaniment is the PAC extended open palm salute from a raised hand.

"Izwe lethu", the rallying cry of Africanists which means "the land is ours (the African people)", is shouted by workers in the industrial centres of South Africa without fear of the colonial regime.

The question can be asked: How has the PAC managed to imprint itself on the map of the South African struggle?

A study of the organisation's history shows that at its inception in 1959, the PAC pledged to espouse and implement the 1949 Programme of Action which spelt self-determination as a goal of the struggle to be realised by launching campaign after campaign involving the masses on every level at all times so as to prepare them for the ultimate confrontation — militarily.

This strategy has since evolved through various stages.

In the 60s the regime brutally put down the anti-pass campaigns, killing 69 Africans in Sharpeville. The PAC president Robert Sobukwe interpreted this stage as the one in which the organisation had succeeded in removing from Africans the fear to go to prison.

The 1976 national mass uprisings led by President Zeph Mothopeng were interpreted by late chairman John Pokela as having removed the fear to die.

"The racist regime harasses human beings, it murders human beings, it hangs human beings. It does not use violence on inanimate objects. It is therefore evident that the enemy will have to be fought on the level of mortals. Assaults on other objects will always be seen as complimentary," he said.

One can, at this point when the PAC programmes seem to be on course, say the organisation has strenuously stuck to its declared programme. It is these clear and unambiguous goals, strict adherence to them and the patience over the meticulousness with which they have to be employed that are at the centre of the current success of the PAC.

PAC remembers its fallen ex-Secretary for Defence

The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania and its military wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army, have suffered one of their greatest losses in the untimely death of the former PAC Secretary for Defence, Cde Edwin Makoti. He was 67.

"Ntate", as the late Cde Makoti was fondly known in the PAC and APLA, was perhaps better known among the PAC fighters for his significant contribution in the building of APLA.

By Combat Editor
Willie Mazambane

SA claims Botswana border area gains against APLA men

By Muriel Dimpho

SOUTH AFRICA has claimed that its security forces have killed three Azanian People's Liberation Army guerrillas and arrested nineteen other APLA men in the Groot Marico corridor bordering Botswana over several months.

Nine more APLA guerrillas were known to have crossed into South Africa through that border area, but none of these had been arrested, said the Chief of the South African security police, Major General Basie Smit.

He was briefing a group of parliamentarians touring police border bases in the Western and the far Northern Transvaal Province.

Maj-Gen Smit, who had told the parliamentarians of a "revival of PAC terrorist operations" in various parts of South Africa, was asked why he believed the organisation was intensifying its military activities.

Said he in reply: "They (the PAC) believe they have a possibility again".

The APLA Chief Information Officer, Cde Jonny Majosi, admitted that there had been a lot of APLA activity in and around the Groot Marico corridor "because this war is being fought in every part of occupied Azania".

Cde Majosi, however, did not wish "at this stage" to comment on Maj-Gen Smit's statistics about alleged setbacks or to shed any light on any possible APLA successes in the Groot Marico corridor.

It was under his military leadership that in 1980 the PAC introduced a massive wide-ranging scheme to retrain most of its fighters, making them what are today viewed even by Pretoria itself as the most daring guerilla fighters in South Africa.

It was also under Ntate's military leadership that the PAC introduced various military and political education programmes to its fighters, making them some of the most militarily informed, most politically clear and most operationally efficient in South Africa.

But Ntate (father) was more than a defence man. He was a great articulator of the PAC ideological and political line and significant contributor to the development of many PAC major policy documents.

These included one in 1975 which has since been adopted by the OAU as its official document on South Africa's legal and international status.

They also included one entitled The National Mandate, which sets out the PAC position on the national question in Azania, with the land ownership issue having been placed at the heart of that question.

A highly trained soldier, a seasoned journalist and an accomplished diplomat, Cde Makoti had held various senior posts in the PAC, including being the then Secretary for Publicity, Information and Political Affairs as well as being, as Chief Representative in Indonesia in 1967, the first PAC diplomat in southern Asia.

Born on July 1, 1921, Cde Makoti received his primary education in Sterkspruit, Herschel, in the Cape and completed his secondary education in Johannesburg, where he got married and had three children.

A founding member of the PAC, Ntate left South Africa in 1961 for Lesotho, where he began working for the PAC publicity department. Passing through Botswana and Zambia, he went to Tanzania about four years later when he was posted to Indonesia as a diplomat.

In 1968, he led an APLA unit for military training in China and on his return to Tanzania he was appointed Secretary for Publicity and Information before becoming Secretary for Defence and several years later returning to his publicity post.

He retired from the post two years ago due to failing health and served the party in the area of research.

COURT COMBAT

10 PAC activists given 166 years

TEN Azanian patriots were recently sentenced to a total of 166 years in two major trials in Racist South Africa under the so called Internal Security and Terrorism Acts for engaging in activities of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC).

In the first trial in Pretoria, PAC Central Committee member and Director of Operations in the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), Comrade Enoch Zulu (54) was sentenced to thirty-one years, of which he will serve an effective sixteen years.

APLA combatants sentenced with Comrade Zulu were Comrades Siyabulela Gcanga (28) who was sentenced to twenty-one years but will serve twelve years, Paul Mohohlo (31) sentenced to twenty-one years but will serve ten years, and Vincent Mathunjwa (31) sentenced to twelve years but will serve ten years.

Other trialists were Reverend Daniel Nkopodi (29) of the Methodist Church who was sentenced to thirty-eight years but will serve sixteen years, Achmed Cassiem (41) will serve an effective six years, and Yusuf Patel will serve five years.

In the second trial, revolutionary artist and editor of the first African publishing house, Skotaville, Jaki 'Stone' Seroke and two APLA combatants were sentenced by a racist magistrate in Springs for "terrorism" and membership of a banned organisation (PAC). Comrade Seroke was sentenced to twelve years, of which he will serve an effective ten years.

In his judgement, the magistrate found that Comrade Seroke belonged to the PAC propaganda department, and claimed that he was an executive member of the organisation.

Comrades Mandla Cele and Thembinkosi Khonongwe were sentenced, and will serve an effective ten years each.

The majority of those sentenced in the Pretoria trial were arrested in the so-called independent bantustan of Bophuthatswana but were tried and convicted in Pretoria. This in itself exposed the sham independence of Bophuthatswana because the racist apartheid regime did not even bother to go through a formality of 'extradition' to give a semblance of respect to the supposed independence of Bophuthatswana.

Moreover, at the time of their arrest in April 1986, Louis Nel, the then deputy Foreign Minister and Louis Le Grange, then Minister of Law and Order, publicly claimed that their security forces had 'discovered' a document containing

From Azania News

names of 'moderates to be eliminated'. They also claimed that Comrade Zulu was involved in the killing of white farmers at Mbashe.

It is now apparent that such statements were made to influence the courts because the claims were never substantiated.

The ten Azanian patriots represent a cross-section of the population, demonstrating the widespread and united opposition prevailing inside the country against the illegal minority racist regime.

Comrade Zulu was a member of the Central Committee of the PAC and Director of Operations in APLA, the military wing of the PAC. He is a distinguished veteran of the struggle against settler colonial rule in Azania.

Reverend Nkopodi is a priest in the African Methodist Church (AME), reflecting the church's growing opposition to apartheid. Comrade Cassiem, who served five years on Robben Island from 1964 to 1969 and who has been under house arrest or detention since 1969, is a respected leader of Qibla, a principled Muslim organisation in Azania.

Skotaville editor honoured by PAC

DESCRIBING Jackie Seroke as "a young and gifted black poet, playwright and editor", South African sociologist Fatima Meer said while Pretoria had discarded, demeaned and negated him, the PAC had elevated him.

Ms Meer, a Natal University sociologist, was leading evidence in mitigation after Seroke and co-accused Mandla Cele and Thembinkosi Khonongwe were convicted of terrorism and membership of an unlawful organisation before being jailed for a total of 32 years.

Seroke, Skotaville editor described by a Springs Regional Court magistrate as "a PAC executive member and propagandist" was given 12 of the 32 years while Cele and Khonongwe got 10 years each.

PAC assures OAU that it wants unity with ANC

THE Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) is and has always been ready for unity with the African National Congress and other anti-apartheid groups in South Africa, two senior PAC officials have said in separate interviews recently.

"The PAC believes in unity of all the forces who have a contradiction with the Pretoria regime, including the ANC," said the PAC Administrative Secretary, Cde Joe Mkwana, in a brief interview with *Azania Combat*.

"We of the PAC have responded positively to all calls for unity talks with the ANC, but are still awaiting a response from the ANC," said another PAC official, Cde Gora Ebrahim, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

Cde Ebrahim, who is also the PAC's acting Secretary for Information and Publicity, was referring to unity calls spearheaded mainly by Nigeria and several other member states of the Organisation of African Unity.

"The PAC has had no problem regarding the issue of unity and we have informed Nigeria and other OAU members that we are ready to discuss unity with any anti-apartheid group, including the African National Congress," said Cde Mkwana.

Defence minister's thanks for Combat

By Priscilla Sherren

THE Nigerian Minister of Defence, Cde Domkat Ball, has thanked the PAC Chief Representative to Nigeria, Cde Bojana Jordan, for conveying to him copies of *Azania Combat* and other PAC publications.

In a special message issued through the Special Services Division of the Nigerian Defence Ministry, Cde Ball expressed "deep appreciation for the valuable books and pamphlets" sent to him by Cde Bojana.

The issues of *Azania Combat* sent to Cde Ball included one with the coverage of the Nigerian defence minister's visit last year to a PAC multi-purpose centre in Tanzania where he had been met by the APLA Commander-in-Chief, Cde Johnson Mlambo, and other senior PAC officials, including Defence Secretary Cde Sabelo Phama.

By Priscilla Sherren

"But it is our firm belief that such unity should not be amorphous, but must be principled."

Cde Mkwana, who is also member of the PAC Central Committee's Military Commission, said the unity being sought by the PAC had to be based on the following minimum of basic principles:

- That apartheid cannot be reformed but must be destroyed;
- That the vehicle for change cannot be the settler minority regime and its allies but the dispossessed indigenous African majority;
- That all forms of struggle are important but armed struggle is the principal form;
- That while sanctions and other external pressures against the regime must be encouraged, the factor is the internal principal; and
- That the East-West conflict must be kept out of the Azanian liberation struggle.

"The PAC will never be party to any form of unity that is not based on these principles," said Cde Mkwana.

Cde Ebrahim, who gave two interviews, one of them to *City Press*, told the Johannesburg newspaper that the question of unity between the PAC and the ANC was expected to be on the agenda of an OAU liberation committee meeting in Tripoli, Libya, with Nigeria set to formally call for the revival of the OAU ad-hoc committee on unity between the two liberation movements.

The ad-hoc committee, said Cde Ebrahim, would come up with areas where there are no differences between the two organisations and cite these as the foundation upon which unity could be achieved.

The PAC foreign affairs secretary, who reaffirmed the five unity principles outlined by Cde Mkwana, referred to OAU sources which said African countries, who had been strongly advocating unity, had noted the positive response of the PAC to all the unity calls.

Meanwhile, the ANC has said it is not aware of the OAU's intentions regarding the issue of unity.

A "senior ANC spokesman" was quoted by the *Sowetan*

(December 17 1988) as saying:

"There is no way in which the OAU can impose a solution on people who are independent forces."

The ANC spokesman, who was not named by the newspaper, referred to what he or she called "the OAU record and experience" in its efforts to bring about peace in Chad and other troubled parts of Africa and said "I even doubt that the OAU would like to set up any committee on the (unity) issue"

In an article entitled "Will the Gap Be Bridged?" by *Sowetan* reporter Mathatha Tsedu, the ANC spokesman reportedly cited ANC talks with South African rugby Chief Danie Craven, soccer boss Kaizer Motaung and other individuals and groups, saying this was part of ANC "efforts" to bring about unity against Pretoria.

The spokesman ruled out any possible unity with the PAC until the PAC did what he or she called "something substantial" against the regime. There was no indication as to what was meant by "something substantial"

As the ANC continues to resist all OAU attempts to help bring about unity and as it awaits "something substantial" from the PAC, the voice of unity is becoming louder and louder from people and groups inside and outside South Africa.

While a few divisive elements and groups continue laying stress on the political differences among the forces fighting Pretoria, a rapidly growing number of patriotic individuals and organisations maintain that the road to unity may not be an easy one, but there is no justification for not taking it.

And the PAC apparently shares the latter view because, as the PAC foreign affairs secretary puts it, unity against Pretoria is now more important than it has ever been



Cde Gora Ebrahim

before.

Citing the PAC's minimum of basic principles upon which unity should be based, Cde Ebrahim said: "We are not putting these as preconditions, but as a working paper for unity."

He said this in another interview this time with the *Sowetan* reporter, Mathatha Tsedu, who spent two weeks in Harare and spoke to officials of the PAC, the ANC and the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA).



'The PAC has had no problem regarding the issue of unity'



PAC Military Commission member Cde Joe Mkwanazi speaks at the PAC's Iringa III Plenary Session in a hall at a PAC camp outside the Tanzanian city of Iringa.

APLA guerillas are praised as PAC leaders meet in the bush

THE PAC Central Committee ended its four-day Plenary Session with a special praise for militants of the Azanian People's Liberation Army, (APLA), for their resounding successes in battles with the South African security forces.

"The plenary commended the militants of the Azanian People's Liberation Army for intensifying the liberation war," said a communique issued at the end of the Central Committee meeting held in the bush near the Tanzanian town of Iringa, which lies several hundreds of kilometres from the capital, Dar Es Salaam.

The Plenary Session was the third consecutive PAC conference to be held outside that city, making the PAC the only liberation movement to hold its top leadership meetings in the bush.

Addressing the delegates, who included all but one of the PAC chief representatives around the world, APLA Commander-in-Chief Cde Johnson Mlambo said the Plenary Session was being held at a time when the racist regime was facing increased resistance inside South Africa and had suffered ignominious military defeats in Angola.

*From Priscilla Sherren,
who covered the PAC's
CC plenary conference*

"Internally, the regime, its security forces and the liberal Press have been compelled to acknowledge the nationwide presence and growing support of the PAC," said Cde Mlambo.

The Plenary Session analysed the internal and international situations and reaffirmed the leadership's resolve to maintain unity within the PAC and the Azanian masses, and to step up the liberation struggle on all fronts, especially the military.

It resolved to strengthen the firm bonds and contacts between the PAC and mass organisations inside Azania, expand the organisation's internal

presence, and consolidate its internal structures, while at the same time increasing international recognition and support for its political line.

The Iringa Communique III said the Plenary

Session also commended the Azanian-trade union movement, the youth and women's organisations and the patriotic clergy for their respective roles in the struggle to overthrow the white settler-colonial minority rule in occupied Azania.

Tanzania backs PAC war stand

By Priscilla Sherren

THE PAC's longstanding and resolute stand against any form of negotiations with Pretoria received support from Tanzania recently when a senior government official in that country opened a top PAC meeting with a call for the maintenance of armed struggle as the main form of fighting the racist settler colonial regime.

"Everywhere we went we were greeted by young revolutionaries. Their demand was not a conference table but guns," said Cde Malecela, a member of the Eminent Persons Group, (EPG), which visited South Africa in 1987 in search of a peaceful settlement to that country's political problems.

Opening a four day PAC Central Committee Plenary Session near the Tanzanian town of Iringa, Cde Malecela said: "While all other avenues for peaceful change are being explored, the armed struggle, being the principle method of fighting, must be intensified."

The PAC's choice of security force targets in its war against Pretoria also received backing when Cde Malecela said: "On the battlefield, the fighters must choose those strategic targets that will continue to weaken the state machinery."

"On behalf of my party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, the government and people of Tanzania, I hereby pledge continued support and solidarity with the PAC and all other genuine organisations in South Africa," said Cde Malecela, Tanzania's Iringa Regional Commissioner and therefore the highest government representative in that region of this East African country.

"Africa in general, and the Frontline States in particular decided long ago to sacrifice the little they have in order to destroy apartheid, and that commitment still stands valid today."



Commander-in-Chief Cde Mlambo bidding Cde Malecela farewell.



Cde Mlambo (in beret), Military Commission members Cde Joe Mkwanazi (in glasses) and (on his left), Cde Sabelo Phama as well as other PAC officials and cadres awaiting the arrival of Cde Malecela for the PAC Plenary Session in a bush just outside the Tanzanian city of Iringa.



The APLA Commander-in-Chief Cde Johnson Mlambo, Military Commission member and Administrative Secretary Cde Joe Mkwana and their aides on the move during a short break from the plenary session.



FIVE of the PAC war veterans who were present at the conference were (from left) Cde Joe Mkwana, Cde Elliot Mfana, Cde Mfanasekhaya Gqobose, Cde Lawrence Mgweba and Cde Bojana Jordan

PICTORIAL COMBAT

'Internally, the regime, its security forces and the liberal Press have been compelled to acknowledge the nationwide presence of and growing support for the PAC'
Commander-in-Chief Cde Johnson Mlambo

All conference pictures by Combat Chief Photographer Lerato Mokoena



The Secretary for Defence, Cde Sabelo Phama, having a chat with the secretary for Foreign Affairs, Cde Gora Ebrahim.

'God is not against violence for peace' says PAC officer

By Priscilla Sherren

GOD is not against violence if that violence is for the cause of peace and justice, a PAC Foreign Affairs assistant director, Cde Waters Toboti, said in Harare recently.

Cde Toboti, the then outgoing PAC Chief Representative to Zimbabwe, was speaking at a reception hosted by the Lutheran World Federation's branch in the Zimbabwean capital to bid him farewell.

Cde Toboti, a churchman-cum-politician, told the guests: "People have got to be free. This is what the holy bible preaches. Those who oppress their fellowmen, and such oppressors include the Pretoria regime, must and will be removed from power through force."

He added: "God is not against violence if that violence is for the cause of peace and justice, and God does not want cowards."

Cde Toboti, otherwise known as "bishop", said: "There is no room for cowards in the kingdom of heaven. This should be clear to all bishops, reverends and other church people in our country."

Cde Toboti, now a PAC foreign affairs assistant director whose responsibilities include co-ordination of church activities, paid tribute to the Lutherans for their active role in the Azanian freedom struggle.

"Luthern ministers and bishops have for a long time been among those who have been victimised by the racist regime for refusing to bow to apartheid," he said.

"They are among those who have signed the **Kairos Document** where members of many other churches have refused to do so on the pretext that God is the God of peace not of violence."

The truth, however, was that such people were burying their heads in the sand, completely overlooking that apartheid was in essence violence itself which could only be stopped by violent means, said Cde Toboti.

**One Settler!
One Bullet!**

PAC WOMEN'S FILE

40 years of struggle



Cde Nomvo Booi

And it's Aluta Continua for PAC's Nomvo Booi, a former POQO fighter

"My children have already suffered a great deal and my people continue to suffer. For this reason, I have never asked myself whether or not to go on with the struggle. You just have to go on and on" — Cde Nomvo Booi, member of the PAC Central Committee and one-time member of POQO (now called the Azanian People's Liberation Army).

Cde Nomvo Booi, the PAC Secretary for Social Welfare, joined the struggle to liberate Azania at an early age when she became a member of the African National Congress Youth League.

By Willie Mazambane

Her political career spans almost 40 years.

"As a member of the ANC Youth League, which formed the foundation of the PAC, I took part in the Defiance Campaign in 1952 and was closely involved in the founding of the PAC," she told a member of the leading Dutch solidarity group, *Azania Committee*, in an interview.

With the formation of the PAC on April 6 1959, Cde Booi became a district secretary and played a leading role in the PAC's *Decisive Positive Action Campaign Against the Pass Laws* some 11 months later.

The campaign led to the Sharpeville Massacre, the banning of the PAC and the ANC, the declaration of a state of emergency and the arrest of PAC founding president Cde Mangaliso Sobukwe and other PAC leaders, including Cde Booi.


On her release after four months in prison, Cde Booi went underground and worked for POQO, the early PAC guerilla army now called APLA.

Cde Booi, then a PAC regional secretary, was in 1962 arrested and put in prison for 90 days without trial and, worse still, without her family knowing where she was.

Her 90-day detention term was renewed on two occasions, making it 270 days without trial, before she was kept in solitary confinement and under constant interrogation for about a year.

She was then tried, convicted under the notorious Suppression of Communism Act and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. On her release after serving the term at the end of 1968, she was banned and restricted to a remote area outside Willowvale in Transkei.

She remained under restriction until 1982 when she secretly left Racist South Africa (RSA) for Lesotho before proceeding to London and then to the PAC external headquarters after briefly working as a senior officer with a women's group in Zimbabwe.



"Everything in your life has been a struggle, years of prison, years of banning and years of persecution. What gives you the power and will to continue?" asked the *Azania Committee* member in the interview conducted while Cde Booi was on a short visit to London.

"How could I stop?" she replied. "You just have to go on and on . . .".

Cde Booi, a veteran politician, one-time APLA combatant and hardened fighter, continues playing a leading role in the Azanian liberation struggle, which has characterised her life since her girlhood.

No doubt, with 40 years of determined fight behind her, she symbolises a prototype woman of resistance in this protracted struggle to liberate beloved Azania from white settler minority rule and the realisation of the right of the Azanian masses to self-determination.

Western countries are secret participants in SA's terror


DESPITE its claims to the contrary, Britain is still collaborating militarily with the Pretoria regime and this collusion has had a bearing on South Africa's acts of aggression and destabilisation of its neighbours.

For instance, Britain together with France, who had openly supplied Pretoria with modern weaponry before the imposition of the arms embargo against South Africa, have not yet disclosed the quantities of spares they had shipped to the regime.

A very good example is the **Buccaneer** fighter-bomber, which had been used on at least one raid on Mozambique. It is only Britain and South Africa who flew this plane, and therefore any spares to which Pretoria had access must surely have come from Britain.

If an order for the spares was not from the Royal Navy then, whatever the name in which the order was, the spares were destined for South Africa.

While Pretoria does have a reasonably sophisticated industrial base, it does not have the capacity to make certain key components for its



Mr Abdul Minty

By Features Editor
Sol Dumezweni

Mirage and Buccaneer aircraft fleet.

Atlas Aircraft Corporation, the manufacturer of the simpler **Impala** jet, based on an Italian licensed plane, is having problems with the engine of the plane at present. So spares were either bought in vast bulk before the embargo or are secretly being sold to South Africa.

The French and Israeli Link

There also seems to be a connection with Zionist Israel. For instance, South Africa has been upgrading its **Mirage III** planes, and the rebuild seemed to be almost completely based on Israel's **Kfir** plane, an Israeli improvement of the **Mirage III** design.

Israel imported American engines for its **Kfir** but could not pass these on and so South Africa continued using the French **Snecma** engines.

But what is worrying is that Pretoria, with the help of Israel, may be trying to make these engines. And recent reports of Chilean **Mirages**, with French engines being upgraded by the Israelis, opened the possibility of South African involvement on the engine side.

This possibility comes against the background of reports that when the Israelis cancelled their **Lavi** fighter, several top Israeli aircraft designers went to South Africa.

There has also been Israeli involvement with the supply of patrol boats. South Africa is now making identical models as well as of ship to ship missiles, which South African experts have managed to duplicate.

While the regime is short of manpower, capital and equipment for mass production of many weapons, it is managing to acquire at least the manpower and equipment.

Some of the equipment is being sold to the Pretoria regime quite openly because it is of civilian



Buccaneer bombers . . . SA has used similar planes in Mozambique

type. For instance, the machine used in making bulldozer gears is also used to make tank parts.

The Italian Link

There have also been licensing arrangements before the imposition of the embargo.

For instance, South Africa is still making the **Impala** jet, which is an Italian plane. When the Italians were questioned about this, they claimed that cancelling the licence would solve nothing because South Africa would simply stop forwarding royalties but keep on making the plane.

This, of course, is nonsense because withdrawal of such a licence would put pressure on Pretoria, due to the fact that a licence giver could initiate retaliatory action if South Africa were to refuse to discontinue the manufacture.

The French, for their part, had allowed South Africa to make **Mirage FII** planes but no one knows the terms of the licence under which Pretoria is making such planes. Only the French know, but are just not prepared to talk.

The West German Link

Another trouble area is the export of civilian or non-military versions of para-military equipment.

One example here has been the export of West German helicopters as recently as 1985 and 1986. Apparently, none of these 'copters needed a licence because they were non-military versions.

However, conversion of the helicopters to military versions was well within South Africa's capabilities, requiring basically just the bolting of weapon systems.

The United States and Canadian Link

While exports of weapons to South Africa are banned, imports of the regime's weaponry are not. Any ban on such imports is purely voluntary, which is something odd because one cannot strengthen a mandatory ban with a voluntary restraint.

South Africa, for instance, claims exports of 3 billion rands a year, a useful source of scarce export earnings and an important aid in offsetting weapon development costs.

Apart from the controversy surrounding imports of South African-made weaponry, there have been deliberate illegal breaches of the embargo.

For instance, technology from Canada, smuggled through the United States, which has enabled Pretoria to produce the **G5** and **G6** artillery, has probably been the most devastating to the embargo.

For without this long range (up to 40km) and highly accurate artillery, it is doubtful whether the South Africans could have scored any successes in its invasion of Angola, particularly in Cuito Cuanavale in the period immediately preceding the ceasefire accord.

Arms still finding way to SA as West breaches UN embargo

From Combat Features
Editor Sol Dumezweni

TWELVE years after the imposition of mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, the Pretoria regime is still getting spares for its weapons of terror and is still managing to get military equipment and technology from several Western powers.

Along with deliberate breaches of the embargo by some of these countries, there are also different interpretations of what exactly is banned by the 1977 United Nations Security Council resolution which effected the embargo.

Undoubtedly, the embargo has had its successes to some extent. For instance, South Africa has been unable to obtain the latest fighter tanks and planes and this has had a significant bearing on its ignominious defeat in Angola after losing air superiority and ground firepower.

However, says the director of the **World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa**, Mr Abdul Minty, there have been numerous deliberate breaches of the embargo, with vast amounts of material and equipment still finding their way into South Africa secretly and very illegally.

Azania Combat learnt from Mr Minty recently that one problem which opened loopholes was that each country drew up its own embargo regulations and these varied widely from one country to another.

Pretoria, says Mr Minty, has been able to fully exploit these variations or differences in the way the regulations have been drawn up.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) member states, for example, had a certain system principally designed to stop the export of arms and military technology to given countries but had their own variations.

There were basically two categories, the first being that of prohibited items, whose monitoring was no problem, and the second being items requiring licencing, which were a headache in that licences were handled secretly for reasons of commercial confidentiality.

It also appeared that no licence was needed in the export of military items from one Nato country to another, something which allowed Pretoria to exploit the weaker links in the chain.

Mr Minty's Campaign, for example, recently exposed a bid to export a complete target-tracking system to South Africa, although Pretoria had still managed to import one of the system's units.

South Africa had ordered an electro-optical from **Messerschmitt Boelkow Blohm (MBB)** and **British Aerospace (BAe)**, who are manufacturers of the systems. BAe supplied its part to MBB and claimed, when this was exposed, that it assumed MBB was not selling it to South Africa.

In an attempt to be clever, MBB claimed it had been given a licence because the South Africans wanted the system "to track weather satellites" when in fact the system which had been ordered would have been for missiles.

Despite the exposure, however, the first of the three tracking system units was sent to South Africa, but the licence was withdrawn before the other two units were exported. This came in the wake of pressure which had been brought to bear upon Britain and West Germany by leading figures in the two countries.

For the system to work, all three units are needed, And now Mr Minty's campaign wants the third until recalled from South Africa.

The **World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa** is now looking at several possible solutions in an effort to close the existing loophole, which the growing trend of multinational European collaboration with South Africa could only enlarge.

One such solution, says Mr Minty, would be a simple clause in all component contracts stating that neither the final weapon nor its parts could be exported to South Africa.

This would at least discourage one partner from trying to export to South Africa any military material supplied by the other.

SA military dominate the scene as politicians take to back-stage

THE TRANSKEI CASE

By Son Nyama

AS the Azania People's Liberation Army combatants are hammering their way to emphasise their presence on the battlefield, and as the Pan Africanist Congress establishes itself effectively at the controls of the revolutionary machinery, P.W. Botha or F.W. de Klerk and their political lieutenants at the command post of the racist fort are losing control of the situation in South Africa.

While sweating nervously on the hot seat of power, dangling a juicy carrot to bribe their reactionary allies in Africa and impressing their imperialist masters in the West, Botha or De Klerk find themselves trapped in the booby traps of their own design and making.

The bantustans, in general, and the apartheid showpiece, Transkei, in particular, are giving the oppressor Nationalist regime nightmares, contrary to the purpose for which they were carefully designed and established.

Not that the puppet leadership in the bantustans is miraculously becoming revolutionary. On the contrary, the heightening of revolutionary attitudes of the African masses, backed up by APLA forces, is resulting in complicated conditions of service for these puppets.

In the Transkei bantustan, it all started with the exposure of the filthy linen of corruption and the ousting of the faithful-to-the-master Matanzima Dynasty by its own puppet army, the Transkei Defence Force (which of course is an extension of the SADF).

The failure, contrary to expectations, of the Botha regime to interfere in favour of its loyal servant, despite repeated pleas for help, may be attributed mainly to the ascendance of the racist military over the Pretoria political set up.

The hounding of the Matanzimas out of power by their military dogs came at the height of the power struggle between the racist regime's politicians and the military over approach to the Angolan and Mozambican situations.

Over and above the differences over external relations, the crisis inside the country deepened the crisis within the regime.

The leaders of the 86-day Stella Sigcawu administration flew to Cape Town and, with caps in hand, pleaded with the racists to reinstall them with military force after they had been overthrown.

The South African politicians showed some sympathy whilst the members of the military were uncompromisingly hostile.

No wonder that what was planned to be a very secret plot had its details landing in the hands of the Transkei military rulers within 36 hours and consequently landed the delegation of plotters in trouble on arrival at the airport back home.

For all intents and purposes, the case of the Transkei "coup" convincingly supports the view that Botha and his Nationalist Party leaders are being held at ransom by the racist military.

With the PAC establishing itself within the African society and gaining respect at the international level, and with APLA combatants effectively and efficiently hitting the enemy, one need not be a professional political observer in order to see the oppressors increasingly rallying behind the so-called extreme rightwing white organisations, the CPs, the AWBs, the Witwolves and others.

Similarly one need not be an intellectual political analyst to find out the reason why.

Within the SADF, the so-called extremists are gaining and enjoying more confidence commensurate with the increasing support they enjoy in the white society. The walls of the white laager are growing higher each day and Botha or De Klerk may find themselves and their associates in the cold outside the laager.

SA now under military rule

IN a total strategy to defend white minority rule in the face of continually increasing African resistance, the Pretoria regime is intensifying its build-up of military forces and its establishment of tighter military control over the settler-colonial state itself.

During the 1970s, white South Africa underwent a process of militarisation, in which attitudes and outlooks within the white minority were transformed, authority structures re-organised and all available human and material resources mobilised in defence of white supremacy.

The 1980s have seen further progression towards an overtly offensive stance on the part of the Pretoria regime against not only the African majority in South Africa itself, but the people of Namibia and the neighbouring independent states.

The regime is building up conventional military formations, including a nuclear capability, the need for which can only be explained in terms of the regime's commitment to a regional war of aggression.

Resources

This strategy of military expansionism, both inside and outside South Africa, has required the settler-colonial and racist state to channel massive human and material resources into its terrorist war machine.

And to implement the regime's repressive and aggressive directives, the South African Defence Force and other arms of the South African security forces must be capable of controlling mass popular action in the cities and townships while maintaining and strengthening an efficient military and security infrastructure in the countryside.

They must be trained and equipped to sustain South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia or, if the territory gets independence, be ready and able to implement Pretoria's systematic programme of destabilisation against it and other independent neighbouring states.

To achieve these, the regime requires a highly specialised, sophisticated, efficient, well equipped and technologically advanced military and security apparatus, which has to include a highly trained and well equipped police force.

During the 1970s, the South African Police (SAP) was transformed into a force which functions, to all intents and purposes, as an arm of the SADF. Most of the SAP's energies are today directed towards containing the rising level of the Azanian liberation

**By Combat Editor
Willie Mazambane**

struggle.

It is against this backdrop that the Azanian People's Liberation Army's Commander-in-Chief, Cde Johnson Mlambo, ordered APLA fighters to direct their main blow at the racist soldiers and police, who are one and the same thing in all material respects.

It is for this reason that scores of the South African armed forces have collapsed to the shattering sound and deadly bullets of the Scorpion, the AK-47 and Sten guns operated by the ever efficient APLA combatants.

In fact, most of the victims of what has now been dubbed APLA's "grenade warfare" have been members of the South African armed forces.

The modern South African police force is built around two pillars of political repression — the intelligence and "riot control".

Police

The police force is made up of the "uniformed branch", which forms 80 percent of the entire force, and the "detective branch", which includes the security branch.

Apart from the SAP, there are various other specialised police forces, who include the administrative board police (a kind of municipal police whose prime function was the enforcement of what used to be the pass laws).

In the same specialised police category, there is also the railways and harbour police, traffic police and various bantustan police forces trained by and integrated with the SAP.

Counter-guerrilla

A large section of the uniformed police within the SAP has been organised into para-military units and deployed in all potential and actual "trouble spots", which now include roadblocks.

These units often join hands with the SADF in

(Continued on Page 24 ...)

'Peace' costing SADF more

SOUTH AFRICA's long embroilment in the war in Namibia and Angola appears to be coming to an end and one would naturally expect a significant reduction in Pretoria's military spending. However, the opposite seems to be true.

This year's R8,6 billion defence budget — up R1,7 billion on last year's budget — and the R460 million additional allocation to last year's defence spending, clearly shows this.

Although it has not yet been officially disclosed, independent military experts and analysts have roughly estimated that Pretoria spent R1 million a day in its war in Namibia and Angola.

And yet this amount is only a drop in the ocean of extra money which the South African Defence Force demands to keep itself ready to counter the intensified campaigns of the Azanian People's Liberation Army, other guerilla forces and the African masses in general.

And the SADF explains that the cost of the adventures in Namibia and Angola have in any case been "marginal" compared to the basic costs incurred anyway in maintaining the racists' defence force in the face of mounting challenge by the liberation forces.

To maintain combat readiness to counter threats against the hated Pretoria regime, national service is not to be reduced, as the South African defence minister, General Magnus Malan, has pointed out.

That the peace in Namibia and Angola is going to cost more than the war first became apparent when the SADF asked for an extra R460 million in its additional budget recently in order to balance its books for last year.

This was confirmed recently when the SADF presented its R8,6 billion main budget for the 1989/90 period representing a hefty 20 percent rise over last year's defence budget.

Although the SADF has said that this included the allowance for salary hikes, the increase over last year's actual expenditure was only 13,7 percent — far less than the 20 percent this year.

What is quite clear, however, is that despite the apparent end to South Africa's war in Namibia and Angola, more money is going to Pretoria's military machine.

It is said that an additional budget of about R17 million was the estimated direct cost of the actual implementation of United Nations Resolution 435 during the present book year.

About R130 million was expected to cover the cost

**By Combat Editor
Willie Mazambane**

of physically withdrawing troops from Angola and Namibia and accommodating them in South Africa, the total cost of which would eventually rise to between R150 million and R200 million, if costs to be incurred in the 1989/90 budget were included.

But most of the additional budget — about R345 million — was because of the "changed strategic situation in the region arising from the withdrawal from Angola", says a defence memorandum to the budget.

"This resulted in the SADF having to review its planning and make certain adjustments to its force structure," the memorandum said.

Military financial experts' explanation of such adjustments is to the effect that while South Africa was fighting well inside Angola, the front-line was far from bases in Namibia which were well beyond the reach of the Angolan forces' conventional weaponry, including the Mig-23 aircraft.

This made it possible for South Africa to defend such bases lightly and cheaply.

However, when the South African forces pulled back to Namibian bases in the face of mounting onslaught by the Angolan forces in August last year, these bases came within the range of Angola's conventional attacks.

The defence of these bases had to be beefed up and the production of certain conventional weapons such as the Rooikat armoured vehicle had to be accelerated.

In this year's R8,6 billion defence budget, the costs of implementing the Namibia peace plan are reflected, but it is clear that the bulk of the increase will go to developing, producing and buying new weapons.

And this time the SADF gives no strategic motive, but explains in the memorandum attached to the budget that the main increase is due to the need to "finance its long-postponed modernisation and re-equipment programmes".

"Neither the threat nor the necessity to replace obsolete weapons systems has disappeared, while the arms embargo is still in force," it is said, adding that the SADF now had to enter into "long-term commitments" to meet the challenges of the 1990s.

QUOTABLE QUOTES

From Uncle Zeph's mouth

"... And then they (the prison officers) said to me: 'No, Zeph, you are being freed and it's unconditional'. My response to that was: 'Well, if my release is unconditional, I thank you, gentlemen, and I accept'."

"My first task, which I am going to do everything in my power to discharge, is to unite the African people. I am committed to that unity and I am going to devote all my time and effort in seeing to it that the task is fulfilled."

"Every inch of the Azanian soil, the whole 100 percent of it, belongs to the Azanian people."

"Until the white people stop seeing themselves as 'whites' and begin owing their only loyalty to Africa, and until they accept a democratic society governed by an African majority, they will remain colonialists in Azania."

"We surely have paid a high price for our beliefs. We must now get our freedom, which I know will not be offered on a golden platter. We have to be united and fight bitterly for it."

"We will not negotiate for now because we do not want a Muzorewa type of government."

"We need to respond to the clarion call by (late PAC founding president) Robert Sobukwe in the 1960s that we must be alert, vigilant and decipher the writing on the wall."

"I must thank the people of Azania, who two years ago, elected me as President of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, an organisation I love most."

"The confusion is created by people who do not like us. They create their own monster and then they destroy that monster. They don't destroy the PAC."

"... In the first place the PAC is banned. But you can't ban all the people who are members of the PAC because they are very many and are in the majority all the time."

"The Organisation of African Unity has continued to make its mark in Africa. It has continued to call for unity between the PAC and the ANC."

Uyibhubesi (You are a Lion)



"UNCLE ZEPH"
President
of the
PAC

Latin America accords signal route to peace in Nicaragua

FOR the past eight years, Nicaragua has had to protect its hard-won independence from imperialist destabilisation carried out through the American-backed Contra bandits. As a result of this destabilisation, Nicaraguans have for the past eight years known no peace.

If the peace accords agreed upon by the presidents of the Central American states are smoothly implemented, however, the Contra bandits will be deprived of rear bases.

From the Southern African experience, it is well known that bandit forces such as the MNR and UNITA are led by opportunists who are no more than the puppets of counter-revolutionary forces such as the apartheid regime.

Without a rear base, these bandit forces which murder and terrorise the freedom-loving people of the Frontline States, sabotaging their economies wherever possible, cannot hope to survive.

These puppets have proven that they enjoy no popular support whatsoever, and survive not only from plundering and enslaving the very people they claim to be liberating, but also from foreign finance.

This finance comes either directly from Racist South Africa or is channelled through Racist South Africa by certain other countries.

The similarities between the destabilisation in independent Southern African states and that in Nicaragua are very striking.

Racist South Africa cannot allow the development and survival of progressive Southern African states because it believes that these states will "export" revolution to South Africa.

But South Africa does not seem to realise that its own

From Peter Domingos in Managua

oppressive and exploitative policies are the very causes of contradictions which give rise to the revolutionary struggle.

Nicaragua finds itself in a situation similar to that of the Frontline States.

The country is situated close to the world's most powerful and reactionary imperialist state, the USA, and an area which is of great importance to United States trade routes. This area is tense with revolutionary activity, as seen in El Salvador where the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front is fighting against the reactionary Duarte regime.

As a result of this, the Nicaraguan revolution has always been threatened by a foreign-backed destabilising bandit force.

This bandit force, like the bandit forces in Southern Africa, is equipped with modern weapons which it uses to plunder and rob, murder and maim the very population it claims to be freeing.

The decision by the Central American presidents to revitalise the peace process in Central America is ceasing to provide the Contra bandits with rear-bases — such as the base provided by Nicaragua neighbour Honduras — may, for the first time, give Nicaragua the opportunity to realise its potential in socialist development.

(... From page 20)

counter-guerilla operations both in the urban areas and the countryside, particularly in border zones.

Only when there are lulls in the African resistance are these police forces returned to crime prevention, but nowadays such lulls are very scarce, if there are any at all.

The security branch is in reality what could be described as the political police force, whose duty is mainly to identify and act against organisations and individuals seen to be a "threat to the security of the State".

The branch exercises the powers of arrest, detention and interrogation mainly in terms of the Internal Security Act and other security-related laws of South Africa. And most reported cases of brutal torture of detainees have been carried out by members of this branch.

All members of the South African police force are trained for counter-insurgency operations and this training is almost identical to that being given to the infantry units of the South African army.

Weapons

The weapons, equipment and uniforms used by the police force members involved in "riot control" operations and in roadblocks as well as in counter-insurgency operations clearly show the para-military nature of this force.

There is therefore no doubt whatsoever that the Pretoria regime has gone a long way in militarising the South African society, with almost every administrative structure having gone military and directed by the hidden hand of the generals.

This however is not assisting Pretoria in any way in its bid to contain guerilla activity and mass resistance by the Africans.