ࡱ>  ϓbjbj :2 1118il$1FnHA"ccc)v)$*EFGFGFGFGFGFGF$4HJdkF/*#)#)^/*/*kFcc F.../*ccEF./*EF..:_4,4c 2q1*4 1FF0F4 :K**:K44:KA8 /*/*./*/*/*/*/*kFkF),/*/*/*F/*/*/*/*:K/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/*/* : How we made the fatal mistake of not talking to Hamas Baron Frankal Its March 2002. The Saudis, a new and potentially powerful player on the Israel-Palestine diplomatic scene, launch an Arab peace initiative. Europe, having succeeded in defusing a nasty confrontation when Israel besieged Bethlehems Church of the Nativity, is moderately hopeful that the Saudi initiative will strengthen, the EU-inspired Road Map to an Israel-Palestine solution brokered by the Quartet the US, together with the EU, Russia and the UN. However, the Iraqi storm clouds are gathering, and UK Prime-Minister Blair is already preparing for the possibility that the US may go to war there. His top strategic priority is to stop any such action splitting Europe and the US. His message to the White House is simple: the sine qua non of a broad global coalition that would accept US action in Iraq is progress on the Israel-Palestine front. Weeks later, and without any consultation whatsoever of the G8 partners that were just about to meet in Canada, US President Bush suddenly declared that Yasser Arafat - the Palestinian leader with whom the Road Map, the Saudi initiative and the Oslo Accords were developed - was heading a Palestinian leadership tainted by terror, and that the free world could no longer do business with him. This article is not about how that made in Jerusalem view trumped the policy that virtually the entirety of the rest of the world wanted the US to pursue. Nor is it about how that change of policy stymied any prospects for resolution of the Israel-Palestine Conflict until today. This article is about Europe and America, and how the fierce closeness of their relationship after the Second World War had given way by the mid-90s to wary ordinariness, as underlying goals became distinct, and the senior US partner showed itself highly unwilling to recognise that a Europe coming of age might have its own views. On no issue was and is truer than the Conflict, making it perhaps the best prism through which to view the contemporary state of the relationship between the two powers within whose spheres, it is not much of an exaggeration to say, the fate of the world in our generation will be largely determined. Europe emerges from its decades-long slumber... Whilst China makes all the headlines, Europe is still, by far, the worlds largest exporter, accounting for a quarter of worlds GDP, and its currency, the euro, is in every way second only to the formerly-mighty dollar. Similarly, European regulation has proven its globetrotting potential by blocking the mega-merger of two of Americas largest firms, GEC and Honeywell, even after the merger was accepted in Washington. Europe is feeling its way towards defining a collective understanding of, and future for, itself beyond an economic single space. Europe here means the European Union, which is made up of 27 Member States, including Britain (the UK), France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Whilst not a single country, the EU is no mere international organisation. Its members have pooled large areas of their sovereignty to such a degree that in many ways (like a common driving licence) they have less powers at national level than US states. Talk of a European state remains alien to most European citizens, who, although they increasingly consider themselves also European, primarily relate to their nation state (e.g. Spain), with its own language, Parliament, government, laws and courts. But the reality is complex: many regions may have such things, like the Scottish Parliament and the Catalan language. The EU meanwhile has a quasi-government (the European Commission), a directly-elected Parliament, the worlds largest single market, laws in abundance and, crucially, a powerful court system to enforce them. European law is a full and superior part of every Member States national law. Like the US Supreme Court, the rulings of the European Court in Luxembourg trump any decision by any national body. Most of Europe has no borders (Schengen) and a single central bank, like the Federal Reserve, which sets a single monetary policy (the euro area). The EU is the worlds brand leader in post-national cross-border integration, with Africa, Asia, the Gulf and South America all consciously trying to learn from Europes failures and successes, most notably that France and Germanys bitter enmity of just sixty years ago has been replaced by open borders and a common currency. ...not entirely to Americas satisfaction Until recently, this European development chimed perfectly with the US desire for a continent whole and free, meaning the inclusion of the central and eastern European countries previously trapped behind the iron curtain. Now this has happened: the EU looks out across the Mediterranean to Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Egypt, and its east borders Russia and Ukraine. From the EUs Cypriot border a small boat takes you to Syria, Lebanon and Israel. However, while the US consistently encouraged the widening and the deepening of Europe, it consistently underestimated the geo-political implications of that integration. Today, the US and Europe have  HYPERLINK "http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1513" increasingly different underlying views about the region, especially Turkey. US impatience for Turkey to join the club collides with European fears of overstretching the EUs integration elastic and elicits barbs about how the US would feel if Brussels said loudly that Mexico should become the 51st US state. A key track, albeit a slow one, of European integration is the EUs Common Foreign and Security Policy, including defence operations. However, Europes abject failure to formulate a common policy on Iraq typified the problem that unlike smaller Member States, which generally only have regional or border policies, the bigs have perceived political interests around the world and glittering embassies and other historical baggage to match. They are not ready for foreign policy by committee. Yet it is clear that although the UK, France, Germany and Italy still punch above their weight in international fora such as the UN and the G7, their influence is visibly declining. Behind the scenes, the EUs foreign policy machinery is working well, and its reach is steadily expanding. Javier Solana, the EUs putative foreign minister, has held the line on Iran not just in Europe, but has visited Tehran with a mandate from the whole group of six, meaning the EU [UK, Germany, France], Russia, China and absolutely unprecedented - the US. The EUs latest (Lisbon) Treaty sets up a phase of significant development, bringing into being a new high-profile President to represent the EU to the world, a new overarching EU diplomatic service, and a new foreign minister. Henry Kissinger famously asked who he should call when he wanted to talk to Europe. He now has an answer. The end of the post-war liberal international consensus Back in June 2007, when sub-prime was just a cut of meat, I wrote that there is a stunning complacency in the US and Europe, that economic growth in an era of ever-increasing globalisation is boundless. The second half of that sentence was about similar complacency that this is an era of manageable small wars, in which global conflict is unthinkable. Both of these fallacies are drawn from a western generation born in the hopefulness of the baby boom, rather than the millions of corpses of WW2, and weaned on prosperity that, for most, has risen faster, for longer, than any time in human history. Its foundations are todays international architecture, meaning the UN, the Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the IMF/World Bank, NATO, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the G7/G8 and the acronyms go on. There was European help, but this is a world built by the US and based on common visions and future aspirations. That world is breaking down. The reticence of its creator to act through the UN Security Council, and the failure to allow others to be fully represented there, undermines its legitimacy. India and Israels accepted nuclear weapons do the same for the NPT, and provide justification for Pakistan, Iran and North Korea to go nuclear, while Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Japan, Taiwan, South Africa and Australia make mass nuclear breakout within a decade a dramatically realistic scenario. The IMF, World Bank and G7/G8 continue their pursuit of obscurity by showing a remarkable inability to accept the need to share international economic sovereignty with the new Asian powers and others, an ineptitude that led to the collapse of the WTOs Doha Round, possibly the last chance to bind in the new economic powers to the worlds current set of post-war trading rules. The fact that new global players, massive competition for the worlds depleting energy stocks and rising religious fundamentalism threaten to make the established world order obsolete should not be surprising. However, the fact that the chaos that is inexorably becoming more omnipresent in our lives is being speeded up by the two pillars of that establishment world order certainly is. US Treasury Secretary Paulson engaging China, and Ethiopia invading Somalia are two small but highly-indicative examples of how arrogance, ignorance, short-termism and a lack of understanding of how fundamental the alliance is, on both sides of the Atlantic, has led to a nonchalant internalisation of the once-fanciful thought that Europeans are from Venus and Americans from Mars. Take a deep, deep breath, because Robert  HYPERLINK "http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3460246.html" Kagan has triumphed. It was Huntington, another neocon, who premonitiously cast the US as a lonely superpower back in 1999. In the bipolar world of the cold war, many welcomed the US as their protector against the other superpower. The events of 1989 produced a unipolar moment for the indispensable nation, with no significant other major powers, as epitomised by the first Gulf War. However, this quickly gave way to an era where the US was still hegemonistic enough to veto action by others, but could not itself succeed without others acquiescence. Sanctions, for example, work only when others support them, difficult for a hegemon, which prefers to act as it wishes, but cant. Its attempts to act in that way, which are ultimately doomed to failure, only antagonise the lesser, but significant, powers. Since 1999, US power has waned far more dramatically that Huntington expected, and that need for passive acquiescence has turned into a need for active support. Huntington pays Europe the ultimate compliment, Undoubtedly the single most important move towards an antihegemonic coalition [was] the formation of the European Union. Nor is the idea of balancing the superpower exclusively an American nightmare or French aspiration, Tony Blair, prime-minister of Europes most pro-American country said that a single-power world is inherently unstable. I mean, thats the rationale for Europe to unite. When we work together, the EU can stand on par as a superpower and a partner with the US. The shortlist of candidates for a long-term strategic alliance with the US is short indeed. Authoritarian and human-rights abusing arch-economic rivals China ? Hydrocarbon-inflated Russia, which has just exploded a thermo baric bombs it extols as four times more powerful than Americas ? Huntingtons conclusion should not be startling: cooperation with Europe is the prime antidote for the loneliness of American superpowerdom. However, alliance has a price. At the very least, a hearing and a taking into account of what Europe has to say. Bushs tin ear, not so much as consulting his closest European ally before announcing that the US would no longer talk to Yasser Arafat, was the clearest of messages that the US is not yet willing to pay that price. Israels attitude to Europe is very strange... Just over forty years ago, the Israeli cabinet held a serious discussion about applying to join the EU and even took the very first step, of starting negotiations over an association agreement. The utterly unimaginability of Israel today as part of the EU, with a corresponding lack of any strategic link to the US, tells us all we need to know about the evolution of Israel and Europes relationship in that time. However, if you take a large step back, and look at a map, the idea should not be surprising. The EU is Israels number one trading partner, with about 40% of Israeli imports coming from the EU and about 30% of Israeli exports directed to the EU, a tripling over trade in both directions over the last decade. Israel lies 160 miles from the EU compared to 8,000 from the US, and, in stark contrast to the countries between and surrounding them, share a great deal of cultural and social values, not least a commitment to democracy.. More than a third of its population has European roots (revealingly, there is a growing niche in new EU Member States, such as Lithuania and Hungary, of Israelis tracing back their family roots in order to apply for an EU passport). Given that Israels massive Sephardi immigration only took place in the 1950s and 60s, it is no exaggeration to say that Israel was initially built almost entirely by Europeans. This is as true for its physical structures as for its institutional and governmental ones: Tel Aviv is a world-class showcase of  HYPERLINK "http://www.interart.co.il/bauhaus/" Bauhaus, all built by a clutch of leading German architects. Israel plays its soccer, and most other sports, in European leagues, sings in the  HYPERLINK "http://www.eurovision.tv/index.php" Eurovision song contest and is a member of most European economic, political and cultural organisations. Over time, particularly with an end to the violence, there is a good likelihood that Israel and the EU will forge a much closer bond, providing a European anchor to Israel in return for Israel opening its borders with its neighbours. In Huntingtons seminal  HYPERLINK "http://www.harding.edu/USER/sbreezeel/WWW/202/readings/Huntington%20The%20Clash%20of%20Civilizations.pdf" Clash of Civilisations, the battles of history move first from being between nations to being between ideologies, and now to being between civilisations. In his kin-country syndrome, common communities share cultural features that distinguish them from each other. Europe and Israel are surely part of the same civilisation. Also just over forty years ago, Israel did not have a firm alliance with the US, which was decidedly neutral towards Israels birth. Instead, the young, vulnerable state was helped by Europe. In 1956 (Suez), Israel conspired with Britain and France to bring down Egypts nationalist leader, Nasser, and was resolutely opposed by Eisenhowers America, which strongly rebuked Israel and used its massive financial muscle to force the abandonment of an otherwise-won war. Recent archive opening shows that in 1967, the US still had a contingency plan ( HYPERLINK "http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/851705.html" Critical Incident No. 14) to invade Israel on the Arabs behalf, not knowing that Israel had already built its first nuclear weapon, from French know-how. Having created the modern Middle-Eastern Map, the Europeans had strong historical presence - but Suez was the last hurrah for the old order. After 1967 the relationship began to utterly change: within a year America sold Israel 50 F4 phantom jets, becoming its principal military supplier. Even before that, an Israeli attack on an American ship, the USS Liberty, brought unprecedented - no retribution. The reasons for this dramatic change are grounded in the changing priorities of US foreign policy. Most notably, the Middle East is home to the worlds largest oil reserves, and was then a near-future centre of the world where America needed deep anchor. Also, with Arab nationalism lazily equitable to communism, Israel, with its strong free market democracy, was a reliable pillar. Finally, the ease with which Israel won in 1967 suggested that the territorial status quo, i.e. Israels new occupation, was unlikely to be effectively challenged any time soon. When the next attack came, in the Yom Kippur war of 1973, Americas arming of Israel was substantial and sustained, and has been ever since, based on a shared understanding of the world by two countries built by immigrants. The contrast between the vitality of Israels connections to Europe and America today could not be starker. Whilst Israeli Prime-Ministers visit Washington several times a year, an hours Internet search fails to throw up a single visit of any Israeli PM ever to Brussels. This is symptomatic of Israels views about European influence in its affairs. Prejudices, entirely predictable given Europes ant-Semitic history and the Nazi Shoah that played such a vital role in Israels creation, are firmly to the fore. Whilst in Europe itself it is anti-Muslim sentiment that dominates the anti-racist agenda, in Israel, there has been an upsurge of anti-Semitism in Europe. Ariel Sharons call in 2004 for French Jews to immediately move to Israel given the wildest anti-Semitism in France caused a furore in Paris, with then-President Chirac declaring the Israeli Prime Minister persona non grata, but it wasnt news to an Israeli press that gives wide credence to overarching theories linking every reported incident of anti-Semitism. Crucially, this affects what Israelis think Europeans think about the Conflict:  HYPERLINK "http://hsf.bgu.ac.il/europe/uploadDocs/iepnpgdjp.pdf" polls suggest almost two thirds think the EU rarely, very rarely or even never, condemns Palestinian terror attacks. ...except that Israel is Martian In Europe, the Conflict is the only story about Israel consistently covered by the mainstream media, and years of coverage of Israeli tanks and warplanes bombing Palestinian women and children have framed the picture most Europeans have of the Jewish Goliath and the Palestinian David, often with the uncomfortable undertone of Europes colonial past imposed. In a 2003 opinion poll, 59% of Europeans saw Israel as not just an obstacle to peace in the Middle East but as the major threat to world peace. However, it is more than reporting that divides Israel and Europe: they fall on opposite sides of the fundamental world view divide identified by  HYPERLINK "http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3460246.html" Kagan. The author was writing about America, but it is no less true for Israel that power is all-important the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power. Europe, by contrast, is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. Having definitively solved the Franco-German conflict that spawned the world war in which a third of world Jewry was exterminated (amongst a total carnage of some 40 million people) Europe is attached to its methodology. Israel, however remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession of military might. The EUs theoretical construct of the international order is based, like the EU itself, on the fair application of international rules and frameworks. Its harder to kill people when youre buying and selling things from them. The US, as inevitably befits a hegemon with more treasure to give, is more subjective in its favours, rewarding those that support it with aid, military assistance and silence about deviations from US norms. Israels nuclear bombs, accepted in an area where US foreign policy has never been so shrill and active about the need to stamp out weapons of mass destruction not legitimated by the relevant international framework, is perhaps the most egregious example of this. A majority of Israelis, regardless of wanting peace, consider the Conflict insoluble in the medium term. For all the headlines, the territories are ever more distant to most Israelis. Just twenty years ago, the green line was all but eradicated: Israelis shopped in West Bank towns and Palestinian workers laboured in farms and building sites up and down the country. Today, a new generation has a wall separating two societies that never meet. Israeli labour comes from China and Romania and even the settlers have different road systems. This has allowed recent Israel strategies, such as the Gaza disengagement, the fence and Convergence to aim at containing and managing the Conflict. Europe, seeing a central driver of Middle Eastern unrest and the growth of Islamic extremism wants to solve it. However, European actions to bring about an actual solution, such as vocal backing for the 2003  HYPERLINK "http://www.geneva-accord.org/Accord.aspx?FolderID=33&lang=en" Geneva Accord, is seen as soft, pro-Palestinian, and counterproductive to Israels security interests, even though its position (a two-state solution based on 1967 borders, with justice for Palestinian refugees and a split-sovereignty Jerusalem) squarely replicates Israeli politics mainstream left. European criticisms of Israeli actions are perceived as hostile, and interpreted as proof of bias. Growing apart Europe and America are growing apart. For different reasons, they are both turning their attention in on themselves. They see different opportunities in a changing world, and different problems. Even when they agree on the problem, they increasingly come to different conclusions about how to deal with it. The knee-jerk reaction the view of the other is primus inter pares in taking into account others is lost. Worse, ignorance and demonisation of the other has become mainstream, making for a profound estrangement. For too many Americans,  HYPERLINK "http://www.guardian.co.uk/france/story/0,11882,893202,00.html" cheese-eating surrender-monkeys is more than a joke, and the prospect of a  HYPERLINK "http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/359" godless, pampered and over-regulated Europe collapsing through low birth rates make it at best an unreliable long-term exclusive partner, and at worst the failing of a potential rival. Bernard Lewis, another White House favourite, already discerns these trends in todays Europe, with its formerly monolithic (Western) culture being eaten away from the inside as Muslims fill Europe's demographic and spiritual void, making it just a matter of time until Eurabia joins the Arab world. For too many Europeans, America is easily characterised as in the thrall of religious, gun-toting fanatics, intent on shooting up the world and building up Islamic fundamentalism to replace Soviet communism as the evil of evils needed to justify the use of massive US military might instead of Europes favoured tools of international law and institutions, consultation, conciliation and, ultimately, compromise. Words that trip easily off the European tongue when talking of the US today include Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and extraordinary rendition. In a recent Financial Times  HYPERLINK "http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4d0ad7dc-feeb-11da-84f3-0000779e2340.html" poll of Europeans, America came ahead of Iran and North Korea as the country contributing most to world instability. However, this estrangement is far from complete. America and Europe remain the worlds two biggest trading partners. Every day troops fight, and die, side-by-side in Iraq and Afghanistan. NATO is still the worlds pre-eminent military alliance and the holy grail of an independent European defence policy remains more aspiration than perspiration. Common strategic goals, such as democracy promotion, are real and deep. Also, the political winds have changed. Germanys Chancellor, Angela Merkel, is stridently more pro-American than her predecessor, who broke the rock-solid post-war US-German compact. That now looks like an aberration. Similarly, the new British Prime-Minister brings a subtle but deep-seated strategic shift from a Blair whose (failed) strategic aspiration was deeper British integration in Europe, to a Brown who sees the UKs future as a stand-alone success in a world of strong powers, which Britain can best ride in the US embrace. Ironically, the European state most crucial to the transatlantic alliance is France. While the US can essentially take Germany and the UK for granted, Paris is the bellwether. Strained ties have fractured the Atlantic community for a decade, and so the change from the acerbic Jacques Chirac to the Atlanticist Nicolas Sarkozy of Hungarian and Jewish lineage is very important. With the potent poison sucked out of the recent US-Europe relationship, a sympathetic new US administration, focused on the need for international burden sharing, has a fair wind behind solving the core problem of creating a genuine European defence capability that is a companion and not a competitor to NATO. Nowhere more evidently than on the Conflict However, the Conflict shows up extremely diverging aims, based on fundamentally different understandings of the world. Israeli attitudes, including on European anti-Semitism have, to a degree, crossed the Atlantic to the mainstream American press. European attitudes about the conflict have not. While a clear majority of Europeans see Israel as the main obstacle to the resolution of the conflict, no fewer that  HYPERLINK "http://www.theisraelproject.org/site/apps/nl/content2.asp?c=hsJPK0PIJpH&b=689705&ct=3839191" two-thirds of Americans, who see the conflict through an entirely different construct in the mass media, support Israel and consider its actions to be taken in the context of living in a tough neighbourhood. Europeans just dont buy this. They know the neighbourhood because they live in it. This popular divergence appears at the highest levels. The deafening silence around the G8 world when Bush unilaterally froze out Arafat was far from the only occasion all the diplomatic niceties cannot hide what in a family would be called a blazing row. Another was in 2004, when the EU failed to support Bushs declaration that the resolution of the conflict would take into account the demographic realities of Israels West Bank settlements. In that same year the EU was public in its hostility to Israels wall/barrier/fence, with all 25 Member States voting for its immediate demolition at the UN, in contrast to Israel and the US. The Conflict is the very best example of how, without directly challenging American hegemony, Europes emerging foreign policy machinery is seeking to be more active. Since the turn of the millennium, Javier Solana has made the Middle East one of his few foreign policy priorities. The first tangible outcome was the formation of the Quartet in 2002, where Europe finally leveraged the fact that it provides some 60% of the entire global aid on which Palestinian society depends. In 2005, European boots arrived on the ground, at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and Gaza. In 2006, EU countries provided the biggest contingent of the UNIFIL blue helmets that secure Lebanon. There has been no public disagreement, but there is a pronounced difference in taste about how the EU and the US deal with the Conflict. It is hard to imagine Arafat dying in an American hospital, or the US diffusing the Church of the Nativity crisis in the way that the EU did, by giving the 12 accused Palestinians inside refuge in Europe for a year (they are still there). Another enlightening episode was the reaction to the undisputedly free and fair Palestinian elections of January 2006, the first in ten years. Having boycotted the earlier Presidential poll, won by Arafats successor as head of the PLO, Mahmoud Abbas, Hamas fought these Parliamentary elections and convincingly won them. Abbass Fatah grudgingly accepted the result, but Israel did not, immediately isolating the Palestinians. The key question was how the international Quartet would respond. The US immediately followed Israel, easily, but entirely misleadingly, casting Hamas as an Al-Qaeda-like organisation, bent on destroying not just Israel but the entire free Western world. All US government aid and contacts with the Palestinian territories were cut off. Russia took an entirely opposite approach: it invited Hamass leader for talks in Moscow. The UN, as shown in the brilliantly explicit  HYPERLINK "http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2007/06/12/DeSotoReport.pdf" end of mission report of its then envoy, took the same view, reasoning that Hamas was evolving and should be encouraged to evolve more. With the Quartet disintegrating, its envoy, James Wolfensohn, quietly resigned. How Europe reacted to Hamas Europe, as so often, fell between the two stools. Of course, talking of Europe is, to a degree, creative writing. Some EU Member States are clearly more pro-Israel, such as Germany and the UK, whilst others, such as Spain and the Scandinavians are better characterised as emphasising more Palestinian needs. Responding to the Palestinian elections created a very difficult internal debate. On the one hand, there was a lot of sympathy for the new start view. This wanted to support the democratically-elected Hamas as much as the world had supported the previous Fatah government. If the ultimate sign of democracy is the changeover of power from one administration to another after elections, this was democracy in action. It was hoped that by accepting the responsibilities of government, Hamas moderates, including new Palestinian Prime-Minister Ismael Haniyeh, would be strengthened. With time, the government would rise to its responsibilities, not just in terms of administering the Palestinian territories (which it was clearly prepared to do) but also in supporting moves to end the Conflict. Having maintained a unilateral ceasefire for over a year before the elections, this seemed a reasonable prospect. On the other hand, there were the Member States that viewed the Atlantic alliance as Europes foreign policy sine qua non. It was this second view that eventually won out. Europe therefore accepted the line that Hamas must remain an international pariah until it met the three conditions agreed by the Quartet: the renunciation of violence and the acceptance of both signed agreements and of Israels right to exist. Diplomatic links and direct aid were cut off. In not being prepared for Europe and the US to split on the issue, the EU was following a consistent pattern of thought, namely that the only way to solve the Conflict is for Israel to concede a viable Palestinian state, and the only way this will ever happen is when Israel (in the diplomatic version) is sufficiently supported by the international community - or (the behind closed doors version) is forced into a corner by the US. The other guiding consideration was Europes place at the table. To oppose Israel and the US would have been to marginalise the EUs role in the conflict. Thus, although diplomacy was much more nuanced on the ground (EU troops stayed, direct aid replaced by humanitarian aid though a temporary mechanism that, with their agreement, bypassed Hamas), Europe allowed the Quartet to follow the US line. According to the UNs  HYPERLINK "http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2007/06/12/DeSotoReport.pdf" envoy, this effectively transformed the Quartet from a negotiation-promoting foursome to a body all but imposing sanctions on a freely-elected government of a people under occupation. This decision was not without positive consequences for European foreign policy. In recent years, and in particular since the schism over Iraq, a huge effort has been made to ensure that whatever the EU does in foreign policy, it does it together. This attempt has been surprisingly successful. Thus, despite occasional  HYPERLINK "http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6154702.stm" counter-initiatives aimed at challenging EU passivity and the passive acceptance of US diplomatic dominance, the pro-Israel faction has more or less held the line, on the basis of the unanimously agreed  HYPERLINK "http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/22520.htm" Road Map to Palestinian-Israeli peace. Indeed, the Road Map would not exist if it werent for the EUs strong desire to hang together on this most divisive of issues, and to hang together with the US. This pattern was again observed with the Second Lebanon war of 2006, when Finland, the rotating EU Presidency, called Israels initial bombings a disproportionate use of force and said Israels blockade cannot be justified. Spains Prime Minister was even blunter, Israel is wrong. Self-defence is one thing; however it is another to launch a counter-offensive consisting of a general attack on Lebanon and Gaza that is just going to escalate violence in the area. These statements had broad majority EU support. However, after the G8 summit a week later, the UK and Germany succeeded in ensuring that the EU line avoided criticism of Israel. This European unity pays dividends: a small but important milestone was the changing of the guard from an American Quartet envoy (Wolfensohn) to a European one (Blair) and, on the back of that, intense and successful efforts by the Europeans (and mainly Angela Merkel) to revive the Road Map, link it to the Arab States own (Saudi) peace initiative, and ultimately force a visibly-reluctant America to relaunch the peace process at Annapolis. Conclusion ? The main outlines of a conclusion to this article are easily discernible. The future of the world would be a much better one if the US and Europe could somehow make it their central foreign policy goal to agree with each other, even at the expense of specific and cherished policies. If America and Europe want to lead a second creation, and not be mere participants, they have to work hand in glove. The second is that this is highly unlikely to happen, the most realistic scenario being that the shared closeness of before the Berlin wall came down can somehow be re-engineered on the basis of more equal recognition from the US and more burden-sharing from the EU. The third is that even this scenario is unlikely, because the trend of estrangement is a deep-rooted growing apart. On no issue is this more evident that the Israel-Palestine, or Palestine-Israel, Conflict, where the US, public and decision-makers, really are from Mars, and the Europeans from Venus. On the one hand, any hope of equitable progress in this bitterest of conflicts depends on addressing the central problem of Palestinian poverty and desperation. The solution sounds like a growing Palestinian economy, passports, the ability to travel to neighbouring villages and the prospect of work and future aspirations. On the other hand, all this is utterly secondary to a central strategy of divining and implementing what needs to be done to ensure Israeli security. To date, Europe has been unwilling, or unable, to challenge the US view of the Conflict or to impact on its diplomatic leadership. If and when Europe takes that step into the unknown, we will know the whole world is not quite the same as it was the day before. This article was originally written, by invitation, for the American-Jewish zeitgeist magazine, Zeek, at  HYPERLINK "http://www.jewcy.com/zeek" http://www.jewcy.com/zeek. However, despite several edits, they ultimately refused to publish it.       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