ShelterCluster.org
Coordinating Humanitarian Shelter

SHELTER CLUSTER RAPID ASSESSMENT

IRAQ INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT CRISIS
Area of Origin Assessment Report
October 2014

NFI distribution to people displaced by violence from Anbar province (credit: Médécins Sans Frontières)

In partnership with:

REACH An initiative of IMPACT Initiatives ACTED and UNOSAT

List of Maps

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AOG	Armed Opposition Group
AoO	Area of Origin
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ITS	Informal Tented Settlement
KI	Key Informant
NFI	Non-Food Items
KRI	Kurdistan Region of Iraq
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Geographic Classifications

Governorate	Highest form of governance below the national level.
District	Governorates are divided into districts.

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SUMMARY

There is very limited information on the humanitarian and in fact overall situation inside the territory controlled by Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) in central Iraq. To address this gap, REACH conducted a remote assessment for the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa and Salah al Din. In light of widely reported concerns about the availability of shelter as well as the living conditions of populations affected by the crisis, this report places emphasis on shelter and winterization needs.

The findings presented in this report focus on the shelter situation for both the displaced and the local populations. Data was collected from non-displaced respondents in the area of origin through recently displaced persons arriving in the KRI, thus the findings refer to the overall situation and not the situation for internal displaced persons (IDPs), unless indicated otherwise.

- **The proportion of displaced persons who are renting their shelter or being hosted by the local population is higher in the four governorates controlled by AOGs than in the KRI**. According to the information received from recently displaced persons about half of the 500,000 IDPs in these areas are being hosted by the local population or renting their own shelter. Nevertheless, one in ten households continue to squat in the open air.
- **The threat of eviction from collective centers means that another one in four households may be forced to stay in the open air at night.** Significant damage across these four governorates to private homes means that many people do not have a home to return to even if this was their intention.
- While this statistic alone might suggest that the population in the AOG controlled areas are less vulnerable overall from a shelter perspective, REACH cautions against jumping to this conclusion. The data also suggests that **the quality of rented/hosted shelter is less than in KRI, and it is unclear what support mechanisms, if any, are in place in camps or**

collective centers. Given the restricted access of government or international actors to these areas, capacity to provide goods or basic services is limited.

- **Many of the 500,000 IDPs in the least accessible areas of Iraq will be unable to adequately prepare for winter and will become increasingly vulnerable.** Most vulnerable at this point are the IDPs staying in the open air, without adequate shelter or means to make meaningful preparations for winter.
- **Gas cookers and gasoline in general have become much more expensive since the start of the conflict, and are expected to continue to rise in price before winter.** While prices of bedding, heaters and carpets have remained relatively stable, informants indicated that these too will likely become more expensive as household prepare for the oncoming winter.
- **Daily fuel shortages and power cuts often lasting more than 6 hours per day mean that the most common heating systems are rendered inoperative on a regular basis.** Assistance in the form of fuel (provision of gasoline or kerosene) and gas- or kerosene-powered heaters, would be an appropriate winterization strategy.
- It is unclear whether sufficient capacity and willingness exists in these areas to support camps as a longer term solution. It will however become clearer over the upcoming month whether many schools and other collective centers are to be evicted. Bearing in mind the large number of children and teachers displaced, many of them outside the four AOG controlled governorates, the need or capacity to reopen all schools may be limited. **If so, the Shelter Cluster should consider supporting collective centers as a medium term shelter solution for the upcoming winter.**

CONTEXT

On 13 August 2014, the situation in Iraq was declared as a Level 3 humanitarian crisis by the United Nations.[1] An estimated 1.8 million people have been displaced since the start of the year as a result of violence that has broken out in much of the northern and central parts of the country. While the displacement of approximately 800,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) has occurred towards the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), approximately 500,000 more displaced persons remain within the four governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa[2] and Salah al Din which are largely under the control of armed opposition groups: Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa and Salah al Din.[3] (See map 1) Whether this is by choice or these people have been prevented from leaving, the ongoing conflict around them has led to limited access to basic services and in some cases a threat to their lives.

Access and security remain the greatest challenge for any sustained relief effort in the areas controlled by AOGs. Response strategies requiring an institutional approach, such as strengthening the electricity network, would be challenging to say the least. And unless supply routes into the four governorates in question are re-established and IDPs are able to find some form of income, their ability to access NFIs will continue to decrease.

The humanitarian response has provided much needed immediate live-saving support to IDPs who have fled their homes, in particular those who have sought refuge in the KRI. The oncoming winter season will however present new challenges and requires critical steps to be taken now in preparation. While the impact of the season will be most severe in the north of the country, average temperatures in Winter in the western desert (Anbar and southern Ninewa) lie only two to three degrees above freezing and may dip below zero, with temperatures in the areas bordering KRI dropping slightly lower.

[1] Data source : http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRAQ.pdf

[2] For the purposes of this report, Akre district has been excluded from the analysis on Ninewa governorate.

[3] International Organization for Migration, Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Report II of Round IV (19 September 2014). Calculation of figures on displaced individuals are based on DTM figures for displaced families and an assumed family size of six individuals.

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IRAQ
Number of IDPs per district

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Production date: 15 September 2014





Legend

- Country Borders
- Governorate Borders
- District Borders
- KR-I and Kirkuk
- Central Iraq
- Southern Iraq
- Inaccessible Area

Number of IDPs per District

- 35001 - 172188
- 10001 - 35000
- 2001 - 10000
- 6 - 2000

Administrative boundaries: GADM/OCHA/HIC 2011
IDP Data: IOM (DTM August 2014)

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 38N
Projection: Transverse Mercator
File: REACH_IRQ_Map_IDP_IDPsDistricts_15Sept2014
Contact: reach.mapping@impact-initiatives.org

Note: Data, designations and boundaries contained on this map are not warranted to error-free and do not imply acceptance by the REACH partners, associated, donors mentioned on this map.

REACH Informing more effective humanitarian action

Annual precipitation rates range between 100-200mm in most of Anbar, Salah al Din, Diyala and in southern Ninewa; the northern half of Ninewa as well as Tooz district in Salah al Din and Khanaqin and Kifri districts in Diyala get an average annual rainfall of over 250mm.4 Shelter support and in particular water proofing should focus on these latter areas in particular, some of which are also comparatively more accessible than the rest of the four governorates in question.

SHELTER

REACH findings suggest that approximately 14% of IDPs are staying in the open air or unfinished buildings. This figure aligns with the most recent Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which puts the figure at 13%.[5] According to key informants, approximately 46% of all IDPS displaced within the four main conflict-affected governorates are either hosted by local population or renting a house or apartment. This proportion is significantly lower than the corresponding figure indicated by the DTM which put the proportion of IDPs hosting or renting in these four governorates at 67% - possibly because IDPs hosted or renting are less 'visible' to KIs than those living in schools or parks.

Figure 1 - Shelter types used by IDPs



Conversely, the proportion of IDPs who have found refuge in collective centres (including many schools and mosques) according to REACH key informants is up to 30%, while the DTM puts the figure at 14%. Both DTM and REACH informants further report that only a small section of the displaced population in these areas, approximately 5%, stay in camps or informal tented settlements (ITS).

The damage to buildings and infrastructure as a result of the conflict is most pervasive in Anbar, followed by Salah al Din and Ninewa, and least in Diyala. In Anbar informants report that 35% of physical structures are completely destroyed and another 38% have suffered moderate to heavy damage. This fact in itself is not surprising, as fighting in Anbar has been more or less ongoing since December 2013. Considering that approximately 80-85% of people in the four governorates lived in a privately-owned, fully paid home before the conflict,[6] this leaves a large proportion of IDPs from these areas without a home to return to, and many of those who remained in damaged properties.

Figure 2 - Reported damage to buildings



[4] Iraq Country Pasture/Forage Resource Profile, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 2011, http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/AGPC/doc/Counprof/PDF%20files/iraq.pdf

[5] International Organization for Migration, Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Report II of Round IV (19 September 2014). Shelter types in the DTM have been aggregated to align with REACH typology, in which 'Open Air' includes unfinished buildings and 'Camps' includes military camps and informal settlements.

[6] Iraq Knowledge Network Survey 2011, p. 280. www.cosit.gov.iq/documents\statistics\living conditions statistics\survey \full report\Iraq Knowledge Network Survey 2011/Iraq Knowledge Network Survey 2011.pdf

According to key informants, the proportion of houses and other privately owned buildings that have been completely destroyed as a result of the conflict was 33% in Salah al Din, 19% in Diyala and 16% in Ninewa. Conversely, the proportion of private buildings with no or only slight damage is greatest in Diyala (54%) and Ninewa (45%).

The most commonly used heater types are electric heaters, gas heaters and kerosene based heating. 42% of respondents in Anbar reported using an electric heater, the most commonly used heater type in each of the governorates assessed. In addition, between 20%-30% of respondents in Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al Din reported using either kerosene or gas heaters. Only in Diyala were blankets (19%) and wood (14%) reported as commonly used heating types.

Figure 3 – Types of heating systems used



Since the most common heater types are powered either by fuel (gas or kerosene) or by electricity, shortages in either of these power sources have a significant negative impact on the winter preparedness of shelters.

More than half (59%) of respondents across the four governorates reported experiencing fuel shortages on a daily basis. This response was least common in Ninewa, where 39% reported daily shortages of fuel, compared to 45% reporting shortages on a weekly basis. In Salah al Din, 87% reported experiencing shortages more than once a week.

Figure 4 - Frequency of fuel shortages



Such shortages are mainly a result of disruption in the production and refining of oil due to the conflict. Fighting near Baiji (Salah al Din Governorate) in June brought the largest refinery to a production standstill, reducing supply and causing significant price increases in the KRI and elsewhere.

Figure 5 - Proportion of households without access to electricity network



About half of informants indicated that homes in their area are not connected to the general electricity network. Respondents in each of the four governorates in question stated they did not have access to networked electricity (63% on average across the assessed area).

In Diyala, where the figure was lowest, 50% of households were not connected to the network, whereas in Salah al-Din, where this proportion was reportedly lowest, 23% of households reportedly were not connected to the network.

Pre-crisis data shows that the general network was the primary source of electricity for less than half of all households in Anbar, Ninewa and Salah al-Din

already before the onset of the conflict.[7] Diyala was the exception, where 96% used the general network as the primary source. Most people were instead dependent on shared generators as their primary source of electricity.

Figure 6 - Average number of hours with working electricity per day



Most of those households who *were* connected to the electricity network experienced daily power shortages as a result of network blackouts and fuel shortages for generators. In Diyala, half the population had access to working electricity less than 2 hours per day, while 30% of the population reportedly had no access to electricity at all. This too is not necessarily a deviation from the pre-crisis situation, as data shows that households in the four governorates were able to access power through the power network for an average of 6.7 (Ninewa) to 10.5 (Diyala) hours per day.[8]

NON-FOOD ITEMS

The conflict has had an apparent effect on inflation across the country, with the Consumer Price Index (CPI) decreasing in May and June, then increasing during July and August (by 0.5% and 0.8%, respectively).[9] CPI data for the months of June-August was not available for the Governorates of Anbar[10], Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah al Din, however. For this reason, REACH asked informants about price changes in the inaccessible areas.

Following the fall of Mosul in June and the second wave of displacement in August, certain non-food items have more than doubled in price. For the purposes of this assessment, REACH has reviewed price inflation in relation to the five non-food household items which will become most crucial in the upcoming winter.

Figure 7 - Price change since start of conflict for selected NFIs



Bedding – Respondents reported only limited change in price of bedding (sheets, pillows and blankets). In Anbar, the price went up by up to 38%, while the price was stable in Diyala and went down slightly in Salah al Din (18%) and Ninewa (6%). The price of bedding is expected by most informants to go up before winter, or else to remain stable.

Figure 8 - Predicted change in price of bedding by winter



[7] Iraq Knowledge Network Survey 2011, p. 206

[8] Ibid, p. 208

[9] Central Statistics Organization, Iraq. Consumer Prices Indices. Accessed 28 September 2014. Data was not yet available for September 2014.

[10] Data for Diyala presumable covers only those areas that can be accessed safely, such as Khanaqin district. Data for Anbar was already unavailable since before June

Gasoline – The price of gasoline reportedly rose by 116% in Diyala, by 83% in Anbar and by 75% in Ninewa. Conversely, gasoline prices experienced only a minor increase in Salah al Din (7%). Across the four governorates, a majority of informants expected prices to go up again before winter.

Figure 9 - Predicted change in price of gasoline by winter



Gas cookers – Gas cookers saw the largest price increase of all non-food items in question, nearly tripling in price in Ninewa Governorate. In the other three Governorates, the price of gas cookers more than doubled as well, rising by 142% in Diyala, 123% in Anbar and 108% in Salah al Din.

Figure 10 - Predicted change in price of gas cookers



Heaters – Of the five items measured here, heaters were the most stable in price, decreasing by approximately 6% overall. Price change at governorate level ranged from a 17% decrease in Diyala to an 11% increase in Ninewa. The stability of the price of heaters is most likely due to limited demand during the hot summer months. Most informants (79%) expected the price to increase before winter, though a minority did predict price may instead go down as well.

Figure 11 - Predicted change in price of heaters by winter



Carpets – Interestingly, respondents in Diyala reported a 76% increase in the price of carpets, whereas respondents in Salah al Din indicated a drop in price of approximately 33%. In Ninewa and Anbar, little change in price was reported; Ninewa also had the lowest proportion of people expecting a price increase ahead of winter: 66%, compared to between 80 and 88% in the other three governorates.

Figure 12 - Predicted change in price of carpets by winter



Price inflation is not the only factor affecting a household's ability to acquire the abovementioned winterization items. Limited supply due to the inaccessibility of the area would have a similar effect, and changes in household income due to limited livelihood opportunities – resulting for instance from damaged infrastructure or displacement business owners – would limit people's ability to invest in such purchases.

Across the four governorates, a majority of respondents (70%) indicated that the average household income had gone down as a result of the conflict. This answer was most consistent in Ninewa governorate, where 90% reported a decrease in household income.

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IRAQ
Destination of IDPs from Central Iraq

For Humanitarian Purposes Only
Production date: 29 September 2014





Legend

- Country Borders
- Governorate Borders
- District Borders
- KR-I and Kirkuk
- Central Iraq
- Southern Iraq
- Inaccessible Area



Data sources:
Administrative boundaries: GADM/OCHA/HIC 2011
IDP Data: IOM (DTM August 2014)

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 38N
Projection: Transverse Mercator
File: REACH_IRQ_Map_IDP_AreaOfOrigin_15Sept2014
Contact: reach.mapping@impact-initiatives.org

ANNEX: METHODOLOGY

The information presented in this report was collected using the Area of Origin (AoO) methodology which was first piloted in Iraq in July 2014[11]. By interviewing members of the displaced population about their area of origin, REACH is able to assess the situation in the area at the time of displacement, despite not being able to access the area.

The original pilot conducted in July 2014 was purely based on this remote methodology to capture the needs of IDPs and vulnerable native populations in non-accessible areas. However, the dynamic context in Iraq has meant that some previously inaccessible areas are now safe enough for direct data collection (and vice versa). For this reason, REACH has also collected information directly from informants inside the area in question, either in person in newly accessible areas, or over the phone in inaccessible locations.

Through previous assessments in accessible areas reporting a large population or influx of IDPs, REACH data-collection teams identified KIs who were in regular contact with persons in their place of origin since being displaced and who indicated a willingness to assist in future assessments. Based on information from the DTM, REACH identified locations with displaced persons who arrived since August 2014. Field visits are then conducted to assess whether these IDPs are willing and able to provide information on their area of origin.

Identified KIs and recent arrivals were interviewed in groups (of approximately 3 – 5 participants) based on their city, town or village of origin. Group interviews were utilised in order to ensure that the views of multiple KIs, in regular contact with their place of origin, where possible of different ages or sexes, are captured. In some specific cases, such as with religious leaders or government officials, interviews were conducted individually.

Remote data collection using Area of Origin methodology is inherently limited by its focus on inaccessible areas. Access to information is only possible if displaced persons reach the area REACH can operate in. The sampling is therefore purely based on convenience – all informants identified and contacted by 4 September 2014 were included in the sample. The number of samples – one sample representing one interview with between one and five informants – is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Sample size per governorate

Governorate	Sample size
Anbar	57
Diyala	39
Ninewa	76
Salah Al Din	37
TOTAL	**211**

Data collection took place using Open Data Kit (ODK) software on Android-based smartphones, significantly reducing the chance of data entry errors. Moreover, as mentioned, the assessment included only those IDPs who had recently been displaced or who had been in regular contact with their area of origin. Finally, statistical outliers and obvious errors were excluded from the analysis.

Data collected by REACH through key informants was triangulated with the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) maintained by the International Organization for Migrations (IOM) as well as relevant secondary data from the Central Statistical Organization Iraq.

The methodology for this assessment was designed therefore to be indicative rather than representative, as the sampling method is not random but convenience-based. Within this limitation, REACH did attempt to collect data with as wide a geographic spread as possible. Finally, it should be noted that indicators collected are perceptions of the IDP population assessed.

[11] REACH. Assessment of Area of Origin of Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Iraq (12 July 2014). Available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/operations/iraq/document/reach-initiative-assessment-area-origin-internally-displaced-persons.