

Review of the IFRC Shelter Cluster Coordination Services in Response to TC Pam in Vanuatu

October 2015
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The source of the front cover illustration is from the Vanuatu Shelter Cluster and depicts the traditional DRR approach of Ni-Vans in strong wind storms of using their own weight to hold down the roof of their home.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

3W	Who, what, where mapping analysis
8-A-F	Eight Area Framework
ARCS	Australian Red Cross Society
BBB/BBS	Build Back Better/Build Back Safer
CDC	Community Disaster Committees
CGI	Corrugated galvanised iron, roofing material.
CHF	Swiss Franc
DLA	Department of Local Authorities
DREF	Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	Evacuation Centres
FHH	Female Head of Household
FRCS	French Red Cross Society
GoV	Government of Vanuatu
GSC	Global Shelter Cluster
HAP	Humanitarian Action Plan
HH	Household
HSWG	Housing Sector Working Group
IEC	Information Education and Communication
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IM	Information Manager/management
km/h	kilometres per hour (wind speed)
kt	Knots (wind speed)
LCO	Local Community Officer usually based at village level
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NDMO	National Disaster Management Office
NFI	Non-food items
NZRCS	New Zealand Red Cross Society
OCHA	(United Nations) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PASSA	Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter Awareness
PMER	Programme Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
PNS	Partner National Society
PWD	Public Works Department
RCRC	Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies (the Movement)
RTE	Real Time Evaluation
SAG	Strategic Advisor Group
SAP	Strategic Action Plan of the GoV.
SC	Shelter Cluster
SCC	Shelter Cluster Coordinator
SCP	Shelter Cluster Partners
SCT	Shelter Cluster Team
SWG	Shelter Working Group/s
TC	Tropical Cyclone
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
TWIG	Technical Working Group
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster and Coordination
VET	Vocational Education and Training
VHT	Vanuatu Humanitarian Team
VNSO	Vanuatu National Statistics Office
VRCS	Vanuatu Red Cross Society
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene promotion

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My many thanks to those that assisted by filling out the survey, by being interviewed when there were no doubt other pressing issues to deal with and for allowing me the space to get this Review of the SC coordination completed.

The Pacific is at the pointy end of Climate Change.¹ The Islands in it are separated by seemingly vast expanses of water and as a result the cultures that exist on them are ruggedly independent and unique which includes how they handle disasters. There is arguably a 'Pacific Way' that is quite separate from other less isolated land areas and countries where humanitarians operate. Thus, it has been my privilege to undertake this Review of the coordination of the shelter cluster in response to TC Pam in Vanuatu, arguably one of the more diverse of Pacific Nations given that it apparently hosts over 112 indigenous languages² within its boundaries.

Without doubt, the humanitarians that operate and work in this space are consequently called on to manage complexity well beyond what they would expect in other parts of the world. My only hope is that this report depicts that complexity while it reflectively advances the shelter options for those affected and shelter cluster discussion for those assisting. It has been a privilege.

Particular thanks for the support from IFRC's Peter, Pablo, Mateo, Ryan, Xavier, Tom and Andrew. Also Shadrack from NDMO, David from IOM and David from Butterfly Trust, Dick from PWD, Damien from the Disability Desk, Jean from UN-Habitat, Bob from RM Architects, and Jerry representing Lankorai Village.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the communities. Perhaps they were not immediately visited as part of this coordination Review (that looked inside the 'machine') ...nonetheless it is what the machine produces in terms of outcomes for those affected that remains as the ultimate measure of coordination.

Regan Potangaroa
Auckland,
October 2015

¹ Alexei Trundle and Darryn McEvoy January 2015 "DRAFT (Pre TC PAM) Port Vila, Vanuatu Climate Vulnerability Assessment –Abridged Report," RMIT and UN-Habitat pg 8
http://www.fukuoka.unhabitat.org/programmes/ccci/pdf/Vanuatu_PVVA_Abridged_March9.pdf accessed September 2015

² "Languages of Vanuatu," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Languages_of_Vanuatu accessed September 2015.

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“Life is like a box of chocolates,” said Forest Gump in the movie of the same name. You never know what you are going to get, it is random, at least until you bite into it: which is what this Review seemed to find as it opened up the SC coordination. Many of its discussions had multiple conflicting aspects to them which, while not necessarily random, nonetheless were problematic in establishing findings. The objective of the Review was to make recommendations in each of the 8 areas of the requested framework (see 8-A-F) in addition to the key overall findings. Example questions of this multiple aspect were: was the coordination effective or not, was it efficient and appropriate or not, was there an acceptable level of coherence that promoted a sustainable outcome; how did it link and enable any required merging into programmes beyond the SC response? This desire to provide a fuller review did open apparent contradictions in the survey data which the Review has tried to explain or merge into an overall picture of the coordination component of the SC in Vanuatu following TC Pam.

It may have been an opportunity missed that a link up was not formally required between this Review and the REACH 2 survey that occurred concurrently. It should be noted as one reads this Review that it is solely on the Coordination and how the machine worked, but not on the impacts of it. That aspect was the aim of the REACH 2 Review; although there were expected to be some unavoidable overlaps between the two Reviews. Thus, despite attempts to meet, it was not possible to check the overall findings of this Review against REACH 2. However, despite a useful geographic connection, REACH 2 did seem to be largely output based that may have made useful comparisons difficult for this Review.

This was the first time that a SC was established in Vanuatu and the IFRC should be congratulated for their strong coordinated effort firstly with NDMO and increasingly with the PWD and DLA; and secondly with the leadership of the SC. This has created not only a platform to work from but also gave an ‘on the job’ experience of how it works in practice and how it could work in the future. If one were marking this it would deserve an A- because of the way that the IFRC were able to involve the Government. It was a job well done.

That being said there were two key areas that need to be reviewed:

1. The shelter strategy of promoting traditional construction based on the availability of local materials, local skills, limited quality control and because no one apparently died in a traditional structure (though this cannot be confirmed from the current data) gives this strategy credibility. It also gets over the difficulty of logistics and using modern materials that may be foreign and, in the case of CGI that could also be dangerous in the next cyclone. However, the lack of certain materials such as natangora/ palms for roofing for a 2-3 year period till they grow back means that there is a roofing gap in the shelter strategy for that time.

2. The advocacy role of the impact of TC Pam on women and girls and its mainstreaming into the SC seemed to be lacking. What is there is seemingly based on generalisations that could be from other theatres such as “...when women earn an income, they reinvest the vast majority of it in the well-being of their families....For every year a girl spends in school she raises her family income by up to 20 percent.....Educated girls grow into educated women, who have healthier babies and are more likely to educate their children.” This is not a criticism of those criteria but a plea for better proxies and indicators so that the SCP can better target what is currently lacking for at least 50% of shelter beneficiaries during the response and leading into the early recovery. One possible way to do this has been included in the Annexe but other practical methods must be investigated.

Certainly presentations were hosted by the SC from organisations such as the Vanuatu Women's Centre,³ but the actually dealing to, advocating for and mainstreaming of the impact of TC Pam on women seemed 'light' and probably non-existent beyond this hosting of the Women's Centre.

Furthermore, the roll out of 'All Under One Roof' by IFRC⁴ means that important issues such as disability in shelter will also need to be addressed given that such impairments affect approximately 15% of the population, and impairments are usually at the core of their poverty situation.....that is if they can be 'found' as being invisible is part of the issue. The GSC needs to identify pragmatic approaches for both of these if they are to receive more than continuing 'lip-service'.

These were the two, maybe three, key findings that need to be addressed. But, in addition, and going beyond the data was also analysed to identify ways that the SC 'Added Value' as a way to determine some road map ahead. That analysis suggested the following:

- a) Training, and in particular the ability to staircase or seamlessly connect the usual capacity building and more formal levels of training. One great example was the work of TVET to train trainers in how to rebuild tourist bungalows based around traditional Ni-Van housing.
- b) The development of a Pacific Way and the specifics of managing a disaster in the Islands of the Pacific. There were details that were both particular to Vanuatu, but general to the Pacific region. Examples are logistics, chiefly power structure, social issues and their historic roots, tourism and livelihoods, migration and the role of faith based and voluntary organisations.

1.1 RECOMMENDATIONS

This Review contains the following recommendations that are simply tabulated here for the executive summary with their basis explained in the body of the report. They are primarily for the IFRC, but also for the SCP where applicable.

Coordination Arrangements (refer to sections 2.0, 4.0, 4.1, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4)

1. Get the SC Response activated as early as practicable.
2. Plan SC Response deployment for a minimum period of 6 months.
3. Maintain the established strong links with NDMO during any Response
4. Set up regional hubs as soon as practicable.
5. Insist on strong SC handover procedures.
6. Ensure that there is dedicated SC administrative support.

Supporting Service Delivery (refer to sections 2.0, 4.0, 4.2, 6.1, 6.3 and 6.4)

7. Assessments must/should be better linked to Response.
8. Work with traditional coping mechanisms.
9. Expressly explain what a Category 5 TC means to those about to be affected by one.
10. Strengthen the Divisional linkages within PWD.
11. Identify and document situations where the SC Adds Value.
12. Use technology for better and faster information flows.
13. A 'one-size-fits-all' approach must be treated as the last option.

³ "Vanuatu Women are leading, we are supporting," March 20, 2015 <http://www.actionaid.org/australia/women-leading-response>

⁴ "All Under One Roof Disability-inclusive shelter and settlements in emergencies IFRC," http://www.cbm.org/article/downloads/54741/All_Under_One_Roof_-_Disability-inclusive_shelter_and_settlements_in_emergencies.PDF

Informing Strategic Decision Making (refer to sections 2.0, 4.0, 4.3, 6.1, 6.3 and 6.4)

14. Campaign for combined assessments especially with other clusters.
15. Streamline 3W information inputs.
16. Drive the inclusion of cross cutting issues.
17. Include informal settlements.

Planning and Strategy Development (refer to sections 4.0, 4.4, 6.1, 6.3 and 6.4)

18. Break any strategy development up into bits for easier feedback.
19. Finalise the approved SC technical standards early.
20. Ensure that the IASC standards for NFI's⁵ are known and applied.

Advocacy (refer to sections 2.0, 4.0, 4.5, 6.1, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5)

21. The impacts on women and girls and those with impairments must be identified.
22. Traditional coping mechanisms cannot be excluded.
23. Provide for feedback and complaints.
24. Promote an inclusive SC.
25. The role of the GoV in future disasters needs to be spelt out.

Monitoring and Reporting (refer to sections 4.0, 4.6, 6.1, 6.3 and 6.4)

26. Identify lists of people with impairments.
27. Train PWD staff in data collection.
28. Have access to useable census data.
29. Make the basis for strategies obvious and available.

Contingency Planning/Preparedness/capacity Building (refer to sections 2.0, 4.0, 4.7, 6.1, 6.3 and 6.4)

30. Establish what will be the linkages into early recovery.
31. Establish rosters for surge deployment.
32. Link training and capacity building as units of recognised training courses.
33. Confirm the role and coverage of EC's.
34. Confirm and maintain pre-positioned stocks and capacities of agencies.
35. Develop a multi-hazard context, especially for seismically generated events.
36. Establish a Pacific wide annual training programme, possibly led by the IFRC.

Vanuatu SC Moving Forward. (refer to sections 2.0, 4.0, 4.8, 6.1, 6.3 and 6.4)

37. Recognise that any effectiveness will be more culturally based.
38. Identify value-adds that the SC provides.

⁵ IASC Emergency Shelter Cluster, "Selecting NFIs for Shelter," December 2008
https://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/95759/D.03.a.04.%20NFIs%20for%20Shelter_IASC.pdf accessed September 2015.

2.0 INTRODUCTION

TC Pam was born north of Vanuatu on the 6 March 2015, when it was officially named as a tropical disturbance TD11F.⁶ It grew in strength and reached a tropical depression classification by 8th March, and then as Tropical Cyclone Pam at 7pm NZDT on 9th March. From this time warnings were being issued for its predicted path between Vanuatu and Fiji. Instead of between, TC Pam eventually moved across the southern islands of Vanuatu on Friday 13th and Saturday 14th March as a powerful category 5 cyclone. It had sustained average wind speeds at its centre of 250km/h together with heavy rain falls.

Table 1: Australian tropical cyclone intensity scale⁷

Storm Classification	Averaged Wind Speed ⁸		Wind Gusts ^{9 10}	
Tropical Cyclone Cat 5	>107 kt	>200 km/h	>151 kt	>279 km/h
Tropical Cyclone Cat 4	86-107 kt	160-200 km/h	122-151 kt	225-279 km/h
Tropical Cyclone Cat 3	64-85 kt	118-159 km/h	90-121 kt	165-224 km/h
Tropical Cyclone Cat 2	48-63 kt	89-117 km/h	68-89 kt	125-164 km/h
Tropical Cyclone Cat 1	35-47 kt	65-88 km/h	50-67 kt	91-125 km/h
Tropical depression	31-35 kt	57-65 km/h	<50 kt	<91 km/h
Tropical disturbance ¹¹	28-30 kt	52-56 km/h		

The above table is important and has been included in this Report because there was (and seemingly remains) a general misunderstanding in Vanuatu of what a Category 5 meant. The wrong assumption was made that it was the same annual storm that rolls in every year. As a result less than adequate preparedness was done. Moreover, it is not well understood within the disaster preparedness, response and recovery communities that there are different naming designations depending on where a storm originates. Despite these differences of naming they nevertheless represent the same storm category and impact. For example, the category 5 tagging of TC Pam could have also been called a category 5 major hurricane, a super typhoon, a typhoon, a super cyclonic storm, a very intense tropical cyclone and a category 5 severe tropical cyclone, depending on its place of origin. A 'tropical cyclone' sounds inferior to a 'super cyclone,' but they are the same storm.

This apparent naming difference is further confused by the different estimates of wind speed. TC Pam originated in the area controlled by the Australian Bureau of Meteorology and/or the Regional Specialized Meteorological Centre in Nadi, Fiji and hence its terminology and wind speed measurements differ significantly from other metrological areas. The 250 km/h of TC Pam is equivalent to +300km/h, again depending on place of origin. Humanitarians need to be aware of these subtleties and may otherwise inadvertently prioritise incorrectly or inappropriately as happened for the shelter solutions in Port au Prince, Haiti.

The winds gusts that did occur not only damaged buildings but were sufficiently intense to strip the vegetation off, leaving trees bare. It caused serious damage to housing, key

⁶ "TC Pam summary," <http://blog.metservice.com/tag/tcpam/> accessed September 2015

⁷ "Tropical cyclone scales," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tropical_cyclone_scales#Australia_and_Fiji accessed September 2015

⁸ These wind speeds are measured at a height of 10 metres above the ground (usually in open terrain) and are averaged over 10 minutes. Note that the United States Weather Service average over 1 minute and hence their values are typically 14% higher.

⁹ "Maximum sustained wind," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximum_sustained_wind accessed September 2015. Note that cyclones in the Southern Hemisphere are reported according to the Australian tropical cyclone intensity scale. These are for a 3 second gust

¹⁰ "Tropical Cyclone Intensity and Impacts," <http://www.bom.gov.au/cyclone/about/intensity.shtml> accessed September 2015

¹¹ Wind speeds estimated for a tropical disturbance as the terms 'disturbance' and 'depression' seem almost interchangeable refer to "Comparisons across basins," http://www.worldlibrary.org/articles/tropical_cyclone_scales

economic and tourist infrastructure, wide power outages and disruptions to water supply. Gale force winds (over 65 km/h) were experienced at up to 300-380 km¹² either side of its path, so it was seemingly a Pacific wide event.

All of this is important for those responding, as well as those subjected, to any significant cyclonic events so that the scale and both the level of preparation and expected damage can be ascertained.

Nonetheless, the early warnings meant that people and businesses were able to prepare, but it still resulted in 11 deaths according to the Vanuatu Government.¹³ The total cost of TC Pam was estimated at VT48.6 billion¹⁴ (approx CHF 423 million) representing 64.1% of Vanuatu's GDP. The report goes on to state that "...the sectors that sustained the highest level of damage were the housing sector, which accounts for 32% of the total damage costs, followed by the tourism sector (accounting for 20% of all damage), the education sector (accounting for 13% of all damage), and the transport sector (accounting for 10% of total damage)."




Figure 1: The Extent and Proximity of TC Pam to Vanuatu and for the Pacific Region (as at 9pm (left) and 7pm (right) Friday, 13 March 2015). Source NZ Met Service¹⁵

In contrast, the largest level of economic loss will be in the agriculture and tourism sectors, which are estimated at 33% and 26% of the total losses respectively. In addition, the environmental sector suffered significant losses to ecosystem services, although these losses are not accounted within the impacts to GDP.

Some sense of the relative strength and impact of TC Pam is tabulated below.

Thus, TC Pam was one of the most intense cyclones on record in the South Pacific and certainly that was the case for Vanuatu going back to at least 1981. According to the NDMO office it was the first Category 5 cyclone that Vanuatu has responded to with all recent history being Category 3 or less. But besides this it should also be noted that while storms affected more people than seismic events, seismic have the larger death tolls.

¹² "Tropical cyclone Pam deepens over Vanuatu," <http://pacific.scoop.co.nz/2015/03/tropical-cyclone-pam-deepens-over-vanuatu/> accessed September 2015.

¹³ "Vanuatu govt still say Cyclone Pam death toll at 11," <http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/269306/vanuatu-govt-still-say-cyclone-pam-death-toll-at-11> accessed September 2015.

¹⁴ "Vanuatu Post-Disaster Needs Assessment Tropical Cyclone Pam," March 2015 Government of Vanuatu Prime Minister's Office PMB 9053, Port Vila, Vanuatu.

¹⁵ "Tropical Cyclone Pam Updates – Saturday 14 March 2015," <http://blog.metservice.com/2015/03/tropical-cyclone-pam-updates-saturday-14-march-2015/> accessed September 2015.

Table 2: Effect of Disasters in Vanuatu¹⁶

Type	Year	Affected	Deaths	Cost (USDx1000)
Storm(TC Pam)	2015	166,000	11-16	433,000
Storm	1985	117,500	9	173,000
Storm	2004	54,008	2	No data
Storm	1987	48,000	48	25,000
Earthquake	1999	14,100	12	No data
Storm	1993	12,005	4	6,000
Volcano	2008	9,000	0	No data
Volcano	2005	5,000	0	No data
Storm	1988	4,700	0	0
Volcano	2001	4,500	0	0
Flood	2002	3,001	1	0
Earthquake	1997	No data	100	No data
Storm	1999	No data	32	No data
Storm	1992	No data	2	No data
Storm	1981	No data	0	1,000

Hence, this technical content must be understood by all disaster responding personnel regardless of whether they are involved in early warning, messaging, DRR or assessment.

3.0 TERMS OF REFERENCE

The GoV, through the NDMO, activated the cluster system to coordinate the anticipated humanitarian response by aid agencies following TC Pam. The clusters are national coordination mechanisms led by the government, with humanitarian partners acting in a co-lead capacity to provide technical assistance and support to the government lead.




Figure 2: The NDMO Organisational Structure.

¹⁶ Data used from UNISDR Preventionweb.net

There was no shelter cluster in Vanuatu prior to TC Pam, although the GoV had requested IFRC support to establish a shelter cluster some two weeks prior to TC Pam. As a result, IFRC has been co-leading the SC in Vanuatu since March 2015.

The Secretariat of the IFRC now seeks to review the effectiveness of the SC coordination services provided by IFRC in response to TC Pam in Vanuatu, to identify key lessons and recommendations to improve and inform future responses.

This project aligns with Strategic Aim 2 of IFRC Strategy 2020: to save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disasters and crisis. It will provide key lessons and recommendations to improve and inform future shelter response in Vanuatu. Through improved shelter coordination, humanitarian agencies can strengthen the shelter response to disasters.

3.1 REVIEW OBJECTIVES

The stated objectives of this Review were to:

- Appraise the service provided by IFRC as SC co-coordinator to SC participants – Government, UN agencies, RCRC, NGOs, both national and international, and other actors.
- Review and analyse the experience of IFRC with respect to the establishment and operation of the SC, with a particular emphasis on lessons to be learnt for future operations.
- Provide recommendations with regard to IFRC's leadership of future emergency SC coordination activities in Vanuatu, for preparedness and emergency response and the resources required to perform such a role.
- Examine if there were aspects of IFRC's cluster leadership which potentially might have, or actually did, compromise the mandate and principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent.

In determining these objectives, the Review used the following framework:

1. Coordination Arrangements
2. Supporting Service Delivery
3. Informing strategic decision-making of the humanitarian response
4. Planning and Strategy Development
5. Advocacy
6. Monitoring and Reporting
7. Contingency Planning/Preparedness/Capacity building
8. SC Response

This is referred to as the Eight Area Framework, or 8-A-F.

3.2 DESIRED OUTCOMES

Through the conduct of a Review of the Vanuatu SC in response to TC Pam, the following outcomes will be achieved:

- IFRC (Pacific Regional Office, Asia-Pacific Zone Office and the Shelter and Settlements department) will identify lessons and act on recommendations to improve future deployments.
- SCT members and the GSC Support Team will learn from the findings of the Review and apply them to revise tools and guidelines to improve shelter coordination policy and practice.

- Vanuatu SCP and Government will use the Review as a reference to improve their shelter response in future disasters as relevant.
- The Pacific Humanitarian Team and other clusters in Vanuatu and the region will use the Review to identify good practices and areas for improvement that may be relevant to their own coordination responsibilities.
- Donors and other humanitarian actors will use the Review to inform planning and funding decisions for future shelter coordination and response in Vanuatu.

3.3 METHODOLOGY

The methodology used a mixed-mode-design of surveys (SurveyMonkey), face to face and skype interviews, and a desktop Review of key documents and background literature to triangulate the findings on which the recommendations are based.

A desktop review was completed on material provided via DROPBOX (85 SC related documents were read), the SC web page (89 documents were downloading, including technical guides and meeting minutes) and relevant material from the internet (119 documents downloaded). The most relevant of these were included in a Literature Review document included in the Annexe. The SC web page was a primary source of material but this was backed by a Google search that managed to pick up other non SC materials that were while not directly relevant from their title but were once they were read. For example, “Traditional Architecture in Vanuatu” by Christian Coiffier published 1988, gave relevant expert information about the materials that had been and could be used in the traditional structure strategy proposed in the SC strategy. This was when everyone seemed to have an opinion on what was traditionally used in Vanuatu. But there were others that were not included in the Literature Review such as the “Lessons Learned” reports from the other clusters.

Interviews are a valuable assessment tool because they allow the participant to share their experiences, attitudes and beliefs in their own words. The interviews were semi structured around the 8-A-F. They were electronically taped using a Q3 Zoom recorder that firstly meant that the interviewee could talk freely without having a microphone in their face. Secondly, in depth notes were not required which meant that the interviewer could concentrate on what was being said and probe further with appropriate questions and comments. The recordings could be reviewed later and further analysis of the comments and ideas taken and themes developed. In all there were 21 people interviewed during the 2 weeks in the field and these are tabulated below:

Table 3: The People Interviewed

	Name	Position/ Organisation/ Location.
1	Peter Lawther	IFRC was the first SC Coordinator based in Port Vila, Vanuatu, but overall in Suva, Fiji.
2	Xavier Genot	IFRC was the 3 rd SC Coordinator based in Port Vila, Vanuatu
3	Andrew Peacock	IFRC Technical Coordinator based in Port Vila, Vanuatu
4	Ryan Smith	IFRC IM based in Port Vila, Vanuatu
5	Robert Mulligan	Architect based in Port Vila, Vanuatu
6	Jerry Esrom	Local entrepreneur and village representative lives in Port Vila, Vanuatu.
7	Dave Colbert	Butterfly Trust based in Port Vila, Vanuatu
8	Dave O'Meara	IOM based in Port Vila, Vanuatu.
9	Tom Bamforth	IFRC was the 2 nd SC coordinator based in Port Vila, Vanuatu.
10	Dick Abel	PWD Vanuatu SC co-lead, lives in Port Vila Vanuatu.
11	Jaqueline de Gaillande	Vanuatu Red Cross Chief Executive Officer, lives in Port Vila, Vanuatu.
12	Wojciech	NDMO based in Port Vila, Vanuatu.

	Dabrowka	
13	Shadrack Welegtabit	NDMO Director lives in Port Vila, Vanuatu
14	Jeffrey Kaitip	DLA lives in Port Vila, Vanuatu
15	Damian Farrell	Dept of Women's Affairs Disability Desk Vanuatu Govt lives in Port Vila, Vanuatu.
16	Naket Kuknei	Provincial Project Office Tanna Island lives on Tanna Island, Vanuatu.
17	Daniel Samson	NDMO, lives on Tanna Island, Vanuatu
18	Nalan Manakel	DLA Tanna Island lives on Tanna Island, Vanuatu.
19	Jean D'Aragnon	UN-Habitat based in Port Vila, Vanuatu.
20+21	CARE office	CARE Tanna Island, Vanuatu.

Timing meant that meetings could not be held with the REACH team, the shelter team from the LDS and the RTE team leader. The FRC and the ARC had left and could not be contacted, as had OCHA and UNDP.

Surveys were the third leg of the triangulation. SurveyMonkey was used which worked well except for the intermittent internet connectivity encountered in Port Vila, meaning that access to the results was only possible back in New Zealand. There were actually two online surveys adapted from the IASC, one for SCP and one for the SCT.

The questions for both surveys were adapted from the IASC standards. They were sent out to all 141 people on the SC email list, with 4 rebounding back but it had 32 responses, or a 24% return rate, which is acceptable given many would have left Vanuatu. There was a sufficiently broad organisational coverage of those survey responses, as can be seen from the figure below.




Figure 3: Survey Coverage of the SCP.

Qualitative data analysis is an iterative, often reflexive, but certainly a reflective process that seems to begin as data is being collected rather than after the data collection has been completed. Ideas and connections start and are jotted down with interpretations being an ongoing process. The central point for this Review is the 8-A-F. While this is a useful tool for evaluation, ultimately, it is the outcomes for the beneficiary community that are the final measures. This point was made by all the speakers at the recent Pacific section of the World Humanitarian Summit in Auckland on 30 June-2 July 2015.¹⁷ This is stated so that the reader appreciates that, while this report concentrates on the coordination aspects, the author nonetheless is mindful of what the real impacts should be. The design of the two pronged evaluation is that the REACH 2 survey would review the impacts of the SC in Vanuatu.

Finally, the methodology did adhere to the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluations,¹⁸ with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized.

4.0 THE REVIEW

So, what was found from this Review? The following analysis is presented using the 8-A-F Approach mindful of the questions raised in the TOR for each of the eight areas.¹⁹ The eight areas are not completely independent of each other and at times questions and issues stated in one will be answered in another. They are interconnected. In addition, the review of the draft Report suggested that a further section would be needed to cover aspects raised in the Project Objectives of the TOR. Thus, there is one additional section beyond the 8_A-F Approach.

The results from SurveyMonkey have been included and may seem 'prominent', maybe too prominent. This was not the intention. However, they do provide a useful quantitative platform from which to fold in the other findings of the Review and expand the discussion of the 8-A-F Approach.

Care was taken with the folding in of interview material to ensure protection of the interviewees as stipulated in the IFRC Framework for Evaluation. In addition, the folding in of any negative opinions was done only where there was triangulation from either the literature review or the experience of the author. Again, this seemed to be in line with the intent of the framework.

Finally, to get a broad overview of the SC Response in Vanuatu the review of the draft version of this Report suggested a timeline. This has been constructed based on the IFRC Vanuatu case study and extended to include most of the milestones for the SC. This has been included in the Annexe.

4.1 COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS

There was no SC in Vanuatu prior to TC Pam,²⁰ but the IFRC was in discussion with the GoV just 2 weeks prior to it. Immediately following TC Pam, the SC was set up as a 'working group' of the logistics cluster, but quickly became a standalone cluster. It had been the

¹⁷ Regional Consultation For The Pacific, Auckland, 30 June - 2 July 2015 "Final Report"
<http://reliefweb.int/report/world/regional-consultation-pacific-auckland-30-june-2-july-2015-final-report> accessed September 2015

¹⁸ IFRC PED, "IFRC Framework for Evaluation," February 2011,
<http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/monitoring/IFRC-Framework-for-Evaluation.pdf> accessed September 2015.

¹⁹ These questions have been included in the Annexe.

²⁰ "Vanuatu Shelter Cluster Tropical Cyclone Pam Response Lessons Learned, June 2015,"
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/vanuatu_sc_ll_final_report_v2_22062015.pdf accessed September 2015

intention of the GoV to set up a SC whether or not TC Pam occurred; but Pam’s occurrence meant that it probably happened sooner.²¹ While its set up may have been serendipitous the advent of storm forecasting of metrological events within the Pacific Region should mean that replicating such a timely activation of the SC must now be workable.

The cluster setup in Vanuatu is shown in the figure below with the 6 existing clusters of Logistics, Food Security, Education, Health and Nutrition, Gender and Protection and WASH. There was no GoV counterpart for the SC as its role does not fit neatly into any one government department and hence that selection by the GoV was not made till June. This made strategy development difficult up to that time.

Humanitarian Coordination Structure for Tropical Cyclone Pam




Figure 4: The Initial Cluster Setup in Vanuatu for the TC Pam Response.²²

The PWD were selected by the GoV and now lead the SC, with IFRC as the co-lead. There were some concerns about the selection of the PWD, who are primarily infrastructure centred, regarding whether they would have the background for shelter and NFI distribution. In addition, their critical infrastructure role, outside the Cluster arrangement, could result in either little time allocation or marginalizing of any SC priorities. However, on the other hand, the PWD have divisional offices in all 6 provinces and were a key part of the NDMO’s assessment and hence the SC should be well represented at both national and local levels for future disasters. Previously, shelter had simply consisted of distributing emergency tarps based on an initial rapid assessment. The NDMO office would advise where the needs were and shelter aid (usually as tarps) was delivered. In the future, assessment mapping and coordinating such assistance would mean better targeting of beneficiaries and reduced

²¹ Reported in the interviews with the NDMO

²² “Flash Appeal Emergency Response Plan For Vanuatu Tropical Cyclone Pam March –June 2015,” <http://reliefweb.int/report/vanuatu/flash-appeal-emergency-response-plan-vanuatu-tropical-cyclone-pam-march-june-2015> Accessed September 2015

duplication by SCP. The use of standard assessment forms, apparently used across the different clusters and government departments for TC Pam, should make this more seamless in places where the PWD have had a key role in the past. This would be a distinct asset for a SC lead by the PWD.

However, there had been issues as the VNSO measured kitchens as the basic HH unit and not individual HH. The issue here, besides the obvious difference in numbers, is the difference in coping mechanisms. Counting individual HH will miss the potential for other kitchen members to assist and hence assistance based on HH will cross the natural coping mechanisms of wider families. This is the sort of issue that an infrastructure based organization may struggle with.

On the technical side the need to identify a building code (especially for schools and community buildings) also came up. The current gazette code is 1992 based and there were apparently several other versions based on later revisions of Australian and New Zealand building codes in use for 2000, 2004 and 2011/13. This is also related to the SC strategy of using traditional (but non engineered) structures and while there was a technical publication on BBB principles (TWIG), Owner Driven Housing Reconstruction (IFRC) and Key principles for Safer Construction (IEC) there is no code for traditional structures. This gap seemingly remains.

Nevertheless, the gap of a co-lead does remain and, while the VRC could have been the obvious choice, they had indicated that they did not have the capacity for that role. This lack of shelter capacity within VRC meant that there was minimal potential for linking from the SC and this perhaps should be addressed for future disaster responses. ARCS have one shelter delegate with VRC. His current role is with the construction of schools in the Shepherd Islands and he has also been rolling out the VRC safe shelter awareness program that concentrates on housing²³. Hence, the co-lead gap remains and presumably IFRC will need to support PWD in terms of strengthening the SC as it moves forward with the discussion around EC, pre-positioning and data collection (the lack of up to date census data for the TC response was a problem). This will be hampered by not being in-country but the IFRC could/would nonetheless be available when disaster occurs.²⁴ On the other hand, the NDMO did have suggestions for who that could be and this will probably be discussed further in the coming months. DLA will take the lead for recovery housing activities, into which the SC needs to link, with UN-Habitat taking the co-lead role. Overall, the clusters will remain as convened by the NDMO.

It was difficult reviewing the role of the SC relative to the other 6 Clusters for a variety of reasons, mostly because the people involved were no longer available. That aside, the NDMO were highly appreciative of the contribution from the SC and the expertise, techniques and personnel they were able to bring to it. The SC made several attempts to connect with other Clusters and this is reflected in the materials posted on the web page and in the minutes of SC meetings where other Clusters were invited to be present.

However, there seem to be issues beyond this Review when basic data, such as the counting of kitchens mentioned earlier, is not known to any of the 6 established clusters and the sharing of core data is not apparently happening. Another example was what code was to be used for the design of schools and community buildings? Hence, there appeared to be coordination issues between the Clusters. This is further evident from reading the "Lessons Learned" from other Clusters in that there are minimal if any aims that reach across their

²³ Safe Shelter Awareness Workshops, West Tanna http://www.vanuaturedcross.org/news/2015/11/12/shelter-awareness-tanna?fb_action_ids=982734818431252&fb_action_types=og.likes accessed Dec 2015.

²⁴ The exact role of the IFRC as the GSC in a disaster in Vanuatu will become blurred when a co-lead is appointed. This did not come up in the interviews and discussions with IFRC personnel.

cluster lines. Hence, the earlier A- mark for the SC because of its high standard of leadership.

The key SCP listed on the SC web page are tabulated below.

Table 4: SCP in Vanuatu as part of the TC Pam Response.

AAR Japan	Disability Desk	Samaritan's Purse	World Vision
Act for Peace	Habitat for Humanity Australia	Save the Children	
ADRA Vanuatu	Habitat for Humanity New Zealand	Vanuatu Red Cross, with the Australian Red Cross, French Red Cross and IFRC	
Butterfly Trust	IOM	Vanuatu Society for People with Disability (VSDP)	
CARE International	Liberty for the Nation	Vanuatu Christian Council	
Caritas	NDMO	ShelterBox	The Salvation Army

It is not clear which of these would be described as active SCP, but the implementing organisations at the time of this review were ADRA, Caritas, Vanuatu Christian Council, Disability Desk, The Salvation Army, World Vision, CARE International, Vanuatu Red Cross, Save the Children, IOM and the Latter Day Saints (LDS). These seem to be the core of the SC. There are several faith based and volunteer organisations on this list which is could be representative of the Pacific context. The engagement by the SC of such organisations with a longer history and direct community involvement, but with less technical grounding compared to the larger SCP, requires a different approach. Those interviewed expressed a problem keeping up with the 3W reporting requirements because they were required to attend more than one Cluster. Butterfly Trust, for example, was attending 5 of the Clusters.

The staffing of the SC has been through deployments from the Regional IFRC office in Fiji and from the GSC in Geneva. There are two points to note. The first was the slow appointment of a SC Technical Coordinator (see SC timeline in Annexe). This meant that the required standards and guidance lagged behind what was happening in the field. This is unfortunate because one of the value adds of the SC is the technical back up it can and should provide. Interestingly, technical strategy back up was provided by Bill Flynn in his role of Technical Advisor for CARE International. The reason seemed to be a lack of suitably qualified people that were available, but that did not seem to be the case as there were several from the ARCS, RedR Australia²⁵ and the NZRC that would have been available. There does seem to be something of a disconnection between the need for technical staff, the various rosters being held and the available technical people.

Table 5: SC Staffing

Rotation	Coordinator	Information Manager	Technical Coordinator
1	Peter Lawther	Neil Bauman	Remotely from Geneva
2	Tom Bamforth	Ryan Smith	Remotely from Geneva
3	Xavier Genot	Ryan Smith	Andrew Peacock
4	PWD	PWD (presumed)	PWD (presumed)

The second point, based on the interviews, was the need for administrative assistance from the start of the SC. Such assistance would free up coordination and technical staff in the

²⁵ RedR Australia relieves suffering in disasters by selecting, training and providing competent and committed personnel to humanitarian relief agencies worldwide," <http://www.redr.org.au/>

roles that they have, but also ensure a more timely response and flow of key information to agencies and donors.

The third staffing issue, again mentioned in the interviews and in general discussion, was the impact of the GoV decision to move quickly from response into the recovery phase. This was planned by unilaterally reducing the response phase to 3 months. This created problems for many shelter programmes which could not be completed in that time frame and suggested that the SCT should be wound up in the same time frame. That was not done and SC extended out to September rather than July. It would seem unrealistic to respond to a Level 3 Emergency by deploying a SCT for only 3 months and that a period like 6 months would be more reasonable.

Fourthly, what came through the interviews of the 3 SCCs were the effective handovers that occurred. This is not always achieved, but it made for a seemingly seamless transition between them that was appreciated by all the SCP's interviewed. Interestingly, they presumed that this was the normal SC experience.

There was an attempt to link into Tanna Island by holding SC meetings there rather than in Port Vila. That was appreciated by SCP's working out of Lenakel, but not by those working out of Port Vila. This is discussed in more detail later in the Review.

There were two TWIGs covering BBS and training courses; and the SAG was instigated to streamline SC decision making. All of the SAC literature were posted on the "Shelter Cluster Vanuatu" web page.

Finally, the work of the SC was well regarded by the GoV, counterparts and SCP.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Get the SC Response activated as early as practicable.** It was timely that the IFRC Regional Shelter Delegate was in Port Vila prior to TC Pam. That sense of serendipity could/should be matched in the future by storm early warning and responding appropriately. While this is mostly probably in place it is still worthwhile underlining it. Get the SC Response established as early as practicable.
2. **Plan SC response deployment for a minimum period of 6 months.** Deploy the SC for a minimum period of 6 months rather than the imposed 3 months that occurred in Vanuatu (due largely to Government pressure to move to recovery as fast as possible). The difference between emergency and recovery shelter, and the need to lead (or transition) into the recovery phase, was not that well understood; or on the other hand was understood, but prioritised differently. This meant that SCP could not realistically achieve shelter outcomes within the HAP time frame. This was problematic in a cyclone, but would be critical in a seismic event.
3. **Maintain the established strong links with NDMO during any Response;** with the SC lead and co-lead potentially being again initially established at the NDMO and then moving to PWD (with the SC leads being at the table at NDMO). This would allow more direct connections to early assessment/data but also to the logistics cluster, which was the key to many of the SCP issues in the first weeks of the TC Pam Response. Furthermore, it would also assist in establishing ongoing links with other clusters such as WASH and Protection.
4. **Set up regional hubs as soon as practicable.** These could be chaired by the PWD or an INGO/NGO already established in the area. For TC Pam this would/could have been in Tanna, Ambrym and possibly Erromango/Aneityum and Moso/Tongoa. The PWD has an existing divisional structure throughout Vanuatu that will be utilised.
5. **Insist on strong SC handover procedures.** Maintain the strong SC handover procedures that allowed for an in-country overlap of coordinators. This was not

necessarily identified as a key feature of the coordination arrangements by the coordinators, but has certainly been highlighted in other SC Reviews. This would need to reflect the PWD lead and IFRC co-lead and there would be some variation depending on who is appointed to co-lead.

6. **Ensure that there is dedicated SC administrative support.** There is a need for dedicated administrative support being available to the SC Response (as noted in other Pacific based SC Reviews²⁶). This may be provided via the PWD, but it should be noted and resources allocated appropriately.

4.2 SUPPORTING SERVICE DELIVERY

In the first days of the response it seems that the SC was leading in the determination and compiling of damage numbers. There had been meetings with the GoV and it had been agreed to use the 2009 census and that these would be compounded using agreed percentages to arrive at the current baseline numbers.²⁷ However, it turned out that NDMO had been receiving up to date data from their Provincial Offices and they in turn had been compiling data from CDC's. This data was apparently handed over on a pen drive to the SCC and was not being distributed widely other than through these informal links. This data flow from CDCs should obviously be formalised and made evident to all Clusters in future disasters. It is not clear why that was not already in place, but it did underline the need to connect assessments to the response and in this case to those affected through CDC's.

Moreover, the Review found tracking assessments and indicators through the SC web page to be problematic. Response data was being input when it became available and SCP were being updated in the SC meetings. This was greatly appreciated and was evident in both the interviews with SCP and the survey data below, but it was difficult to confidently track especially determining whether data had been superseded or not.

Hence, there is a strong need to link assessments to response in any forthcoming disaster responses²⁸ to ensure that the above issues of assessment and tracking response have been addressed. This is also mindful of the issue with counting kitchens, mentioned earlier.

There was strong negative feedback from three interviewees outside the SCT about the 'templatedness' of the SC Response and what was termed "...in case of an emergency break glass and take this" approach. What this meant was there was a perception that the coordination of the SC in Vanuatu was constrained by a prescribed outside approach that was unable to respond to the context in Vanuatu but also probably the Pacific.

The first item mentioned was the smaller scale of TC Pam in Vanuatu (11 deaths) compared to other disasters such as Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (6,340 deaths) or the earthquake in Nepal (7,500+ deaths). The feedback was that this difference of scale requires a different and more flexible approach by the SC that could be at odds with how it may have been approached in these other two disasters. Moreover, this difference of scale was felt to be a common feature of disasters in the Pacific. Secondly, there is a wide difference of building typologies, construction practices and materials throughout the Vanuatu Islands. This was not recognised and a one size fits all was seemingly adopted. Again, this was seen as being typical of Pacific disaster response. Hence, for these reasons, there is a need to better link assessments to Response.²⁹ Again, this is probably not the first time that this has been observed.

²⁶ Peter Lawther (2013) "Review of the Fiji Shelter Cluster in response to Tropical Cyclone Evan," adore.ifrc.org/Download.aspx?FileId=51074&.pdf

²⁷ Based on interviews, but not reported elsewhere.

²⁸ IFRC (2000) "Disaster Emergency Needs Assessment: Disaster Preparedness Training Programme June 2000."

²⁹ This was also one of the findings of the SC Lessons Learned Workshop; see the Literature Review.

There were others that commented on the apparent 'one size fits all' approach of the SC. For example, despite the small range of materials used for traditional construction in Vanuatu there are distinctive geographical differences. Interviewees reported that this was seemingly not reflected in the training or technical documentation of the SC.

Other modes of assistance such as cash grants and voucher systems were also raised in the interviews and, while these were considered, the lack of readily accessible markets seemed to prevent this approach being used more widely.

However, the impact on women seemed to have been missed, perhaps by the assumption that all are affected the same? There was a similar situation with the kitchen based family units instead of the HH approach that was the basis for allocation of aid assistance by SCP. Part of this could have been because of the lack of a SC lead in those early months? But that will not be the case for the next disaster. This and the recent moves by the IFRC to target those in the community with impairments³⁰ means that the one-size-fits-all approach is increasingly being outdated.

In preparing for impending storms Ni-Vans would traditionally do the following:

- Prepare their housing
- Collect food
- Collect building materials for the anticipated damage
- Cut down trees
- Cut back crops for early re-growth immediately after the storm.

That did not seemingly happen with TC Pam because of the reported gaps in traditional building materials. Part of the blame has been attributed to people not understanding what a Category 5 Cyclone meant in terms of the damage and the required actions. They thought it was the usual storm that they were used to and had previously survived with minimal preparation. While this was not driven by the SC it nevertheless needs to be incorporated in the next cyclone response and the traditional coping response actions highlighted.

One good point made by two interviews, again outside the SCT, was the potential impact of building EC. Such centres are appearing as a key infrastructure response in future disasters. However, they make the point that if people know and are provided with an EC why would they then invest in disaster proofing their own home and why would they follow the traditional preparations if they know food and assistance will be provided? It would actually be 'better' if their house was blown down and their crops destroyed. It is a point that the PWD as the SC lead will need to ascertain as the planning for EC proceeds.

Still further, interviews questioned whether it is the SC or whether it should be the Emergency SC and NFI cluster? This is not the first time that the GSC will have encountered this confusion, but it does mean that the SC needs to find examples of their value adding for SCP. These would firstly underline what the SC does that assists SCP and secondly positively address whether it has solely an emergency role or otherwise. This again is something that the PWD could address so that it has some of the answers to what appear to be ongoing questions and, when the cluster is again activated, it can be approached with greater confidence and direction.

Those interviewed commented about the strong support that was received from IFRC Geneva which this Review has contrasted against the minimal one from IFRC KL. This was also commented on by the RTE report and also by other Pacific based responses. This

³⁰ The IFRC "All Under One Roof" programme.

seemed to be accepted as a matter of fact within the SCP It is not clear whether that should be treated as 'good or bad'.

The feedback from SurveyMonkey dealt more with the basic workings of the SC. It suggested that the frequency of meetings and participation of SC partners was good with over 50% being very satisfied with the frequency of meetings and 70+% 'often' attending meetings.




Figure 5: SC Meetings Frequency and Attendance.

There was an attempt to hold meetings on Tanna Island and, while this was appreciated, the value of it was questioned by those interviewed. It meant that those in Port Vila needed to travel to Tanna Island and this, especially for smaller organisations, was expensive. I also noted that for this Review that the airfare to Tanna Island was comparable to airfare from New Zealand. Internal air travel in Vanuatu is expensive. However, it was desperately important for the SC to have a collective view of what is happening outside of Port Vila and Tanna Island was, costs aside, the most accessible. For the Pacific Region where the SC will be located in an island based nation, location and connection to the other islands will remain problematic. The idea of supporting SC partners to form a sub cluster in their regions (as was done in Tanna Island), with the main SC meeting then 'dropping' in at some stage to touch base, is logical and certainly practical, albeit expensive. This should be readily achieved using the existing Divisional organisational structure of the PWD and has been included in the recommendations.

The meetings were considered 'fairly' accessible (see Q7 below) in terms of location and language by 70+% of the SC. This is possibly because of the readily available small van-bus service in Port Vila. Nonetheless, facilities such as a local translation using BE ON AIR³¹ via a wireless network is another service that the GSC should/could be following up on and maybe even trialling. However, 60% of those attending the meeting had limited decision making authority (see Q6 below). This maybe understandable with agencies often needing to attend more than one cluster meeting, thereby spreading the responsibility around the team. This again was a particular issue for the smaller NGO's, but not unfamiliar to the larger ones as well.

³¹ Designed to broadcast your voice <http://www.beonairapp.com/>





Figure 6: SCP Representation at Meetings.

The responses to the two questions below (Q8 and Q9) suggest that the SC was doing a good to great job of both identifying the gaps and needs (Q8) but also in taking strategic decisions about the consequent SC direction (Q9). Both responses showed that over 2/3rds of those surveyed found that to be the case ('Quite alot and Definitely' for Q8; and 'Strategic decisions were taken and they were mostly useful to always useful" for Q9). However, later findings suggest that some significant gaps still existed regardlessly.





Figure 7: Contents of SC Meetings.

There was confusion with the responses about the whether the SC regularly mapped what agencies were doing (the 3W maps) and whether organisations had made decisions based on the gaps identified by the SC (Q10 and 11). While most agreed that mapping had been done, only 50% had any seemingly meaningful contribution. Some reasons for this were that projects had not yet started, 1 was observing and 1 was not operational, but it is down on what would be expected for what is a core coordinating service and consequentially whether any decisions had been made by the Agency based on that mapping. The numbers showed that 57% often did, while 21% were seldom.




Figure 8: SC 3W Mapping.

Some responses to this were that it assisted them to find ways that they could contribute, but perhaps not in the ways suggested by the SC, while others were wanting to know how to interface with the GoV and there was a sense that the SC (other than Port Vila and Tanna) were not connected to other parts of Vanuatu that presumably they were. The shared relationship role of the cluster needed to be emphasized. Finally, 2 organisations pointed to the need for support in compiling the data for the 3W, they simply did not have the resources to complete the work and presumably the demands for needs across the Cluster may have meant that the 3W got a lower work priority than other aspects of their response. Again, these issues should be addressed by having the PWD as the lead and the need to address the 3W reporting overheads of SCP achieved through better technology.

Finally, several SCP, both informally and through the interviews, made a plea for reducing the reporting burden of the SC. It is suggested that the PWD together with NDMO and the Inter Cluster group target potential technology to streamline Cluster reporting requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. **Assessments must/should be better linked to Response.** The Review found it problematic tracking indicators and capacities through the SC web page and other web sites, making it difficult to follow the decision making and strategy development, let alone check whether goals set for the SC had been achieved. Simply putting information on the web page and directing SCP to the web page is not sufficient. It needs to be positively highlighted. For example, it was difficult to know if data had been superseded or not.
8. **Work with traditional coping mechanisms.** The delicate balance between assisting and impeding traditional coping mechanisms and the potential for 'dependency' needs to be carefully gauged. For example, the creation of EC may also mean that people do not invest in BBS for their own houses as they only need to

- evacuate to the EC if a disaster should occur. Certainly, several reports suggest that people are "...now waiting on aid and not proactive in starting up for themselves."³²
9. **Expressly explain what a Category 5 TC means to those about to be affected by one.** The meaning of what a Category 5 TC is was not clear. As a consequence, many received the warning but thought that it was just another storm like they were used to. The gravity of TC Pam being Cat 5 was not communicated. Whether this is a SC issue or not, it nonetheless probably falls to the SC to make sure that this is technically made clear within the Cluster and through any messaging/communications that are made. This could/would be significant for the PWD for future storms.
 10. **Strengthen the Divisional linkages within PWD.** Support a structure within PWD that allows national level policy to be fed into local provincial levels, thereby allowing policy to flow down, but more importantly for practice, to flow back up from them. This could/should involve other Government and non Government organisations as required. The goal is to create a communication channel for disaster response when it happens.
 11. **Identify and document situations where the SC adds value for SCP.** Showcase areas where the SC and SCP have worked in the TC Pam response. There are currently at least 11 projects to choose from. This would/could also assist the PWD to establish a longitudinal view of such value adding outcomes of the SC.
 12. **Use technology for better and faster information flows.** The better use of technology should/could be investigated further. For example, the use of mobile phones for rapid data collection on displacement, shortening or streamlining the data input for 3W (especially for smaller NGO/INGO's); streamlining the recording and presentation of meeting other than writing up full minutes; better alignment with NDMO so that data collectors are covered under any declared state of emergency and use of the time before a storm to get key messages out regarding what to do if your shelter is damaged (such as moving to EC's).
 13. **A 'one-size-fits-all' approach must be treated as the last option.** A 'one-size-fits-all' approach is becoming increasingly out dated and does not reflect the uniqueness that will be found in Vanuatu and probably other Pacific nations. Standard aid packages may need to be reviewed and the provision of either specific assistance or cash so that those affected can select what they need should be investigated. However, cash assistance would need to be carefully targeted so that it does not disrupt traditional coping approaches and potentially promote an unintended dependency. There is a need to understand the uniqueness of each of the Vanuatu island communities in terms of the different material and construction practices. The Literature Review has a good tabulated approach to assess traditional coping mechanisms.

4.3 INFORMING STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING FOR THE RESPONSE

The first needs assessment³³ one week after TC Pam found the following:

- Vanuatu's President had declared a State of Emergency across all six provinces of Vanuatu.
- Shelter, food, health and water, sanitation and health (WASH) remained key needs.
- Half of Vanuatu's population, spread over 22 islands, has been affected by TC Pam.

³² "Vanuatu Education Cluster Tropical Cyclone Pam Response Lessons Learned (2015)," http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/vanuatu_education_lessons_learned_report_23_06_2015_final_draft_11_52_kw_proof.pdf accessed September 2015 pg 15

³³ OCHA Regional Office for the Pacific, "Vanuatu: Tropical Cyclone Pam" Situation Report No. 7 (as of 21 March 2015)," http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA_VUT_TCPam_Sitrep7_20150321.pdf accessed September 2015

- 166,000 people (approximately 66% of the total population) were estimated to be in need of food assistance for the next three months.
- Estimates indicated that around 80% of all EC could be closed if aid, especially emergency shelter and food, is distributed in communities of origin.
- TC Pam has severely compromised the livelihoods of at least 80% of Vanuatu's rural population.
- The Shepherd Islands and Mataso were identified as having the most urgent needs.
- About 57,000 affected school-age children are receiving relief assistance.
- Rates of malnutrition are likely to increase.

There were 3,852 people in EC in Efate, 57,000 children targeted for education assistance and 65,000 in need of temporary shelter. The media reports of 16 confirmed fatalities were rolled back to the final official toll of 11.

The agreed standardised response from SCP reported in the minutes of the SC meeting on the 23 March 2015 were the following:

- 2 Shelter grade plastic sheets to all HH with houses completely destroyed and partially damaged houses
- 1 Kitchen Set to HH with completely destroyed houses
- 2 double blankets to HH with completely destroyed houses

The incorrect census data and the issues of access meant that workable numbers that could be trusted were not yet available. Besides that the minutes also noted that for “3Ws - There is a need for NGO partners to report accurately what stocks they have, what distribution plans are, and where in order to facilitate accurate coordination. Please note that this is a specific request from the government who expects all NGOs to regularly report to the Shelter Working Group 3W to avoid overlap and ensure efficient allocation of resources.” It also noted that Sitreps would be every 2 days and that SWG would be set up in all the regional areas and chaired by INGO's working in the area. Interestingly, the outputs from these were not noticed elsewhere, except for the one on Tanna Island. It was clear that the pressure was on (which is usual) for SCP, but adds detail to what has been reported thus far. It was also clear that the lack of a GoV appointed lead agency was missed. This confusion should be addressed in future disaster response with the appointment of the PWD.

However, by the SC meeting of the 30 March this had been refined to the following:

- Totally damaged HH: 2 Tarpaulins
- Partially damaged HH: 1 Tarpaulin
- HH should have access to a shelter kit. (The quantity per HH will depend on the context and cluster agency assessment of what tools are already available. One toolkit per HH may be excessive.)
- Additional NFIs such as kitchen sets, blankets will also be agency and context specific and dependent on assessed need.

IEC materials were being distributed and assessment numbers of “23 islands identified, with a need of 12,600 households, (rough estimate) that have totally destroyed, or partially damaged house. Population figures are unstable, and this initial estimate is likely to rise. Total number of HH assisted is c. 9500” were being reported though it was problematic to find and follow this data in the SC records.

The HAP that followed had 3 objectives which were as follows:

- Cluster Objective 1: Provide emergency shelter and non-food items for people whose houses have been partially damaged or destroyed. Case load 18,000 HH
- Cluster Objective 2: Assist affected people with repair and reconstruction of houses, water and sanitation facilities. Case load 18,000 HH
- Cluster Objective 3: Investment in safer community buildings. Case load 18,000 HH

These were then used to coordinate 15 proposals of which 11 were fully funded and are now going ahead.

The key document for all Clusters, including the SC, was the 3W reporting. However, the smaller SCP expressed problems in firstly knowing how to fill them out and secondly having the time and staffing to do that. There were three issues namely:

- 1) Several/Most of the SCP attended more than 3 clusters. The regular meetings of the clusters meant that agencies could spend all their time just attending meetings and filling in 3W's.
- 2) Most of the agencies were present before TC Pam and had worked in Vanuatu for some time.³⁴ Thus, their perspective was more 'recovery looking back' rather than 'relief looking forward' which was the SC one.
- 3) All of the SCP had a development perspective rather than a relief/response one.

The SCP performed creditably managing to essentially fill the targets of both assessments.

The Clusters, including the SC, were quite a different experience from the normal experiences in Vanuatu. However, they also acknowledged that all three SCC were very approachable and that even smaller agencies in addition to the bigger ones were made welcome within the SC. They recognise that being part of the cluster system gave them access to resources that they would not otherwise have had access to. One gave the example of being able to source jerry cans from UNICEF, have them filled up via the water source on HMNZS Canterbury and then have them delivered by Black Hawks to their communities of concern. They also appreciated the code and guidelines that the SC produced, such as for NFI Quality Control, plastic sheeting and construction best practice guides. One interviewee commented that the "cluster enabled us to extend our reach and made resources available to us." Another interviewee made the observation about the common mistake for newer aid agencies that "they decide to have a solution too quickly before understanding the problem.....the story is very important. Hence no rush to fix things" was their observation of how to operate in Vanuatu.

The recommendations that come from reflecting on this would be to maintain the use of combined assessments because of the large number of agencies in the SCP involved in multiple Clusters and to streamline the reporting process and the need to promote cross cutting issues.

The feedback from SurveyMonkey dealt again with the basic workings of the SC. The first question asked whether their 'organisation used sectoral needs assessment tools and guidance agreed by cluster?' (Q13) and the second whether their 'organisation been involved in coordinated sectoral needs assessments and surveys?' (Q14).

It is one thing to make assessments and seemingly another to use them and this is evident in the survey feedback. The survey suggests that minimal or no use was made of assessment tools by 24% of the respondents and that another 24% only used them 'sometimes' and that only 36% really used them. The stern notes from the earlier SC meeting are relevant at this point. Moreover, this seems to correlate with the number of

³⁴ Typically more than 3 years.

organisations that were involved in any coordinated sectoral needs assessment; 24% had rarely or never been involved, 27% had sometimes been involved and 27% had been involved in most or all assessments. This suggests that there could be two types of SCP organisation depending on their level of participation with the SC.


Some organisations were also using the displacement tracking mechanism of the Protection Cluster while others already had their own assessments in place before the cluster had developed tools and before REACH had done their first survey. Others had surveys of schools which were outside the SC, while others had their own in-house teams deployed by their HQ's.

The next two questions are about whether these analyses were able to identify risks, needs, gaps in response, the capacity to respond and the constraints on response. The results suggest that the identification of needs, the gaps in the response and risks have been done adequately to well in that order with needs being the best; but that the capacity to respond and the constraints on response have not.

In addition, it seems that the respondents felt that cross cutting issues such as gender, human rights and disability were adequately considered, but that age, diversity, protection were not and that they were not sure about environment and HIV/Aids. This is important because it does seem to be at odds with what was found for the impact on women and girls. Efforts were made by the SC to connect with the Protection Cluster to highlight the issues that SCP needed to be mindful of with their programming; and also with local organisations such as Vanuatu Women. Moreover, it is interesting that the SC thought that it had done adequately with disability, though that sense did not come through the interviews.

Q16 Have these analyses identified risks, needs, gaps, capacity to respond and constraints?

Answered: 22 Skipped: 10



Q17 Have these analyses considered cross cutting issues?

Answered: 22 Skipped: 10




Figure 9: Identification of Risks Needs Gaps and Capacities.

Despite that, 72% found that these analyses did support response planning and prioritisation. There were also comments about the need to keep major agencies involved and to provide 3W data which would assist the transition across to the HSWG, evacuation centres and reintegration of those returning home.

The final test was whether the strategy proposed by the SC was taken up by SCP, as opposed to one developing from solely good planning? Certainly, the strategy to promote traditional buildings was taken up by various shelter organisations, albeit without the guidance of the necessary technical documents.




Figure 10: Support of Planning and Prioritisation.

The other issue that came up in the interviews was what the response should be for the informal settlements in Port Vila.³⁵ Places such as Freswota and Blacksands have a history of land tenure issues and of a vulnerable caseload, together with a level of political manoeuvring. The issue is further complicated by some being in flood plain areas. Nonetheless, there did not appear to be any response from the SC as to what humanitarian assistance should be provided if it was really based on ‘need’. It was included in the SC Strategic Framework³⁶ as.... ‘Similarly, those efforts would also be incomplete without addressing the problem of informal settlements, where disaster risks, exposures and vulnerabilities are amongst the highest in Vanuatu’. The background to this is in 6.4 Annexe 4: Literature Review. This may be a difficult discussion for the PWD to have with the GoV as there could be expected differences between the Government agenda and the humanitarian imperative based on need. In addition, the issue of informal settlements does surface in other parts of this Review.

The picture that starts to emerge from the comparison of the minutes of the SC meeting and the survey are about the differences between them and that there would seem to have been more happening than was seemingly reported. The suggested recommendations are, therefore, more straightforward, with the inclusion of the tip sheets to assist better coordination through accountability to those affected. It was strange to see comments in the SC meeting of 30 March about “Concerns around quantities of food in pipeline - may slow

³⁵ Cyclone Pam Worsens Hardship in Port Vila’s Urban Settlements
<http://www.ipsnews.net/2015/04/cyclone-pam-worsens-hardship-in-port-vilas-urban-settlements/> accessed in September 2015.

³⁶ Shelter Cluster Strategic Framework Executive Summary - V 2.2 15 September 2015

down shelter items coming in.” Clearly, people without food probably do not need tarps, tents or kitchen sets.

RECOMMENDATIONS

14. **Campaign for combined assessments especially with other clusters.** Maintain the use of combined assessments with other clusters, such as emergency food distribution, education and WASH.
15. **Streamline 3W information inputs.**
16. **Drive the inclusion of cross cutting issues.** Promote the inclusion of cross cutting issues. For example, through the use of tip sheets³⁷ as produced by the IASC.
17. **Include Informal Settlements.** Devise a strategy for informal settlements which for various reasons were not seemingly covered in the TC Pam response.

4.4 PLANNING AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

The SC strategy³⁸ targeted 18,000 households (i.e. 90,000 people based on an average HH of 5 people). This is discussed in more detail later in the Review but the centrepiece of this strategy was the use and promotion of traditional Ni-Van building construction. The selection of this approach was well grounded and reasoned, but was complicated because of the inability to actually engineer what was ‘traditional’ and had many geographically differences, as is shown in the literature.³⁹ To BBB or BBS one does need to show that is the case.

Despite its logic, there were gaps in it that surfaced from interviews on Tanna Island. They showed that TC Pam, in addition to damaging houses, also stripped the vegetation that critically supplied the roof; and that it would be 2-3 years before the palms used would again be available. Consequently, the strategy would effectively stall for that time and in Tanna other leaf materials were being used that had a reported useful material life of 2-3 months. This situation would only be aggravated by the el Nino effect and drought through 2016. On the other hand, the literature review⁴⁰ suggests that the use of such leaves did occur at least at the turn of the century and that there could be other aspects that might have been lost in time. Certainly, supplying CGI to be then attached to a traditional timber frame would not be BBB and certainly not BBS. This should probably be followed up by PWD.

Beyond that, the SCP were ostensibly disconnected from the strategy development process. That looked to be at odds with the HAP⁴¹ which was the basis for the current strategy which states that (underlining added) ‘....in consultation with all cluster partners (including other major actors not covered in this appeal such as the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement) and Department of Public Works, the government lead for the shelter cluster, a target caseload of 18,000 households has been identified for humanitarian actors to respond to.’

³⁷ Tip Sheets for the CCCM, Child Protection, Coordination, Education, Food Security, Health, GBV, Mine Action, Nutrition, Shelter & NFIs and WASH sectors and a Vetting Form to assist project vetting teams to code projects are available at <http://gencap.onerresponse.info>

³⁸ “Shelter Cluster Strategic Framework Executive Summary - V 2.2 15 September 2015,” https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/150915_scv_strategic_framework_executive_summary_v2.2.pdf accessed September 2015

³⁹ The Tree and The Canoe: Roots and Mobility in Vanuatu Societies by Joel Domme Maison from Pacific Viewpoint 1985 vol 26 number 1 pg 30-62 http://horizon.documentation.ird.fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/pleins_textes_5/b_fdi_18-19/24050.pdf accessed September 2015.

⁴⁰ Traditional Architecture in Vanuatu by Christian Coiffier ISBN 982-02-0047-4 Published by the Institute of Pacific Studies and the Vanuatu Extension Centre of the University of the South Pacific 1988

http://www.pacificdisaster.net/pdnadmin/data/original/JB_DM603_VUT_1988_Traditional_architecture.pdf accessed in September 2015

⁴¹ Tropical Cyclone Pam Humanitarian Action Plan Prepared by the Government of Vanuatu with support of humanitarian partners 1 May 2015 pg 26.

Some SCP were not in a position to contribute to the plan, while others concentrated on the reconstruction of schools rather than traditional buildings. Some organisations reported that they partially adopted ‘...data from the cluster strategic plans but were limited in human resources and material aid as well as technical experience to contribute significantly to the shelter cluster outcomes...’ while others noted that it was too late for them anyway. Finally, other organisations already had their strategy before the SC and hence for all of these reasons meant that 46% of SCP responded that they ‘did not know’ or that the SC strategy ‘did not apply’ to them.

The lack of technical guidelines at the close of the SC was mentioned in 3 Interviews but despite that 52% surveyed reported that they had agreed guidelines and that their organisations were often-to-always using them. However, comments in the survey did mention that the lack of technical guidance had delayed their training initiatives. Thus, the SC needs to appoint a Technical Coordinator much earlier than what occurred for the TC Pam Response.

It was also recognised by the SCP through the interviews and the survey, that engagement of the GoV was critical to ‘moving on’ and for linking into the recovery framework. Three interviews outside the SCT had strong opinions regarding the delays in appointing a GoV counterpart. This is now resolved with the appointment of the PWD as the SC lead.

On the other hand, the survey suggested that one of the strengths of the SC was the reporting and monitoring of the clusters funding with over 55% reporting ‘almost as often as needed’ or better (see Q25 below). This capability will be one that the PWD should maintain in any future disaster response.

Q25 How often has the cluster coordinator reported on the cluster’s funding status against needs?

Answered: 25 Skipped: 7




Figure 11: Reporting of Funding

Finally, what should be the recovery guidance and involvement of the SCT in the transition from meeting emergency shelter needs to durable shelter solutions? This was posed in the TOR. To a large extent the Review would suggest that the appointment of the PWD would mean that this has been answered, but perhaps not in detail. There are codes, guidelines and IEC materials that should be stored and prepared for the next disaster. The assessment practices would be resolved and, hence, the linkage to the recovery potentially established. Examples of SCP programmes should be documented and the value adding component of the SC needs to be highlighted. This should include a longer term view of the outcomes and impacts for those affected by TC Pam, mindful of traditional coping practices. The guidance

on BBB and BBS need to be followed through with HSWG. All of this should be established in anticipation of the new cyclone season that is about to start. However, the theme of responding to the specific disaster, rather than having a templated one as discussed earlier, is significant. The SCT, under the lead of the PWD, would need to deliberately respond to what is happening rather than to a formula was the feedback from this Review.

RECOMMENDATIONS

18. **Break any strategy development up into bits for easier feedback.** This is for easier feedback on those parts relevant to SCP's. This would seem to address issues coming through the survey of organisations outside the strategy development and more often developing their own strategies in isolation from the SC.
19. **Finalise the approved shelter cluster technical standards early**, especially where strategies using traditional materials and construction practices that may be tricky to codify are involved. In addition, the appointment of the Technical Coordinator should preferably be at the outset of the SC so that such documents can be produced in a timely manner.
20. **Ensure that the IASC standards for NFI's⁴² are known and applied.** And adhered to, especially given the potential of groups that are not accustomed to working in a humanitarian context. The use of less than standard NFI and less than blanket coverage of a community can produce unintended distribution issues.⁴³

4.5 ADVOCACY

The SC promoted several advocacy instruments that included the following⁴⁴:

- BBS and safer shelter awareness that consisted of 4 key messages namely (1) Building Location/Siting, (2) Foundations, (3) Fixings/Connections and (4) Bracing.
- Vouchers for building materials may be used in the Port Vila urban area but they, and also cash transfers, should be avoided due to reasons of cultural acceptance, weak markets and limited or non-existent markets.
- The dos and don'ts of distributions.
- Logistics
- Traditional building
- Pre-positioning of NFI's
- Shelter and NFI technical specifications such as rope, tarpaulins, tool kits, fixing kits (bracing, roofing and structural), timber, CGI, tents and NFI's such as blankets and kitchen sets.
- For clarity of Vanuatu Building Codes (as a lead into recovery and also for school construction).
- SPHERE
- EC
- Protection, gender and disability.

This included the establishment of several TWIGs, SAG, posters and handbooks with most being in Bislama as shown below.

⁴² "Selecting NFIs for Shelter; IASC Emergency Shelter Cluster December 2008," https://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/95759/D.03.a.04.%20NFIs%20for%20Shelter_IASC.pdf accessed September 2015.

⁴³ "Insight for 24 May 2015 - Vanuatu & Tussles over Cyclone Aid," updated at 1:00 pm on 24 May 2015, Radio NZ, <http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/insight/audio/201755432/insight-for-24-may-2015-vanuatu-and-tussles-over-cyclone-aid>

⁴⁴ "Technical guidelines for emergency shelter response to natural disaster in Vanuatu V 1.1–September 2015," pg 11-12, https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/150915_scv_technical_guidelines_v11.pdf accessed September 2015



KEY PRINCIPLES SHELTER CONSTRUCTION




Figure 12: Key Shelter Principles and Shelter handbook in Bislama.

However, one of the key findings of the Review was that the impact on women and girls was probably missed. This resulted in possibly less than adequate targeting of SC programmes. The significant impact on women compared to men was found in a study⁴⁵ completed in June which was reported at the SC meeting and discussed with several INGO. This report has been included in the Annexe. This is important because the research⁴⁶ suggests that women and girls are typically more affected than men and, hence, is why some SCP target that area. The SC had made material available, such as the marker sheets. It had invited presentations from the Vanuatu Women's Centre, a recognised NGO voice for women's affairs in Vanuatu. Their 2011 report was included in the literature review which "challenges Vanuatu's view of itself as a happy nation that values and protects family and children. It explodes myths about who suffers from violence, the severity of violence and its impacts, and where it occurs. It reveals an intense web of intimidation, threats, humiliation, controlling behaviour and acts of physical and sexual violence imposed on the women who suffer from violence by their husbands and partners. It shows pervasive patterns of gender inequality in Vanuatu society, including widespread beliefs and attitudes that directly undermine women's human rights; and it shows that violence against women cannot be prevented unless these patterns of unequal power between women and men (gender power relations) are transformed." Unfortunately Vanuatu⁴⁷ and most Pacific states⁴⁸ have high rates of domestic violence. Moreover, given that FHH represent 20% of HH, the issue of the impact of TC Pam on women generally, possibly deserved a more pro-active stance from the SC. The usually high levels of domestic violence would have undoubtedly spiked following TC Pam. Strangely this seemingly only showed up in the literature review but not the interviews or the survey?

But there were other issues that were also possibly missed. Another was for those with impairments. There were stories reported in the interviews of one man who uses a wheel chair being stuck in his collapsed house in Port Vila for 1 day, basically because no one was aware of him. The problem is that people with impairments are often 'invisible'. This is being addressed by the IFRC's 'All Under One Roof' programme which has just been rolled out. That requires a more thoughtful approach for shelter in the response as well as the recovery and reconstruction stages. It also highlights earlier recommendations such as the 'one size

⁴⁵ Jared Noyaret (2015) Resilience and Psychological Well-being in Vanuatu after Tropical Cyclone Pam (in Press).

⁴⁶ R. Potangaroa, H. Santosa, and S. Wilkinson, "The Application of Quality of Life Metrics," in Anthony J Masys (ed.) *Disaster Management: Enabling Resilience*. (New York, NY,: Springer, 2015).

⁴⁷ The Vanuatu National Survey on Women's Lives and Family Relationships Published by the Vanuatu Women's Centre (VWC), 2011.

⁴⁸ Violence Against Women: Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Violence WHO Western Pacific Region January 2014

fits all' approach becoming increasingly out dated. Whether this will require additional vulnerability targeting (it probably will) has yet to be seen but what should be avoided is a 'one size fits all' for impairments.

Another aspect that came through from the interviews was from the Government departments on the need to coordinate those agencies outside the usual SC process. Most of those agencies outside the SC that responded had been active in Vanuatu prior to TC Pam. They were keen to assist based on these longer term relationships that had been built. Hence, where there were shelter or NFI issues these organisations sought to help. However, in helping their community they unintentionally tilted the blanket overall assistance that was being provided by other organisations. That led to unrest amongst those that were affected because some were seen to be getting more because of their association. Examples were volunteer organisations and faith based groups, and the assistance they were providing to their members. This was seemingly frustrated by a lack of complaint mechanism which was also highlighted in the SC Strategy paper.⁴⁹ Unfortunately, the brunt of this unrest was directed at Government Departments. Hence, it is suggested that the SC and SCP approach such organisations so that this additional distress for those affected, and for Government Departments, not be repeated in future disasters.

With that background from the interviews it is interesting to go through the survey data. That revealed that 52% of SCP 'participated in advocacy discussions and its views were adequately considered' (with 20% indicating that advocacy were 'not applicable' to them). One comment from the survey was that because it was the first time there was a SC in Vanuatu, advocacy was more in terms of setting up government counterparts and explaining the role of the SC. Others noted that there was a robust promotion to include traditional shelter practice within SCP programmes. There was a sense in both the interviews and the survey feedback that the SC was active in promoting improved building guidelines etc, which they did not feel was 'advocacy' and instead could/should have been a separate discussion with the PWD. That is quite 'tough,' but it does appear that several protection areas were not emphasized as much as they could or should have been.

Thus, while there was ostensibly a good coverage of the key messages, several significant advocacy aspects were possibly dropped which the recommendations attempt to pick up.

RECOMMENDATIONS

21. **The impacts on women and girls and those with impairments must be identified.** The targeting of vulnerable groups needs to be reviewed by GSC. The current indicators for the impact on women and girls for example seems weak and the roll out of "All Under One Roof" for the inclusion of disability into shelter will need appropriate proxy indicators for it to be operationalised.
22. **Traditional coping mechanisms cannot exclude others.** In addition, while the adoption of traditional community structures, such as local chiefs or councils, into the more formal disaster response arrangements would be obvious, such mechanisms can often exclude women, people with disabilities and other such vulnerable groups.
23. **Provide for feedback and complaints.** There is the need for a feedback and grievance mechanism for communities. This seems to have been removed from the standard SC template.
24. **Promote an inclusive SC.** Those organisations that are not usually involved in shelter, and possibly struggle outside the SC, should be approached by the SCT. For example, faith based and volunteer organisations usually assist specific communities. Where these communities are also covered by the SC distributions

⁴⁹ Shelter Cluster Strategic Framework - V 2.2 15 September 2015 pg 25
https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/150915_scv_strategic_framework_executive_summary_v2.2.pdf accessed September 2015

they will 'double dip' on assistance. This can cause jealousies within communities and set up tensions that need not occur. Such dilemmas need to be resolved where possible.

25. **The role of the GoV in future disasters needs to be spelt out.** The role of the GoV in future disasters and their desire (quite rightly) to drive disaster planning and preparedness may cause delays in getting assistance to communities. While it is necessary to respect the sovereignty of disaster affected countries and the existing protocols of the government. The informal settlements would/could be one area for discussion as discussed earlier in 4.3.

4.6 MONITORING AND REPORTING

The sharing of information is critical to coordination with the SC and has already been touched upon in this Review. Such information, when managed appropriately, allows SCP to readily and clearly visualise information on the needs of beneficiaries, map how the response is progressing and ensure that gaps are being addressed. It is also instrumental for forming strategies about how this can be achieved holistically. Ultimately it assists the SCP to achieve their shelter tasks more efficiently and effectively. But it relies on the timely sharing of fit-for-purpose information from SCP on their plans, capacities, pre-positioning and shelter assistance completions in the field. In this section more use has been made of the survey data, supported by the other comments that have already been made to this point.

That being said, the feedback from both the interviews and the survey suggests that the SC managed this role well. This can be seen from the positive responses to Q30 and Q31 below where over 70% of SCP organisations were influenced and used SC information.

However, there were questions about definitions. For example, as part of the SC discussion on gender and protection issues (early in the response) the definition of 'house' prioritised sleeping areas and not kitchens. This discussion was to later become an issue when it was discovered the VNSO⁵⁰ defined household as those persons who usually eat together and share the work of preparing the food and/or the cost of work of providing it and hence counted kitchens. On the other hand the NDMO and the Ministry of Health define a household as a family unit sleeping in one shelter and the traditional situation found on the ground of a house consisting of at least two or more buildings usually with a garden.⁵¹

Yet despite the previous discussion about what was perhaps missing in the advocacy area, nearly 70% of respondents from the survey felt that the SC had taken account of the distinct needs, contributions and capacities of women, girls, men and boys in its response and monitoring as shown below.

⁵⁰ This became apparent at the GoV Lessons Learned Workshop in Port Vila on 23-24 June 2015.

⁵¹ "Technical guidelines for emergency shelter response to natural disaster in Vanuatu V 1.1–September 2015," pg 11-12 https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/150915_scv_technical_guidelines_v11.pdf accessed September 2015

Q32 Has the shelter cluster taken account of the distinct needs, contributions and capacities of women, girls, men and boys in its response and monitoring?

Answered: 25 Skipped: 7




Figure 13: The SC and Accounting for Distinct Needs.

Updates on the HAP were evidently circulated via the VHT, but it is not clear whether SCP referenced the HAP (according to feedback from them). However, the SC produced an infographic for the 3 months mark, which has widely shared (emails, hard copies, twitter, etc...) and appreciated by SCP and the GoV. But as mentioned earlier it has been difficult to find that thread through the SC web page and part of the reason has been the lack of dates and status on report documents. What was found is presented in section 4.8.

So, mindful of that and the previous background material the following recommendations are suggested.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 26. **Identify lists of people with impairments.** Develop ways to access as required the lists for people with impairments and from that develop baseline information for future rapid disaster response.
- 27. **Train PWD staff in data collection.** This could also include DLA.
- 28. **Have access to useable census data.** Arrange access to useable census data. This apparently was an issue during the TC Pam Response.⁵²
- 29. **Make the basis for strategies obvious and available.** The basis for strategies, such as needs assessments, should/must be placed in a 'sacred' place; if that is on the SC web page it needs to be unmistakably highlighted. It has been problematic locating this material for the Review, but also it should be readily accessible to chart progress using the stipulated indicators.

4.7 CONTINGENCY PLANNING, PREPAREDNESS AND CAPACITY BUILDING

The SCP seemed adequately prepared for contingencies and has assigned resources to ensure that they are actioned appropriately if needed (refer to the figures below). Some organisations appreciated the material provided by the SC (list of shelter kit items, training material and templates), while other larger ones had their own in-house material and surge

⁵² "Situation report issued by NDMO Vanuatu This report covers the period from 13 and 14 April 2015," http://www.pacificdisaster.net/pdnadmin/data/original/VUT_TC_Pam_20150414_NDMO_Sitrep21.pdf Accessed September 2015

capacity if required. Hence, the survey figures shown below, when adjusted for those for whom it was not applicable, suggested that 60% of SCP had updated preparedness plans and had resources that could be mobilised. This is certainly an area that the PWD should follow up on to map, even for indicative capacities.

The current discussion on EC will need further coordination beyond the current SC and presumably this will be picked up by the PWD and the various other departments that will be involved. It seems to be at the centre of the National Contingency Plans. It will certainly require a wider GoV involvement because it relates to the NDMO, Education, Provincial Authorities, Health, Food Security and Logistics. Issues such as the use of educational buildings many of which were damaged (some extensively) by TC Pam, but will no doubt be rebuilt as part of the TC Pam educational funding. The decision as to whether they will be an EC will not be as seemingly automatic as is assumed. The reinstatement of schools after a disaster like TC Pam is one key event for communities 'returning to normality'. In addition, there is a level of damage associated with an educational building being occupied as an EC which is not covered by school funding. Hence, because of the occupancy times and the damage costs, schools are understandably reluctant (despite the humanitarian need) to allow their buildings to be 'registered' as EC's. This will need to be followed through. In addition, there are the training needs for those that would manage EC's and there is the issue of EC coverage. At present EC coverage is spotty and would not provide a ready solution for disaster affected communities. Moreover, where there are evacuation centres should future SC responses use them for distribution of NFI's and tarps? Would that create a new 'pull factor' for the EC's? Can they also be accessed by people with impairments? The PWD will no doubt be working through these issues with the other Government Departments, UN and INGO's.

The idea of pre-positioning was mentioned in the interviews. The two key aspects were firstly the impact of logistics (often the reason to suggest pre-positioning) and secondly the high internal transport costs for shelter materials that impacted on SCP. The example given was that it cost more to transport shelter materials from the port in Lenakel to their nearby warehouse than it did to transport them by truck in Port Vila and then by boat from Port Vila to Tanna Island. Hence, despite shelter goods being pre-positioned the cost to distribute them locally may outweigh any monetary value gained by them being already there. Moreover, it would be incomplete being able to offer tarps without being able to also offer water or medical assistance (both were issues with the TC Pam response). But, on the other hand, it was noted by the Tafeta Province⁵³ that '.....the importance of early Shelter and WASH support was noted and appreciated'. However, that same report also noted that '....approved permanent houses should be built according to traditional ways of building'. And pre-positioned tarps, nail straps, and tool kits may not be 'traditional'. Cash grants may be a more viable option for any future immediate disaster response.

Moreover, given the politics and cultural history of Tanna Island (though all the islands in Vanuatu have a similar divergent history) it is not a straightforward issue to offer relief aid in a post disaster context⁵⁴. Disaster can under customary lore provide potential rights to occupy and, so, offering assistance can be misunderstood. In addition, working alongside the established local structure may miss the marginalised (could be as high as 50% if women are not represented), the disabled (10-15% of the population) and the FHH (20% of the population) not forgetting the elderly, the young and the infirmed. More evidential impacts need to be established and, as will be seen in the next section, ways for the SC to readily include those affected into the decision making process need to be established for

⁵³ Lessons Learnt from Tropical Cyclone Pam for Tafea Provincial Disaster Committee June 2015 refer to the literature Review section of this Review.

⁵⁴ Refer to "The Tree and The Canoe: Roots and Mobility in Vanuatu Societies" by Joel Domme Maison in the Literature section of this Review in the appendices.

the complexity encountered in Vanuatu. While this Review has been about a response to a cyclone, it should be remembered that Vanuatu is also highly seismic and the next disaster may not be a cyclone.

Finally, the Climate Division of the Vanuatu Meteorology and Geo-Hazards Department (VMGD) confirmed that el Niño is well established with all ENSO indicators pointing to a mature El Niño event to last until first quarter of 2016⁵⁵. Hence, there will be low rainfall in the coming months. How this will play out, and moreover what could have been the SC contingency plan, was discussed, but no clear plans were established before the SC closed. Nonetheless, it will be interesting to keep this issue in view given the impacts on food production that el Niño would mean and the deepening, grinding poverty that will undoubtedly result for communities responding to the impact of TC Pam.

RECOMMENDATIONS

30. **Establish what will be the linkages into early recovery.** The linkages into early recovery remain somewhat blurred. For example, there was a sense of confusion over SC engagement on evacuation centres and technical guidelines were only available in draft form until just recently. That is from the response to recovery perspective. From the other direction (recovery to response) if recovery is to work then it needs to start early, preferably during the response phase. The recovery phase of TC Pam will be taken up by UN-Habitat and DLA, but will probably need to have PWD alongside so that recovery can start during the response phase and, hence, pick up when the response abates.
31. **Establish rosters for surge deployment.** In addition, support should also be offered to PWD in terms of maintaining rosters, contact lists and assessment training. Furthermore, twinning of the PWD with other Pacific PWD's might be useful, though initial feedback is that it may not be practical. Other PWD's do not have the spare capacity to release staff for any disaster response. That being the case, it seems that rosters either within IFRC, PNS or other Pacific based organisations such as RedR Australia could be beneficial. This should be followed up either by IFRC, as part of their co-leadership role, or PWD.
32. **Link training and capacity building as units of recognised training courses** through, for example, the VET system.
33. **Confirm the role and coverage of EC's.** PWD needs to follow through on the role and coverage of EC in future disaster responses in Vanuatu.
34. **Confirm and maintain pre-positioned stocks and capacities of agencies.** Complete and maintain the identification and mapping of pre-positioned stocks and capacities of agencies.
35. **Confirm and maintain pre-positioned stocks and capacities of agencies.** While many of the lessons learnt have focused on storm related disasters the multi-hazard context of Vanuatu, in particular given its high seismicity and history of earthquakes (see later table), should be recorded so that such disasters are included in any DRR shelter initiative.
36. **Establish a Pacific wide annual training programme, possibly led by the IFRC.** This would not only promote and update each nation but also allow informal face-to-face meetings for those that will be front line shelter when a disaster happens.

4.8 SHELTER CLUSTER RESPONSE TO TC PAM.

There were two parts to the SC Response in Vanuatu following TC Pam. The first was The HAP and the associated Flash Appeal, while the second was the SAP.

⁵⁵ 2015 El Niño is now well established: Prepare for drought <http://reliefweb.int/report/vanuatu/2015-el-ni-o-now-well-established-prepare-drought>

The HAP had the primary aim over the period of 1 May to 31 July 2015 of

1. Meeting the remaining life-saving and protection needs of 158,000 people in 23 islands over the next three months (to July 31).

The SC objective was assisting 90,000 people or 18,000 HH (assuming 5 people per HH). This was to have been 6 months, but was pulled back to 3 months by the GoV. This was done so that communities and programs moved more quickly into recovery and away from solely response. However, it was problematic to achieve because of the logistics involved in getting shelter assistance to those 23 affected islands. Nonetheless, the SC managed this very well as detailed later.

This was then supplemented by the SAP which had two further aims:

- 2. Support the restoration of livelihoods and self-reliance of the affected people while strengthening resilience, by re-establishing food security in the affected communities; assisting affected people with repair and reconstruction of shelters, houses, water and sanitation facilities and community infrastructure; and strengthening community-based protection mechanisms.**
- 3. Re-establish and strengthen basic services across all affected areas while reinstating and replacing affected water and sanitation infrastructure for communities and institutions; reactivating and enhancing the delivery of quality health services and preventive interventions with high coverage in all affected areas; restoring access to education through the reparation or replacement of education facilities and materials; strengthening protection services in affected communities including for the most vulnerable persons; and increasing the resilience of farmers through the provision of agricultural extension service.**

The SAP used the Cluster System as a coordination mechanism. The requested funding through the HAP for Shelter was USD\$1.2 million. By September/October 2015 the SC had essentially achieved the first aim and was well on the way to achieving the second. The third was seemingly held over.⁵⁶ This is shown in the tabulated results below in tables 6 and 7.

Table 6: Emergency Shelter Numbers for the HAP⁵⁷(under objective 1)

	HH	Target	%
Tarpaulin	26,304	18,000	146 %
Shelter Tool Kits	13,420	18,000	75 %
Kitchen Sets	10,029	8,500	118 %

Table 7: Support for Self-Recovery⁵⁸ (under objective 3)

	HH	Target	%
Safe Shelter Awareness	8,215	18,000	46 %
Fixing Kits	6,783	18,000	38 %

⁵⁶ "Fortnightly Monitoring Report 2015 Tropical Cyclone Pam Humanitarian Action Plan," https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/annex_1_hap_report_shelter_cluster_-_final_monitoring.pdf accessed September 2015

⁵⁷ Slightly different numbers for planned and distributed were reported for 10 September but had seemingly not been updated. These numbers were from the web page dash board.

⁵⁸ Increased numbers for planned and distributed were reported for 10 September but had seemingly not been updated. These numbers were from the web page dash board.

A further 2,232 more HH were ongoing or planned to be reached after 31 July, eventually bringing HH reached to 87% of the HAP target. These numbers could not be confirmed, but it was a great effort by the SC and the SCP nonetheless.

The reduced timeframe of the HAP (from 6 months to 3) and the resulting focus by SCP on the first objective meant that the other two were going to be less important at least within the 3 month time frame and within the SC. Nevertheless, projects for aims 2 and 3 are expected to start and be completed outside the HAP time frame. These would include BBS awareness and training, repairing/retrofitting/rebuilding of houses and community buildings such as kindergartens, community halls or churches contained within objective 3. In all, 7 projects have been submitted by 6 agencies through the Flash Appeal and HAP appeals for a total of USD\$2,805,842 of which 4 projects received USD\$2,340,841 (84% of total funding requirement).

In addition, 15 fully funded shelter and settlement recovery projects have been submitted to the Housing Sector Working Group for a total of USD\$5.8 million which will support at least 12,240 households, with 11 of them starting within HAP time frame.⁵⁹ The longest of these projects will be completed by November 2018. Hence, at the moment there is no apparent progress on objective 3 of the HAP.

Despite these good-great results, the SC does not appear to be readily including affected communities into the decision making process.⁶⁰ The survey results suggest that 64% either didn't know or there was no process used. And moreover, there were 71% that either didn't know or where no complaint system had been applied. While some SCP may be working through local organisations with local counterparts the need to be inclusive and also for complaint feedback is nonetheless indispensable for accountability and for sustaining programmes long term. This does seem to be a specific issue not only for the SC but for all clusters. It is strange that there is no evident mechanism for people to provide feedback (though there was in the original template devised for TC Pam on the GSC web page⁶¹ which it appears was not used).

RECOMMENDATIONS

37. **Recognise that any effectiveness will be more culturally based.** There is the need to recognise that in Vanuatu any effectiveness is perhaps more culturally based than may be currently assumed.
38. **Identify value-adds that the SC provides:** The GSC needs to identify what are the value-adds that the SC provides and moreover what they are for a Pacific Context.

4.9 FEEDBACK

This section was added following feedback from the draft Review. The feedback sought clarification of the four aspects below that were part of the TOR. These fell outside the 8-A-F areas namely:

- Appraise the service provided by IFRC as SC co-coordinator to shelter cluster participants – Government, UN agencies, Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, NGOs both national and international, and other actors.

⁵⁹ Strengthening housing & settlement community resilience (gives the details on these 15 projects) https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/annex_6_recovery_project_proposal_pwd_-_strengthening_housing_settlement_community_resilience.pdf accessed September 2015

⁶⁰ This issue of community/people participation was also raised at the Regional Consultation for the Pacific, Auckland, 30 June - 2 July 2015 as a Pacific issue in addition to it seemingly being a Ni-Van one. Refer to the Literature Review section.

⁶¹ TC Pam Feedback Form

<http://375elmp02.blackmesh.com/search/node/monitoring%20and%20reporting?page=1>

- Review and analyse the experience of IFRC with respect to the establishment and operation of the SC, with a particular emphasis on lessons to be learnt for future operations.
- Provide recommendations with regard to IFRC's leadership of future emergency shelter cluster coordination activities in Vanuatu, for preparedness and emergency response and the resources required to perform such a role.
- Examine if there were aspects of IFRC's cluster leadership which potentially might have, or actually did, compromise the mandate and principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent.

As indicated, my estimate of the SC performance was an A-; and that was due to the effective leadership that the SC was able to provide. It was difficult at the start when there was no Government lead, but the results were achieved regardless and the aims of both HAP were achieved and the SAP was ongoing. There were issues as outlined, but they are issues that will require a wider discussion which PWD will now be able to follow through. The issue that PWD does need to follow specifically is identifying how the SC adds value for the SCP. Part of this will be documenting good examples from the TC Pam Response.

The Review has documented 38 recommendations and suggested 2 key issues and 2 further ones to follow up on.

How, or what, will be the role of the IFRC's leadership of future emergency SC coordination activities in Vanuatu, for preparedness and emergency response and the resources required to perform such a role is not clear. The GoV are keen to find a co-lead that is in-country. This makes sense. Hence, it is not clear what role the IFRC could play other than through the VRC. This could be at odds with its GSC lead for natural disasters? Few SCP have the depth of project management, experience and technical width that the IFRC maintains. It is not clear. However, if the question is for recommendations then the Review of the SC coordination for Vanuatu following TC Pam would suggest the following:

- Strengthen the shelter response capability in IFRC's Fiji Office.
- Establish how the shelter response in the Pacific is apparently different and adjust the 'template' accordingly.
- Establish what are the value adds for the SC in the Pacific
- Devise better tools to ascertain impact and vulnerability that can be deployed in a response situation.
- Maintain a response readiness, but develop the linkages into the Recovery Phase and possibly beyond. How does what is done in the Response Phase affect the Recovery and Reconstruction phases of disaster affected communities.
- Seek changes that foster innovation and that identify the new problems that the SC should seek to solve rather than how it may do it better to the ones we seemingly know.
- Finally, the SC needs to understand the traditional coping mechanisms of the communities at risk and how the assistance provided may support that response rather than create dependency or unintended consequences.

The resources to do this work in Vanuatu could be found in the PWD, the GoV, but also in the Donors (specifically from the New Zealand and Australian Governments) and finally through Research Universities.

There was nothing found as part of the Review that would suggest that the mandate and principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent had been compromised. However, the specific question of visibility of the SC as the IFRC cluster, was only raised by one person outside the SCT. All the others felt that it was not critical.

5.0 CONCLUSION

As mentioned earlier, this was the first time that a SC was established in Vanuatu and the IFRC should be congratulated for their strong coordinated effort. The overall mark would be an A- because of the engagement with the GoV and the leadership of the SC. It was a job well done.

On reflection, it was noted that several of the 38 recommendations above were repeated in other SC Reviews. For example, the SC review of Cyclone Evan in Fiji in 2013⁶² had 13 similar recommendations out of the 24 the Report suggested. Hence, either lessons are not being learnt which is possible; or are we instead finding solutions to the wrong problems? Certainly the characteristics of the SC issues found in this Review suggest the second scenario and would explain why shelter does seem to have a reputation for being “intractable”.⁶³

Nonetheless, it was certainly a ‘box of chocolates’ because one was never quite sure what you would get as you got into the Review and its associated analysis. There appear to have been two gaps in the SC, one with the traditional building approach and the other in advocating for women who are typically more impacted than men by disasters. There were two further issues related to identifying actual value adding and the need to find a socio-technical approach. But there may also be a third as suggested by the Review. How the shelter problem is framed because the answers seem to be repeating themselves.....not from them being addressed, but because they are the right answers to the wrong questions.....the problem seems to be that we have the wrong problem and we should seek a different ‘box of chocolates’..... and there are various ways that could be done.

⁶² Peter Lawther (2013) “Review of the Fiji Shelter Cluster in response to Tropical Cyclone Evan,” adore.ifrc.org/Download.aspx?FileId=51074&.pdf accessed September 2015

⁶³ DFID (2011). “Humanitarian Emergency Response Review,” Department for International Development (DFID) UK 2011 noted on pg 25: “Providing adequate shelter is one of the most intractable problems in international Humanitarian response. Tents are too costly and do not last long enough. Plastic Sheeting can be good but most often is low quality and falls apart immediately. Rebuilding houses takes years, even when land issues are not major obstacles.”

6.0 ANNEXES

6.1 MAP OF VANUATU

6.2 SC TIMEFRAME

6.3 THE 8-A-F FRAMEWORK TOR DETAILS


6.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

6.5 QUALITY OF LIFE MEASUREMENT AT LANKORAI VILLAGE

6.1. Annexe 1: MAP OF VANUATU

from: http://sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/annex_4_hap_report_shelter_cluster_-_objective_1_map_table.pdf

Shelter Cluster Vanuatu – HAP/Cluster Objective 1 (as of 31 July 2015)



6.2 Annexe 2: SC TIMEFRAME

Timeframe⁶⁴

Month	Date	
Feb	24	Vanuatu NDMO contact IFRC requesting support to establish a SC coordination mechanism in Vanuatu.
March	12	Government of Vanuatu requested IFRC support for shelter response to TC PAM.
	13	Cyclone Pam makes landfall in Vanuatu with winds of more than 250 kph.
	14	IFRC deployed a shelter cluster coordinator to support Government of Vanuatu to coordinate the shelter response.
	16	Key HLP Principles for SC partners.
	21	First Needs assessment established.
	21	First SC meeting Peter Lawther 1 st SC coordinator Neil Bauman IM attended by 6 Aid Agencies summarises stocks in-country and in the pipeline (started as a Shelter Working Group)
	22	First distributions of emergency shelter material registered by the SC
	25	Key Shelter Principles Published - Bislama
	27	Instructions for Fixing Tarpaulins – Bislama and SC establishes 3W and Focal Points in other affected areas suggested.
April	4	Tom Bamforth 2 nd sector coordinator (in SC minutes)
	14	Ryan Smith IM (in SC minutes)
	22	Gender and Diversity Poster- Bislama.
	24	Shelter Handbook Bislama published by the VRCS
	27	Disability inclusive shelter key messages–Technical Guidance and the Updated 3W Reporting Template requested by NDMO. The Shelter & Settlement vulnerability assessment done in April/May
May	4	HAP target of tarpaulins for 18,000 HH showed a gap of 4,500HH but targets for tool kits (11,000 HH), kitchen sets (8,500HH) and blankets (18,000HH) met or exceeded.
	5	The beginning phases of monitoring, shelter repair, training and shelter repair kit distribution activities. First SC in Tanna Island (in SC minutes)
	15	Shelter & Settlement vulnerability assessment completed, to inform shelter recovery strategy.
	15	Xavier Genot 3 rd SC Coordinator, BBS discussed and REACH 1 reported (in SC minutes)
	28	SC Lesson Learned workshop, attended by 24 representatives of 15 cluster partners.
June	4	The 2,000 tarps donated by ARC to the SC arrived in port (in SC Minutes)
	17	Recommended minimum fixing kit contents–Guidance note
	21	Shipping Contact Selection and Vanuatu General Logistics Planning Map
	23	SC co-lead coordinator (IFRC) contributes as panellist of the national NDMO Lessons Learned 2 days workshop
	29	Instruction for Purchasing Building Code Books in Vanuatu (issue of code status raised and which year should be used and the existence of boot-leg copies for 2000, 2004, and 2011/13) PWD established as the co-lead with IFRC of the SC
July	2	National Statistics on housing in Vanuatu presentation to the SC. (issue of kitchens versus HH).
	3	SC Key Messages published
	6	SC lead (PWD) and co lead (IFRC) conduct one hour talk show at Vanuatu radio on the shelter cluster, the shelter response and building back safer.
	31	End of the Humanitarian phase and HAP, Clusters coordination platform for

⁶⁴ Adapted from Shelter Cluster web page and the Case study on Vanuatu following TC Pam.

		PAM response ended and transitioned to the Recovery Framework
August	1	The SC continue to be active for emergency preparedness. The SC coordination platform transitioned in the Housing Sector Working Group, led by PWD and DLA.
	17	The SC conducted an evaluation of the Shelter response, to inform (1) the effectiveness of the shelter operational response detailed in the humanitarian action plan, and (2) ongoing recovery and preparedness strategies following Cyclone Pam.
Sept	7-11	September IFRC and SPC conducted a Shelter Coordination and Evacuation Centre Management Training, hosted by PWD with 13 PWD, DLA and NDMO Vanuatu government staff.
	9	Housing submission to Recovery Framework–Specific Recovery project outputs-Map
	15	Technical guidelines for emergency shelter response to natural disaster in Vanuatu–Guidelines V1.1 and BBS TWiG TC PAM -Guidance note on Building Back Safer awareness and training framework

6.3 Annexe 3: THE 8-A-F FRAMEWORK TOR DETAILS.

1. **Coordination Arrangements:** in-country coordination modalities; activation of the cluster process; staffing; access to equipment and supplies by, and funding of the SCT; understanding, support, and impact of IFRC’s shelter coordination role within the in-country IFRC team and National Society regional delegation, the Zone office and the secretariat in Geneva; value of linking and/or separating the SCT and the Red Cross relief operation; issues with regard to visibility for the IFRC and the RCRC; remote support; and design, implementation and timing of the exit/handover strategy.
2. **Supporting service delivery:** coordination management; design, timeliness and implementation of the SCT, including factors and determinants which provided the SCT’s strengths and weaknesses; linkage of IFRC’s shelter coordination role with any coordination system set up by the national authorities; extent to which national actors (NGOs, affected population, civil society and private sector) were included in the coordination mechanism; relations with other sectors / clusters, the UN system, the Government and other coordination mechanisms as applicable; information management.
3. **Informing strategic decision-making of the humanitarian response:** assessments and response gap analysis and how these fed into the appeal process; extent to which cross-cutting issues were included in the situation analysis and design of the shelter response.
4. **Planning and strategy development:** strategic planning; technical coordination and application of standards; resource mobilization and appeals; accountability to affected populations; recovery guidance and involvement of the SCT in the transition from meeting emergency shelter needs to durable shelter solutions.
5. **Advocacy:** communication and public information strategy and activities; identification of advocacy concerns and advocacy activities undertaken on behalf of cluster participants and the affected population.
6. **Monitoring and reporting:** reporting systems to monitor the implementation of the cluster strategy and corrective action when necessary; cluster performance monitoring.
7. **Contingency planning/preparedness/capacity building:** national contingency plans identified and shared if available; extent to which response followed previously established contingency plans; development of cluster-based contingency plans when relevant; risk assessment and analysis carried out; readiness status enhanced;

regular distribution of early warning reports; training; the feasibility and conditions required for IFRC to continue to lead the shelter cluster during the preparedness and relief periods in Vanuatu.

8. **Shelter Cluster response:** effectiveness and timeliness of the shelter response to Tropical Cyclone Pam; relevance of the shelter section of the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) and Government of Vanuatu Recovery Framework, extent to which the HAP / Recovery Framework has been implemented; integration of Disaster Risk Reduction elements in the shelter response of SC agencies.

6.4 Annexe 4: LITERATURE REVIEW

Arranged Chronologically.....

THE TREE AND THE CANOE: ROOTS AND MOBILITY IN VANUATU SOCIETIES by JOEL DOMME MAISON from *Pacific Viewpoint* 1985 vol 26 number 1 pg 30-62

(This text outlines that shelter is not just a roof to keep the rain off, but that it has many meanings and in the Vanuatu context has a lot more what is usually encountered)

CAN the tree, symbol of rootedness and stability, be reconciled with the canoe, symbol of journeying and unrestricted wandering? At first sight, apparently not. Nevertheless, Melanesian civilisation uses this dual metaphor, this apparent contradiction, to define Traditional Identity. On the island of Tanna in Vanuatu, they say that man is a tree that must take root and stay fixed in its place. The local group, on the other hand, is a canoe that follows "roads" and explores the wide world. Pg 30

For traditional society, this metaphor would not present a paradox. In a previous study, I have shown that although mobility was in the past territorially controlled and socially selective, it could in some cases be very wide-ranging. Present-day mobility, however, has changed in nature: its extension to urban metropolises within and beyond Oceania is felt by many to be a threat to the identity of Melanesian and Polynesian peoples. Such a value judgement implies some definition of identity. During several years in Vanuatu, my research focussed on cultural structures and their connections with land tenure in the societies of Tongoa, Tanna, and central Pentecost (Figure 1). At the heart of these enquiries was the relationship between man and place. Circumstances gradually led me to widen my scope, and I made a transition from a classical geographical approach to a more cultural one, thence to what might be called an anthropology of space. Within that context, I attempt here to elucidate what "kastom" (customs) and cultural identity mean in a Melanesian society. Pg 31

In such a social and political context, mobility can no longer be conceived as a simple removal from one place to another or as a neutral and informal phenomenon. Pg 32

Journeying in traditional times was thus by no means a matter of free wandering. It was, on the contrary, carefully controlled by the group, which endowed it with a purpose and celebrated it as a rite, even sometimes as a cultural initiation. Pg 32

At least in this specific case, it appears that achieving the greatest security was the overriding factor. The spatial organisation of canoe territories reflects this preoccupation. Social space in Tanna is structured by networks of central places bearing symbolic and ritual significance: dancing grounds in the shade of the great banyan trees; sacred or "taboo" places connected with magic stones; dwelling sites and garden areas. Around this living heart, the peaceful dwelling place of followers of custom, there is usually a rather extensive and encircling belt of forest, punctuated by places of identity and security. Pg 39

This doctrine of first appearance is also the basis for sharing out land rights and spaces of authority. Pg 41

To be able to occupy land by right of conquest, it would have been necessary either for all legitimate occupants to have been exterminated (an extreme solution and difficult to achieve given the expedient of flight) or for the invaders to claim very close ties of relationship with the original inhabitants - impossible on principle, because warfare was prohibited between allies sharing -the same food, On Tanna, however, many land disputes remain latent to this day, precisely because this rule by which vanquished groups return to their territory has not been observed. Three or four generations after their flight, many clans still seek to reoccupy their land, largely because the process of warfare was suddenly obstructed by the “white peace” of missionaries or colonial administrators.pg 51

The missionaries made it their goal to reconstruct Melanesian society around a religious identity. In many areas they struck .the final blow to the traditional order, which they saw as pagan, and in exchange tried to substitute a Christian one. Many Melanesian places of identity and dwelling sites, loaded with meaning and symbols, were abandoned. Pg 55

The independence of Vanuatu was achieved in the name of “kastom” and land. Today, the very word “kastom” is brandished as a rallying cry by the government, by all political parties, and even by Christian leaders in those areas where it was most energetically uprooted by their predecessors. This concern with customary values as those of Melanesian cultural identity goes beyond a mere proclamation or appeal to principle. In the islands and villages, the words “kastom” and land have the same connotation. Many understood the end of colonial power to mean that men would reclaim and return to their original identifying places, as if this would occur alongside Melanesians reclaiming their political sovereignty. Government fostered this sentiment by announcing very soon after independence was gained, and writing into the twelfth chapter of the constitution, that the land of Vanuatu would ‘come back to Custom’, that is, to the “man ples”, the rightful occupants as defined in terms of custom and genealogical affiliation pg 59

Traditional Architecture in Vanuatu by Christian Coiffier ISBN 982-02-0047-4 Published by the Institute of Pacific Studies and the Vanuatu Extension Centre of the University of the South Pacific 1988.

A building is said to be ‘traditional’ when its design reflects knowledge exclusive to a local culture and when the economic relationships formed by the need for materials remain within one area. Pg ix

Most buildings in Vanuatu are built at ground level and are quite low which means a considerable reduction in interior vertical space. The interior is sometimes subdivided by wooden partitions to separate the sexes (West Santo, Vao, Aoba) or the family from outsiders. When there are no partitions, hearths demarcate the different areas for each person. Ground floors are usually rectangular in shape (at least twice as long as they are wide) sometimes with circular gables (Santo, Malekula, Shepherd). From three to five rows of lengthwise posts usually make up the framework. The roofing has two parts sloping down to the ground. The gables are often closed, having only one or two doors. Pg xii

Vegetable fibres make up the most commonly used building materials in Vanuatu which is not surprising in this land of great forests. A great deal of vegetable matter is used; various woods for making framework posts, bamboo being the preferred material for roofs — the most important part of a house in the tropics — for the first function of roofing is that of a very large umbrella! Leaves from the sago palm

(especially in the northern part of the archipelago), coconut palm, pandanus and sugar-cane, fashioned into compact tiles are placed one over the other to give an even surface over which rainwater can easily flow. pg xiii

In Vanuatu, the building of a house, whether for family or community, is a communal effort requiring the agreement of the whole or part of the village community. Work is divided up according to sex, age, and social standing. Each type of building corresponds to particular skills and a new building means a particularly big effort on the part of the community. In conclusion, we would say that there are four distinct types of habitation in the Vanuatu Archipelago. The Northern Islands type (Torres, Banks, Aoba, Vao) The Central " " (Santo, Malakula, Ambrym, Pentecost) The Southern " " (Polynesian influence) Combination types (combinations of the three previous types, often with various influences during the last 50 years) pg xiv

Typically, it consist of a ridge-pole and the string-pieces were made of long narrow banyan roots, and the rafters from tree trunks — the narrow part making up the roof edging. Trunks are used for posts were placed upright. Four or five bamboos were placed horizontally over the rafters on either side of the ridge-pole. Overhead, small rafters of very solid wood were tied to the ridge-pole at their thinnest end. Each part of the roofing frames was tied together with strips of bark prepared by the women. Thatch was made from the leaves of the smallest of the sago-palms, their foliage being folded on a reed and pinned together to form tiles. These tiles were prepared and left to dry in piles. Scaffolding was erected inside the house pg 1

Vanuatu Building Methods an Informative Document: 22 April 2009

(This is similar to what might be expected in outside Vanuatu but has the added aspects of cost, skills and material availability included which is what makes this text useful)

Generally speaking, there are always compromises involved with the choice of building method to be employed. These compromises when simplified typically manifest themselves in three areas: Cost, Quality, and Time to build. Pg 1

The relative advantages and disadvantages of Traditional Building Methods are:

Advantages: - Readily available materials from nature greatly cut costs.

- Relatively low level of technical skill involved to construct.
- Provides genuine island look and feel with all natural materials.
- Environmentally friendly and fully sustainable

Disadvantages:

- Materials of unknown strength and characteristics (not engineered to modern standards)
- Fire hazard is serious concern
- Not suitable for finishing with engineered window and doors and thus cannot easily be secured
- Considering the time involved producing many of the components that are employed, the total build time is excessive.

The relative advantages and disadvantages of Timber Framed Construction are:

Advantages: - Readily available engineered materials.

- Can be price competitive with dominant construction methods employed
- Is a relatively quick building method
- Lends itself to pre-fabricated kit producible product

Disadvantages:

- Interior finishing is typically rendered gib rock or a similar non-rugged product that is not robust for usage where heavy or rough treatment is expected (with children, and/or in rental units).

- Fire hazard is a concern although common treatments may reduce the flammability of the timber

- Vulnerable to flood damage

The relative advantages and disadvantages of Structural Steel Buildings are:

Advantages: - Engineered steel components are high strength and highly reproducible with known characteristics.

- Finished structures are high strength and durable
- Can be competitive with low cost alternative building methods
- Can be erected quickly and the system lends itself to kit-set product offerings

Disadvantages:

- Most cost effective designs are not aesthetically pleasing.
- Thermal characteristics are typically markedly poor
- Improper choice of hardware any time during construction or maintenance may cause serious corrosion damage (dissimilar metals actively corrode)
- Vulnerable to flood damage (most always built on ground rather than raised)

The relative advantages and disadvantages of Solid Panel Construction are:

Advantages: - High strength, rugged finished product

- Cost effective (common building systems are more expensive by as much as 50%)
- Quick to build
- Semi flexible structures allow for limited movement in seismically active zones.
- Properly plumb and square walls simplify cabinetry work and furnishing
- Use of Triboard® for internal walls gives significantly more useable internal space
- Good thermal properties with breathable walls – Can be insulated for air conditioned applications

Disadvantages:

- Single source for product and limited expertise with method in Vanuatu
- Flood damage vulnerability (mitigated by construction on piers)
- Fire concern (mitigated by fire rating of Triboard® and non- flammable claddings)

The relative advantages and disadvantages of Reinforced Concrete Block and Interlocking Aerated Concrete Block Construction are:

Advantages: - Very high strength, rugged finished product

- Well known and understood in Vanuatu
- Fire resistant material
- Flood tolerant structure (contents are less secure)
- Excellent sonic isolation (window and doors are weakest components)
- Good thermal qualities

Disadvantages:

- Most costly building method in Vanuatu
- Slowest Building method in Vanuatu
- Vulnerable to “concrete cancer”
- Internal (thick) walls waste usable space
- Unsophisticated local masonry and rendering techniques often create poor results (non-square, non-plumb walls)
- Strength of available concrete blocks is dubious depending upon source
- Environmental concerns over sand consumption for concrete production are growing
- Time to build often causes price variance in materials sourced toward end of project.

This often blows budgets

**The Vanuatu National Survey on Women's Lives and Family Relationships
Published by the Vanuatu Women's Centre (VWC), 2011.**

The aim of the Vanuatu National Survey on Women's Lives and Family Relationships was to conduct a population-based study to provide a reliable benchmark of the prevalence and incidence of violence against women in Vanuatu, and on attitudes to violence including: health and other effects of violence on women and children; risk and protective factors in the family and the community; coping strategies of women; and the implications for prevention and support services. This report presents findings from the survey, which was conducted by the Vanuatu Women's Centre (WVC) in partnership with the Vanuatu National Statistics Office (VNSO) from March to May 2009. This is the first nation-wide study that has been undertaken in Vanuatu on violence against women and attitudes to women's human rights.

This survey opens a door to women's lives: it challenges Vanuatu's view of itself as a happy nation that values and protects family and children. It explodes myths about who suffers from violence, the severity of violence and its impacts, and where it occurs. It reveals an intense web of intimidation, threats, humiliation, controlling behaviour and acts of physical and sexual violence imposed on the women who suffer from violence by their husbands and partners. It shows pervasive patterns of gender inequality in Vanuatu society, including widespread beliefs and attitudes that directly undermine women's human rights; and it shows that violence against women cannot be prevented unless these patterns of unequal power between women and men (gender power relations) are transformed. The high rates of all forms of violence against women (including violence by husbands/partners and non-partner violence) show that the use of violence as a form of punishment and discipline is accepted and condoned as a "normal" part of behaviour within many families and communities. Some women say that they have not sought help because the violence was "normal". The findings show clearly that women do not exaggerate the effects of violence. On the contrary, many women minimise the impact of the violence on their health and well-being; for many, this is an important coping mechanism that helps them to deal with it, to continue in their relationships and to continue working and providing for their husbands/partners and their families.

The complex pattern of intimidation and multiple forms of violence experienced by so many women needs to be taken into account by all service providers, the law and justice sector, chiefs, faith-based organisations, civil society organisations and families who are asked to help women deal with violence. Controlling behaviours by husbands and intimate partners prevent women from finding out about their legal and human rights, reporting the violence to authorities, and telling family, friends, or community and church leaders. The impacts of violence against women are wide-ranging and severe. They include serious short-term and long-term impacts on women's physical, mental and reproductive health; and impacts on children's emotional well-being and schooling, which reduce their opportunities for development and pre-dispose them to the risk of violence in their intimate relationships as adults. There are enormous economic costs to families, communities and the nation to deal with these health and other impacts; and ongoing lost opportunities for social and economic development at community and national level.

When women do take the difficult step of asking for help or leaving home temporarily because their lives are in crisis, family members, chiefs, church leaders, friends and service-providers need to take their requests for help very seriously. They need to respond appropriately to ensure that women's rights are protected, and it is very important that they do not condone or excuse the violence. Given the evidence that violence continues throughout a woman's life, the serious burden of injury, and the substantial costs to the community, all stakeholders and service-providers need to take steps to stop the violence. On the positive side, the survey shows that there are high levels of social cohesion in Vanuatu, with much respect and trust given to chiefs and church leaders. Despite entrenched attitudes that oppose women's rights, there is also considerable support within the community in favour of women's rights and non-violent approaches to resolving conflict

in families. These factors all put Vanuatu in a good position to reduce and prevent all forms of violence against women, by building on the positive work that has already been done by VWC and its network of branches and island-based committees against violence against women (CAVAWs), other civil society organisations, government, chiefs and other community leaders.

Traditional Coping Strategies and Disaster Response: Examples from the South Pacific Region Stephanie M. Fletcher, Jodi Thiessen, Anna Gero, Michele Rumsey, Natasha Kuruppu and Juliet Willetts Hindawi Publishing Corporation Journal of Environmental and Public Health Volume 2013, Article ID 264503,9pages <http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/264503>

The following table is useful for understanding and identifying traditional coping mechanisms. Shelter was concerned about its impact on traditional coping mechanisms and this allows quantifying what that traditional coping mechanism is and how shelter may impact on it.

Table 1: Summary of traditional coping strategies to disasters and climate changes.

Key areas	Summary of traditional knowledge and coping strategies for response to disasters and climate change in Pacific Island Countries
Recognition of traditional coping strategies	(i) Secretariat of the Pacific Community's (SPC) list of crops from the climate ready collection. (ii) Glossaries of traditional climate change terms in some Pacific countries. (iii) Pacific Red Cross societies Toolkit to assess natural disasters vulnerability and response capacity.
Faith and Religious beliefs	(i) Faith-based systems and their interventions are entrenched in the social system and can build resilience. (ii) Recognition of churches, their role in community life, including use as emergency centres or disaster shelters; provision of postdisaster counselling. (iii) Churches may be a source of resources, volunteers, welfare programs for the poor, and needy including non-members.
Traditional governance and leadership	(i) Indication of some integration of political and traditional governance systems for disaster management. (ii) Active involvement of traditional governance structures in village life, disaster management, and climate change adaptation. (iii) Use of traditional leadership networks to share information and communicate in times of disasters. (iv) Involvement of schools, churches, and the community in disaster preparedness and response.
Family and Community Involvement	(i) Extended family system and kinship ties provide a critical support structures in times of disaster. (ii) Movement of families from high risk areas to less vulnerable areas inland during disasters. (iii) Fostering of relationships improves coordination of response teams and helps develop good coping skills.
Agriculture and food security	(i) Traditional agricultural disaster-preparation techniques to preserve seedlings and seeds. (ii) Documenting food preservation techniques and consideration of inclusion in school curricula. (iii) Integrated farming system approach that incorporates the planting of fruit trees with root crops. (iv) Introducing less common foods and reintroducing some forgotten foods from traditional diets. (v) Using organic agricultural practices- pesticide free and no chemicals.


Traditional Knowledge for Adapting to Climate Change Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage UNESCO, 2013.

There are many examples of traditional building methods in Pacific islands. Due to the frequency of natural disasters in the region, many building styles demonstrate adaptations to environmental hazards. Examples include the traditional Samoan fale which is mounted on a high stone foundation to prevent flooding and storm surges. It has a high dome ceiling to combat humidity and has open sides to allow winds to pass through. Such traditional dwellings incorporate architectural styles that enable them to withstand extreme weather and strong winds. Even in the event of the structure failing, replacement materials are readily available and sustainable, and the collapse generally would not injure the inhabitants. Many of the traditional aspects of vernacular housings in the pacific have eroded with the Introduction of western building techniques and materials, including corrugated iron and concrete. Construction is often unregulated, and buildings are not built according To proper

building standards and codes. This makes the western-style buildings more vulnerable to environmental hazards and more dangerous to inhabitants

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE WHO Western Pacific Region January 2014

Figure 1: Prevalence estimates of lifetime exposure to intimate partner violence of women 15-49 years old*, 2000-2010, selected countries, Western Pacific Region




FLASH APPEAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN FOR VANUATU TROPICAL CYCLONE PAM March –June 2015

75,000 people in need of shelter 10,000 people without access to safe drinking water
US\$29.9 million required.

An estimated 166,600 people have been affected by the cyclone more than half the country's population and 11 fatalities have been reported. Shefa and Tafea were the hardest hit provinces. In Tongoa, Emae and Erromango Islands, up to 90 per cent of shelters have been wiped out. In Tanna, 50% of shelters have been destroyed. Roads are impassable as debris is still being cleared.

Need for emergency shelter Significant damage to housing leaves people either crowded into houses still standing, in evacuation centres or without shelter and at increased risk of disease.

Humanitarian Coordination Structure for Tropical Cyclone Pam



1 Provide timely life-saving assistance to people affected by the cyclone

- Provide immediate life-saving and life-sustaining safe drinking water, food assistance, nutrition support and health care to the people most affected by Tropical Cyclone Pam.
- Provide emergency shelter and non-food items for people whose houses have been partially or fully damaged or destroyed.
- Overcome logistics impediments to effective and timely distribution of relief items.
- Provide adequate protection measures for people in need.

2 Support restoration of livelihoods and self-reliance

- Re-establish food security in communities affected by TC Pam.
- Assist affected people with repair and reconstruction of shelters and housing.
- Repair community infrastructure destroyed or damaged by TC Pam, including roads, airstrips, market places, electricity and communications and water supply.

3 Re-establish and strengthen basic services across all affected areas

- Reinstatement and replacement of affected water infrastructure for domestic and agricultural consumption.
- Deliver essential health care and preventive interventions for the affected population at temporary and permanent health facilities and with mobile teams, while repairing, rebuilding or relocating damaged health facilities.
- Restore access to education through the restoration or replacement of school buildings, facilities, resources and learning materials affected by TC Pam.

Around 75,000 people are in need of emergency shelter as assessments indicate that 15,000 houses have either been destroyed or severely damaged. In addition, the loss of household goods (e.g. blankets and kitchen sets) is extensive. Reconstruction of homes is challenging due to the scale of the damage, the destruction of building materials by the cyclone, and the competing need to re-establishing crop gardens and other immediate priorities.

\$2.4 million
Funding requirement

The shelter cluster working group proposes the provision of immediate emergency shelter materials and on-the-ground technical support for safer construction techniques. Targeted emergency shelter assistance to informal settlements in Port Vila is also prioritised. The distribution of emergency shelter kits, tarpaulins and non-food items (NFI) has commenced.

Core areas of work

- 1: Providing emergency shelter and non-food item (NFI) assistance to affected households.
- 2: Reconstructing safer shelters and providing technical training for communities.
- 3: Encouraging and training communities and authorities to adopt safer construction practices.

Post-Disaster Needs Assessment PDNA Tropical Cyclone Pam, GoV March 2015

- An estimated 65,000 people were displaced and required temporary shelter. The cyclone destroyed crops on a large scale, and compromised the livelihoods of at least 80% of Vanuatu's rural population.
- Over 16,000 houses suffered damage due to high winds from Tropical Cyclone Pam in all four provinces considered within this PDNA
- The self-recovery of affected populations is being supported by the government of Vanuatu and humanitarian agencies, with distribution of tarpaulins, tool kits, and non-food items, including buckets, water containers, blankets, and nails and other building consumables.

Not only were house structures themselves damaged or destroyed. Household goods within the houses were equally affected. For the purposes of the damage assessment, and extrapolating from the 2009 census, the cost of damage to household goods was assessed and included as 5% of total housing. For the primarily rural communities affected by Tropical Cyclone Pam, the possessions lost represent a significant portion of the family's wealth and will be difficult to replace.

Consideration should be given to female-headed households (FHHs), which often have no ownership of the land they are on and face huge constraints in accessing finance and manpower to repair or reconstruct their homes. The 2009 gender census monograph (VNSO 2011) indicates that 20% of the households in Vanuatu are female-headed, which can be extrapolated to approximately 3,200 households that suffered damage and losses in the amount of VT 1.9 billion (based on the total effects presented in Table 20). Housing rehabilitation and reconstruction/recovery programs should be positively adjusted to prioritize FHHs as well as people living with disabilities and the elderly. Similarly, early recovery and livelihood programs should also provide specific support to FHHs to enable them to find resources for rebuilding. With regard to evacuation centres, disaster preparedness planning should address the needs of women and girls by ensuring adequate lighting and segregated wash facilities. Future planning and building of evacuation camps should also ensure accessibility for people living with disability.

- Traditional housing (43%) is constructed from local materials such as thatch, natangura (woven palm fronds), woven cane, or other naturally available material. Key features include a concrete or crushed coral gravel floor; lightweight timber frame with local

material wall cladding; roof sheeting made from locally grown material, sometimes with chicken wire covering the thatch (predominantly outer island and peri-urban).

- Semi permanent housing (30%) is incrementally constructed from traditional materials that are replaced or supplemented over time with salvaged or second hand materials. Key features include concrete or crushed coral rock floor, inadequately designed timber-framed walls; natangura grass or corrugated galvanized iron (CGI) roof on non engineered roof members (predominantly informal settlements or rural communities).
- Permanent housing (27%) comprises single- and double-story structures that were likely designed to be comparatively durable. Key features include engineered concrete or timber framed floor; concrete block or timber-framed walls; and CGI on trussed roof structure or roof tiles.

TROPICAL CYCLONE PAM HUMANITARIAN ACTION PLAN (HAP) 1 May 2015



Contact information: Dick Abel (dabel@vanuatu.gov.vu), Tom Bamforth (coord.vanuatu@sheltercluster.org), Ryan Smith (im.vanuatu@sheltercluster.org)

The Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) builds on, and replaces, the Flash Appeal launched on 24 March, and is based on the results of the Second Phase Harmonized Needs Assessment. The Government-led Clusters focus their activities on one primary Strategic Objective: meeting the remaining life-saving and protection needs of 158,000 people in 23 islands over the next three months. The emergency response phase will gradually phase out during the timeframe of this plan. Shelter was tasked to assist 90,000 people of that case load.

272,000 est. total populations, 70% or 188,000 est. people affected 60% or 158,000 affected people targeted in HAP USD 13.5 million.

1. Meet the remaining life-saving and protection needs of the affected people through the provision of safe drinking water, food assistance, nutrition support, health care and adequate protection measures, as well as shelter and non-food items.

At the same time, through a limited number of activities supporting two complementary Strategic Objectives, the HAP also maps the transition from emergency response to the longer-term recovery effort under the Government of Vanuatu Strategic Action Plan (SAP), which will not use the Cluster system as a coordination mechanism.

2. Support the restoration of livelihoods and self-reliance of the affected people while strengthening resilience, by re-establishing food security in the affected communities; assisting affected people with repair and reconstruction of shelters, houses, water and sanitation facilities and community infrastructure; and strengthening community-based protection mechanisms.

3. Re-establish and strengthen basic services across all affected areas

While reinstating and replacing affected water and sanitation infrastructure for communities and institutions; reactivating and enhancing the delivery of quality health services and preventive interventions with high coverage in all affected areas; restoring access to education through the reparation or replacement of education facilities and materials; strengthening protection services in affected communities including for the most vulnerable persons; and increasing the resilience of farmers through the provision of agricultural extension service.

Lessons Learnt from Tropical Cyclone Pam for Tafea Provincial Disaster Committee June 2015

Approved permanent houses should be built according to traditional ways of building, with consideration for permanent evacuation centres in communities built to agreed specifications.

The Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT) is a network of agencies committed to effective humanitarian coordination, disaster preparedness and humanitarian response. The VHT is convened by Oxfam; its members include the Vanuatu Red Cross, French Red Cross, Vanuatu Association of NGOs (VANGO), UNICEF, Oxfam, CARE International, Save the Children Australia (SCA), the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), the World Health Organization (WHO), PeaceCorps, World Vision and Act for Peace, IOM and OCHA.

The NDMO, supported by humanitarian partners, led initial rapid assessment teams in the most affected areas from 18-24 March 2015. These assessments found that Shefa and Tafea provinces, where all of the 11 confirmed fatalities occurred were the hardest-hit provinces.

Shelter and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene relief distribution: The importance of early Shelter and WASH support was noted and appreciated.

Vanuatu Shelter Cluster Tropical Cyclone Pam Response Lessons Learned, June 2015

(Key parts have been underlined)

What has worked well with respect to the Shelter Cluster response to TC Pam?

- a) Quick establishment of the shelter cluster, starting from scratch, and placing it clearly within the NDMO cluster system.
- b) Whilst the establishment of an official shelter cluster was new to Vanuatu, its operation was assisted greatly (albeit indirectly) at Provincial and community level through well organised and managed Provincial and community disaster committees (CDC). In addition, communities themselves commenced reconstruction of emergency shelter / housing immediately. This is a key strength of the Vanuatu humanitarian response mechanism and needs to be leveraged off by the shelter cluster to ensure efficient use of resources and avoid duplication. However, it was also noted that CDC's were not present in every community prior to TC Pam and further work is required to identify gaps and ensure trained CDC's are in place.
- c) Clear and early division of geographical working areas to Agencies (notwithstanding some gaps in Port Vila) and also evacuation centres provided clarity and supported planning at Agency level.
- d) Good level of co-operation, openness, sharing of resources and flexibility between different cluster partners such as GoV, donors, NGO's who were considered to be "solution orientated". This was evidenced by the generally successful distributions of emergency shelter and NFIs, and also following the "protest" at NDMO.
- e) Information management. The 3W's and allied mapping enabled identification of duplications and gaps, resulting in positive collective action taken by cluster partners to resolve issues. Information is consistently updated and shared, (although there were

some concerns raised regarding the accuracy of the maps, leading to isolated instances of people being sent to the wrong NGO).

f) Consistency of shelter cluster meetings (time and location), and low “churn” of shelter cluster personnel, made for a predictability of the operations of the shelter cluster.

g) Good link between the shelter cluster and camp management working group who collaborated (in association with other cluster clusters) to facilitate the prompt, proper and orderly closure of evacuation centres.

h) Basic shelter trainings conducted at community level in safe shelter awareness (although this has not been implemented widely as yet).

i) Commenced establishment of a regional shelter cluster in Tanna.

The key findings and recommendations are identified and prioritised from the lessons learned workshop. They are also categorised against the NDMO key themes provided separately. The key findings are not mutually exclusive, and adoption of the recommendations will identify overlaps to aid the efficiency of implementation

1. Coordination / Surge Capacity Mechanism.

The shelter cluster was characterised by expatriate personnel with a noticeable shortage of Ni-Vanuatu input and participation. This is not conducive to “two-way” knowledge transfer, or in-country knowledge retention due to the temporary nature of international staff. Shelter cluster to increase Ni Vanuatu presence, supported by associated training and peer exchanges. This be further strengthened by recruitment within PWD of a local permanent shelter cluster officer. IFRC to provide shelter cluster training, and facilitate peer exchange where possible.

2. Preparedness. Shelter cluster partners experienced delays and subsequent experience of importing relief items. This ultimately reduces the efficiency of the emergency shelter response. Shelter cluster to develop an emergency response contingency plan, in support of NDMO wide contingency planning, including a pre-positioning strategy for key items such as tools, tarpaulins, rope and nails.

3. Preparedness. There is a need for awareness raising and / or training with respect to the integration of building codes with traditional construction methods and the use of local materials for shelter. SC to develop technical shelter guidelines which identifies and integrates relevant provisions of the building code, traditional and modern safe shelter awareness messaging and mapping of various housing typologies. Such guidelines to be informed by experiences from other Pacific countries.

4. Information Management. Information Management sources and requirements of the SC were exemplified by out of date census information that misinformed the initial assessments, and too many expensive and unnecessary assessments, particularly given that assessment data was largely available from PDCs / CDCs. Shelter cluster to develop (in conjunction with NDMO) and maintain an information management methodology including baseline national demographics at island / village level, (as collected through the PDCs and CDCs). Further, develop systems (in conjunction with NDMO) to ensure that assessment data collected by PDCs / NDCs is accessed in a timely manner.

5. Coordination. The initial lack of a Government of Vanuatu lead Agency for the SC diminished the link between shelter activities and existing projects –e.g. the GoV PWD to mainstream shelter cluster activities within its operations and identify opportunities for integration with broader GoV priorities.

6. Operations of the National Cluster System. The governance structure of the Shelter cluster needs to be clarified / rationalised between the emergency phase and the recovery phases. There are a number of GoV Ministries / Departments involved in housing beyond emergency response, but it is not clear how they come together. SC develop a clear ToR as to extent of its remit and who leads / is involved at each stage of the disaster management cycle (preparedness, response and recovery), and how this interfaces with longer term development planning in Vanuatu.

7. Operations of the National Cluster System. There is a need to enhance to evacuation centre preparedness in terms of identification of centres, physical standards and management training. There is a need for a functioning camp coordination and camp management cluster with clear delineation from the SC. Camp Coordination and Camp Management cluster to be formalised and tasked to take overall responsibility for evacuation centres. CCCM cluster develop standards / guidelines for physical assessment and management of evacuation centres, and list of approved centres. Conduct EC management training.
8. Preparedness. Generally households commenced rebuilding their houses immediately after TC Pam. This highlighted that shelter early recovery needs should be included in shelter cluster discussions much earlier in the response. Shelter cluster to develop a shelter early recovery guidance strategy that can be quickly and easily adapted, modified and accepted by shelter cluster partner agencies for implementation.
9. Gender and Protection. The gender sensitivity of the shelter cluster should be formalised. SC to ensure gender considerations are articulated in the shelter strategy.
10. Coordination. Earlier in the response there were too many shelter coordination meetings (three per week) with unclear objectives. Allied to this, the SC demand for Agency information was onerous early in the response. SC to review meeting and information management objectives. Standard operation procedure to be developed to the balance need for meetings /information, and the practicality of attending / providing same.

**Real time evaluation of the IFRC response to Tropical Cyclone Pam
FINAL REPORT by Sophia Dunn (Team Leader),Filipe Nainoca, Amara
Bains, Madeleine Lyons. 28th August 2015**

(underlining has been added but outside of that there is still much that could/would apply to the SC in Vanuatu from an IFRC organisational perspective)

Findings

The RTE identified a number of strengths of the IFRC TC Pam response. However, there are also a number of fundamental organisational issues that have weakened the timeliness and effectiveness of an IFRC response and recovery program. Many of the findings are symptoms of an absence of adaptive capacity and strategic leadership.

1. The evaluation found a lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities in the operational leadership. The Asia Pacific Zone Office (APZO) Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were not well understood or utilized, resulting in confusion for staff and loss of operational direction.
2. The evaluation found that a multi-layered approach to decision-making hampered the timeliness of some facets of the response including leadership and human resource mobilization. In the instance where officers made direct contact with one another, the result was increased timeliness and understanding of mobilisation requirements e.g. FACT and the Shelter Cluster.
3. Coordination, including within the Movement, with the Government of Vanuatu and with external partners, has been a notable success of the response. This was due in part to the strong relationships in play prior to TC Pam, which contributed to coordinated planning of recovery interventions.
4. IFRC provided support to the Government of Vanuatu by activating its Shelter Cluster Coordination role, providing a Disaster Law Delegate, and utilizing skills from ICRC and the Australian Red Cross Society in Restoring Family Links. Each of these components of the response has been well regarded by multiple stakeholders, who recognized that the Red Cross has a competitive advantage in these fields.
5. The immediate relief response utilized the strong regional relationships between the IFRC Pacific Regional Office (PRO) and Partner National Societies and enabled the timely arrival of standardized relief items into Vanuatu.

6. The evaluation identified assessment as a weakness of the response. The RTE was not able to find systematic management of either relief assessment data or post-distribution monitoring data. This made it a challenge for the RTE to fully evaluate the effectiveness of the response.
7. The mobilization of human resources has been an ongoing challenge in the response, in part related to leadership issues and the lack of clear responsibilities of recruitment, but also because of multiple streams of input – APZO, PNS, and the PRO - to accommodate difficulties in finding appropriately skilled people.
8. The RTE found that utilizing regional personnel had numerous benefits to the operation but some skills were underutilized. Prolonged and more strategic input from these staff would have been appropriate.
9. It is important to offer affected national societies administrative support so that, as lead agency, they are able to channel their local knowledge and expertise into response and programme design and budgets rather than acting as a concierge service to incoming delegates. This was one reason why NS informants preferred staff from Pacific national societies as surge support.
10. The RTE also found long-standing concerns that the logistics and procurement challenges of the Pacific Region are under-appreciated by the APZO and that there was often rejection by the APZO of proactive measures suggested by field staff such as batch buying. This could potentially pose a risk to future operational needs by damaging the relatively small local markets. These field challenges are due in part to a strict insistence in following IFRC procurement procedures that appear to be inappropriate for operating in an environment with small market capacities.
11. The RTE finds that the partnership planning meetings were an excellent, albeit ambitious idea, and all stakeholders have appreciated the intention behind a coordinated approach. The follow up processes however have been challenging and lessons learned from this process need to be built on in future responses.
12. The abovementioned challenges for the TC Pam operation resulted in delayed start to the early recovery programme and unfortunately resulted in a clear demarcation between relief operations and recovery operations, rather than a smooth transition.
13. Review of previous IFRC RTEs highlight that some of the above findings were also noted in evaluation of other operations. It appears that previous disaster responses in the Pacific (and other regions), has resulted in improved *inter-organisational* coordination e.g. the cluster system and specifically in Vanuatu – the Vanuatu Humanitarian Team, but not yielded significant *intra-organisational* change.

Recommendations

1. Improve the organizational adaptive capacity of IFRC Secretariat structures by: IFRC Secretariat

Identifying key roles for disaster response (and recovery) and clarifying responsibilities of key leadership roles, including reporting lines for multi-country responses, thereby reducing multi-layered decision-making.

Increasing investment in the development of modern leaders, i.e. both strategic and operational leaders for key IFRC operational field functions.

Empowering staff members to make decisions within the intent of the SOPs to ensure field operations remain timely and relevant.

IFRC Secretariat and Partner National Societies

Developing and investing in qualified, experienced, specialized technical personnel to be utilized through an 'on-call system' such as a structured roster, as opposed to a mailing list. This is especially important during key disaster seasons such as the cyclone season in the Pacific (November to April).

Increasing investment in early recovery programming and the deployment of those skills early in a response.

Investigating ways of providing better support to staff and volunteers working in disaster contexts, including access to debriefing resources.

2. Address the contextual specificities of the Pacific by:

IFRC Secretariat

Holding a joint exercise with APZO, PRO and the regional NS to discuss contingency plans, review roles, responsibilities and IFRC processes.

Continuing to invest in regional capacity for Pacific responses e.g. comprehensive RDRT training for peer-to-peer personnel in the Pacific Region.

Reviewing the Pacific Logistics Strategy, including its operationalization to address logistic and procurement procedures and ensure applicability for the Pacific context.

IFRC Secretariat and Partner National Societies

Prioritizing the documentation and management of standardized assessment data in disaster response.

Ensuring beneficiary involvement in the assessment process and then putting accountability mechanisms in place to receive feedback from communities.

3. Operationalize national societies as lead agencies by:

IFRC Secretariat

Actively prioritizing indigenous (local) knowledge within affected national societies. This should include clear operational leadership roles, and the utilization of effective counter-parting opportunities.

Providing clear and transparent planning and budgeting processes that include high level involvement of national societies including final sign off on pledge management notes.

4. Conduct a meta-evaluation of past IFRC RTEs over the last 10 years

Geneva Office

Many of the findings in this RTE echo the findings of previous IFRC RTEs. By conducting a meta-evaluation the common recommendations can be prioritized for immediate action and effect.

Regional Consultation for the Pacific, Auckland, 30 June - 2 July 2015

<http://reliefweb.int/report/world/regional-consultation-pacific-auckland-30-june-2-july-2015-final-report> accessed Sept 2015

(The current political context of Vanuatu and the potential future role of the SC in Vanuatu)

Mr. Jotham Napat, Director General of the Vanuatu Ministry of Climate Change and Disaster Management, encouraged the integration of traditional coping mechanisms with modern day science and technology. He noted that communities in the Pacific were already resilient and that any assistance should enhance this local capacity rather than overwhelm it. Mr. Napat suggested that the number of technical experts deployed to Vanuatu after TC Pam was unnecessarily high. He said it was crucial that governments drive disaster planning and preparedness. Mr. Napat called on international humanitarian actors to respect the sovereignty of disaster affected countries and the existing protocols of the government, because "this is where trust is gained." He further noted the overwhelming challenge of dealing with unsolicited goods, many of which were unusable. Pg 12

Ms. Jennifer Worthington, Oxfam Australia and the Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT), underscored the importance of having in place Memorandums of Understanding with national disaster management offices and Standard Operating Procedures for disaster response. She further stressed the value of investing in education and community-based disaster risk reduction, with a need to factor-in the needs of vulnerable people, the elderly and people with disabilities during times of crisis. Ms. Worthington then outlined the role of the VHT, a network of locally-based NGOs, the UN and the Red Cross. She highlighted the

need for response capacity within the NDMO to support its work. While the VHT ordinarily functioned well, its effectiveness was challenged by TC Pam, bringing to light the need to examine the interface between domestic response capacity and international support. Finally, Ms. Worthington stressed the importance of communication and called for improvements in the way feedback is solicited from affected communities. Pg 12

Mr. Pepe Christian Fruean, Digicel Pacific, recounted Digicel's experience in the recovery phase of TC Pam. He noted that in times of crisis, telecommunications were crucial for keeping people connected as well as gathering and disseminating information. Eighty per cent of Digicel's network was lost as a result of the cyclone, but over half was recovered within two days. Mr. Fruean explained that Digicel was able to respond quickly because it had a regional crisis management and deployment plan in place and had pre-positioned critical equipment in neighbouring countries. He further noted that all actors had to work on building trust with the private sector, particularly in terms of private sector-government relationships. He cited the WHS as the perfect platform for increasing networking and building trust. Pg 13

Findings from preparatory stakeholder consultations there was a resounding call from the 1,428 stakeholders consulted across the Pacific in the lead up to the Auckland meeting that people affected by disasters must always be at the centre of humanitarian action. They will always be the first responders to humanitarian disasters and they will be the last. When the attention, funding and external actors have moved on, those affected will be there to undertake the recovery work. Despite this recognition, people argued that disaster-affected communities are not sufficiently involved in decision-making about humanitarian response. There is room for improvement, particularly when it comes to engaging women, youth, the elderly and those living with disabilities. Consultations also pointed to the need for better acknowledgement of the role of kinship ties, extended families, diaspora and faith-based groups in disaster preparedness, response and early recovery, given their central role in how communities organize themselves in the Pacific. Those consulted advocated for consistent engagement with communities pre- and post-disaster to tailor the efforts of governments and humanitarian organizations to each context. Not all communities need or want the same assistance. There are diverse needs, cultures and traditional coping mechanisms in the region that influence how communities can best be supported before, during and after disasters. Cash-based programmes were among the approaches suggested to give affected communities more choice in the kind of support and assistance they receive, though some acknowledged cash-based approaches could increase local tensions and undermine self-sufficiency if not appropriately adapted to the context. Pg 15

Findings from preparatory stakeholder consultations
Respondents endorsed governments as having primary responsibility for leading and coordinating humanitarian assistance and noted how governments in the region have demonstrated strong leadership in many disasters over recent years. However, many also argued that national and international support systems needed to be better tailored to support local capacities. Respondents highlighted the importance of strengthening links between national disaster management offices, central agencies such as the Prime Minister's Office and the Treasury, and line ministries, as a way to ensure an effective whole-of-government approach to humanitarian action. Strengthened disaster response laws were seen as an important element of this. When local capacities are limited or the sheer size of a disaster overwhelms response capacity, respondents called on international partners to provide support in areas where they can add value and come in behind local authorities to fill gaps, not overwhelm existing local strengths. Cooperation between Pacific island countries, civilian-led military support and deployable capacities were among the regional solutions discussed. Those consulted called for governments and humanitarian partners to strengthen collaboration with civil society organizations, given their proximity to affected people and potential in supporting community-based humanitarian initiatives. Pg 20

Findings from preparatory stakeholder consultations

Regional stakeholders' feedback during preparatory consultations recognized that displacement was expected to increase significantly in the Pacific over the coming decades.

This was due to a combination of factors including increased frequency and severity of natural disasters, climate change, natural resource extraction, intercommunal tension, as well as poor economic, health and education opportunities. Against this backdrop, they called for proactive and holistic ways to prevent unwanted displacement and manage migration as an adaptation mechanism. Climate change was identified in the consultations as one of the main perceived causes of vulnerability to displacement and a humanitarian threat in the Pacific. As such stakeholders called for proactive solutions, including climate change mitigation, planned relocations of vulnerable communities and legal frameworks that provide long-term solutions to people displaced both internally and across borders.

Communities underscored the need to consider Pacific people's connection to ancestral land and traditional land ownership when planning relocations, with attention to cultural and conflict sensitivity of both sending and receiving communities. The relationship between displacement and urbanization was also discussed. The protection of disaster-affected and displaced people was another recurrent theme in the preparatory consultations, with the protection of women seen as a particular concern. Notwithstanding governments' primary responsibility to protect people, including investment in police and social services, stakeholders called for humanitarian partners and donors to also prioritize protection in their programmes. They identified community protection committees as valuable mechanisms for engaging displaced people in raising protection concerns. Pg 24

Findings from the preparatory stakeholder consultations

The preparatory consultations identified resilience to disasters as a core objective for the region with a call for humanitarian and development approaches to be effectively integrated to further this goal. Respondents highlighted the need for humanitarian and development actors to consider early recovery as an opportunity to respond to life-saving needs, while also addressing underlying risks. This included the application of development principles in a humanitarian setting. Stakeholders also called for better integration of humanitarian, development and climate change considerations into planning and governance structures. Participants noted that the humanitarian-development conversation should centre on affected people's ability to reduce their exposure to risks, prepare for and recover after disasters, as well as ways in which governments can seamlessly strengthen communities' resilience. Many consulted discussed the value of investing in preparedness and disaster risk reduction in the Pacific, noting that fatalities would likely have been higher from recent disasters had the region's governments not invested in early warning systems, as well as national and community level preparedness. It was suggested that mainstreaming disaster risk reduction in development policies and planning should be supported through ministerial budgets. Intergovernmental processes, such as those covering disaster risk reduction and sustainable development goals were seen as valuable opportunities to bring the humanitarian and development communities closer. Efforts such as the new Strategy for Climate and Disaster Resilient Development for the Pacific, which is scheduled to come into effect in 2016, focuses on embedding actions to reduce climate and disaster risks within economic and social development processes. There was a call for legal frameworks to better link preparedness, response and recovery. Pg 28

Findings from preparatory stakeholder consultations

Regional preparatory consultations, including a dedicated consultation on finance, underlined the importance of sufficient financing for risk reduction, preparedness, response, and recovery in the Pacific. This was seen to be critical, given the region's extreme vulnerability to natural disasters; the small size of its economies; and the high dependence on external financing for both humanitarian and development initiatives. Contributors strongly emphasized the need to align different funding streams, particularly humanitarian,

development and climate change finance, to best serve the needs of affected people. Flexibility in funding, including from government, international donors, remittances from the Pacific diaspora and private sector contributions, are central to these efforts. Stakeholders consulted in the region reiterated that funds must be available to get assistance and resources rapidly off the ground to complement the efforts of first responders. It was suggested that the predictability of humanitarian financing could be enhanced through emergency or contingency funds established by each government. Stakeholders also noted the value of risk transfer mechanisms, such as insurance, for immediate liquidity in the case of predictable, recurrent crises. Catastrophe risk insurance would, however, need to be further investigated, learning from the experience of recent disbursements from the Pacific Catastrophe Risk insurance pilot scheme. There was also a call for more attention to be paid to the accountability of humanitarian actors to both affected communities and taxpayers.

Findings from the preparatory stakeholder consultations

The consultations held prior to the Auckland meeting revealed that the private sector was increasingly seen as a powerful ally in disaster risk reduction, preparedness and humanitarian response. As partners they had the potential to provide innovative approaches to solve issues that governments and traditional humanitarian partners have been grappling with for many years. A range of sectors were identified as having the potential to improve humanitarian outcomes including transport, data, logistics, communication technologies, pre-positioning of supplies, technical advisory services and using Corporate Social Responsibility programmes to build resilience. Respondents in the region noted the reality that businesses, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, form part of affected communities and there is a need to strengthen business planning for early recovery. Those involved in the consultation process felt it was important for businesses to be tasked with problems to solve, rather than to establish partnerships for partnerships' sake. Stakeholders urged governments to recognize and clarify the role of private sector in crisis response efforts in their national emergency response policy and preparedness plans. How to best leverage the available skills and resources of the private sector remained a work in progress and required cultural and behavioural changes on all parts. This included recognition by traditional humanitarian partners that they did not have the monopoly on humanitarian action. Contributors felt that effective collaboration between the private sector, governments and humanitarian organizations required dialogue, understanding and a willingness to change. Pg 37

Shelter Cluster Strategic Framework Executive Summary - V 2.2 15 **September 2015**

(Key parts have been underlined and a fuller text included for completeness)

2. The shelter cluster targeted 18,000 households (i.e. 90,000 people) for emergency shelter assistance under the 3 shelter cluster objectives of the Humanitarian Action Plan 1 (HAP – prepared by the Government of Vanuatu for the period of time between 1st of May to the 31st of July). More than 26,304 households reached with tarpaulins (for a target of 18,000), 10,029 with kitchen sets (for a target of 8,500) and 13,420 with access to toolkit (for a target of 18,000).

3. The primary goal of the shelter cluster was to support self-recovery through the provision of appropriate tools, materials, and technical assistance, primarily through the distribution of tarpaulins and tools during the relief phase, and activities promoting early recovery and complementing the recovery initiatives undertaken by the affected households in order to repair, retrofit or rebuild their dwellings and make those safer, stronger and more resilient to future cyclones and other types of natural hazards.

5. Similarly, those efforts would also be incomplete without addressing the problem of informal settlements, where disaster risks, exposures and vulnerabilities are amongst the highest in Vanuatu.

6. The Government of Vanuatu is leading and coordinating the response to TC Pam. Recognizing its status as one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world, Vanuatu has set up a national structure for disaster preparedness and emergency operations. The cluster coordination mechanism was adopted by the National Disaster Management Office (NDMO), the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT) in 2011 and was activated for the response. The clusters are led by relevant Vanuatu Government line ministries, and co-led by VHT agencies.

7. To ensure preparedness and coordinated response to the humanitarian shelter needs faced by the affected population in anticipation of future disasters in Vanuatu, NDMO had contacted the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 3 weeks before PAM to setup the Shelter Cluster, which was not yet present within the existing clusters coordination platform in Vanuatu.

8. Public Works Department (PWD), following a decision taken at the level of the Prime Minister Office (PMO), currently leads the Shelter Cluster in Vanuatu with the support of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) as cluster co-lead.

9. To better reflect the need to liaise humanitarian shelter and long term housing issues, and to enhance emergency shelter response and preparedness, the Department of Local Affairs (DLA) and National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) are supporting the Shelter Cluster led by Public Works Department (PWD); with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) for emergency, and UN-Habitat (for recovery) humanitarian co leads. The Shelter Cluster will be contributing to preparedness strengthening under NDMO and Ministry of Climate Change Adaptation (MCCA) leadership.

10. To ensure inclusive governance of the shelter cluster in Vanuatu, a Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) has been formed. Its membership aims to represent key stakeholders in Vanuatu for shelter-related issues. The SAG is chaired by the cluster leads PWD & DLA and made up of one individual from the following organizations:

- i. Government – PWD
- ii. Government – DLA
- iii. Government – NDMO
- iv. Cluster Co-Lead for emergency - IFRC
- v. Cluster Co-Lead for recovery – UN Habitat
- vi. Council of Chiefs (MCC)
- vii. Large International NGOs – CARE International
- viii. Small International NGO – Butterfly Trust
- ix. National NGOs – ADRA Vanuatu
- x. Red Cross Red Crescent Movement – Vanuatu Red Cross
- xi. Vanuatu Christian Council
- xii. Evacuation centres working group - IOM
- xiii. Protection & Gender cluster – Women’s Affairs
- xiv. Donor – DFAT

It is important to note that SAG membership is not definitive as it could evolve following particular issues to be addressed, and representatives of larger group could rotate.

11. The Evacuation Centre Working Group (ECWG) is lead by NDMO with IOM to co-lead in country. The NDMO has determined that the ECWG currently sits under the Shelter Cluster but operates autonomously. The intention is that the ECWG will become a full cluster in due course.

12. TC PAM humanitarian assistance phase, Humanitarian Action Plan and clusters based coordination framework has ended on July 31 2015. TC PAM recovery response is coordinated through the Recovery Framework and Vanuatu Government line ministries sectorial coordination.

13. The shelter cluster is now focused on preparedness as per pre TC PAM clusters coordination platform; TC PAM shelter/housing recovery response is coordinated through the Housing Sector Working Group (HSWG), led by Public Works Department & Department of Local Authorities with the support of UN Habitat.

Key issues

14. Government and agencies encourage wherever possible community resilience and shelter self-recovery. Shelter and housing recovery has started rapidly, showing once again the resilience of Ni-Vanuatu. However very few dwellings were repaired and rebuilt with integrating hazard resistant principles. Communities' vulnerability to potential new hazard is higher than before PAM hit Vanuatu.

15. A significant part of the resilience of Vanuatu is founded on traditional shelter and settlement related knowledge, practices and coping mechanisms. This includes specific construction materials, techniques and typologies which are a part of the Ni-Van traditional building culture, social organisation and safety net that have been established over time, which need to be better understood by agencies assisting in the recovery efforts, and promoted to further enhance community resilience. These techniques, typologies and processes could be analysed during shelter assessments of the cluster and implementing agencies, best practices documented and retained with other information, education and communication (IEC) materials developed for the response to tropical cyclone PAM.

16. It is important to identify the traditional individual and community cyclone-proof houses and other buildings that resisted well to cyclone PAM so to learn from traditional knowledge principles that could inform modern building and settlement practices and even be integrated into the national building code

17. An impressive number of dwellings built outside traditional communities, in rural, urban and peri-urban areas —mainly in informal settlements—, are made of mixed traditional and modern materials and construction systems that are often incompatible. Unsurprisingly, these suffered the most damages from TC PAM and are currently being rebuilt the same way as before and thus, recreating (when not exacerbating) the pre-TC Pam hazard vulnerabilities, due to a lack of proper materials, building know-how and financial resources. This situation is particularly worrying as it puts the dwellers at high risk of being injured, not to mention the loss of personal assets, due to probable collapse of the dwelling structures if not constructed properly.

18. To strengthen shelter and housing resilience, it is crucial to include “building back safer” principles/initiatives as core area of reconstruction/disaster risk reduction programming and strategies through households and community safe shelter awareness, training schemes of self- and skilled builders, grassroots education programs and public communication campaign alongside improved building regulations, urban planning and mitigation measures.

19. To complement Government-led evacuation centres strategies relying on public building such as schools, there is the need to support identification, repairing, retrofitting and reconstruction of cyclone-resistant community-led traditional buildings as like nakamals, churches, community halls, kindergarten and other nimaenten or nimatkiskis.

20. Shelter and housing recovery strategies must prioritize the most vulnerable groups such as women, children, elderly or disabled, but also those with exacerbated vulnerability due to weak knowledge and resources to support their shelter recovery process.

21. Shelter Cluster agencies have actual capacity through ongoing and planned projects to respond to some of PAM-affected population's shelter recovery needs, at community and households levels. While some of these activities have been initiated under cluster HAP's objectives 2 and 3, most of these would continue to be implemented within the recovery framework timeframe define by the Government.

22. Building on the shelter cluster's coordination platform, which ended on 31 July 2005 for TC PAM response and partners' recovery capacity, Public Works Department (Ministry of Infrastructures and Public Utilities - MIPU) has implemented a Housing Sector Working Group (HSWG) starting on 1st of August, with the support of Department of Local Authorities (Ministry Of Internal Affairs - MOIA) and National Disaster Management Office (Ministry of Climate Change and Adaptation - MCCA). The aim of the working group is to coordinate some of the related priority actions under the strategy “Assist to rebuild/repair/upgrade private housing and infrastructure,” especially on projects submitted to the priority action “strengthening housing & settlement community resilience.” This encompasses activities initiated within the HAP and newly planned projects aiming to: (1) assist in the repairing,

retrofitting and reconstruction of damaged houses (2) household and community safe shelter awareness (3) building back safer training of skilled and unskilled workers (4) assist in the repairing, retrofitting and reconstruction of damaged community building (5) local and traditional construction knowledge and capacity strengthening (6) building back safer knowledge dissemination, mass and affected population communication (7) strengthen local and national capacity in post disaster shelter & housing

29. The priority action “strengthening housing & settlement community resilience” has been submitted with 15 fully funded projects, which 11 having already started within the HAP period or 4 starting after the 31 July.

30. In order to strengthen preparedness of shelter response and coordination in Vanuatu, IFRC will facilitate a 3 days training on shelter coordination and SPC 2 days on evacuation centres management from 7 to 11 September 2015. It will be hosted by PWD and open to 13 key staff from PWD, DLA and NDMO, at national, provincial and communal levels.

31. The Shelter Cluster is developing the “Technical guidelines for emergency shelter response to future natural disaster in Vanuatu” document, which is aiming to show (1) the recommendations for future responses of the Shelter Cluster to natural disasters in Vanuatu, recommended shelter and non food items (NFI) technical specifications for relief and recovery phases of a response and (3) case studies and key references

32. The Shelter Cluster has conducted from August 12th an evaluation of the shelter response to cyclone PAM, following the Shelter & Settlement vulnerability assessment done in April/May 2015, to inform the (1) evaluation of the effectiveness of the shelter operational response detailed in the humanitarian action plan (2) identify barriers to recovery. It will look at 4 specific objectives:

- Monitor the sheltering conditions for families affected by TC Pam since the baseline assessment;
 - Evaluate the utility of various shelter interventions provided by Shelter Cluster agencies and others stakeholders to enable families and communities to recover
 - Determine if emergency shelter residual gaps and recovery needs exist & if there are any access barriers
 - Inform future preparedness and contingency planning with respect to risk reduction, prepositioning of materials, and identification of vulnerable groups and sites
- Key findings and recommendations has been shared with cluster partners, Housing Working Group and Government of Vanuatu late September.

33. IFRC will develop a case study about the Shelter Cluster in Vanuatu to inform learning and advocacy at pacific and global levels.

34. IFRC will continue to support the Government of Vanuatu Shelter Cluster from its regional base in Suva as part of its shelter cluster convener role within the Pacific Humanitarian Team, and remain committed to deploying suitably trained cluster coordination resources to Vanuatu in the event of another disaster and if/when requested by the Government of Vanuatu.

33. In order to respond to El Nino impact, the Shelter Cluster will contribute, as needed; to the preparedness response plan led by NDMO, WASH and Food Security and Agriculture clusters.

34. Through project proposal submitted to TC PAM Recovery Framework, National and local governments (PWD/DLA and Municipal and Area Councils, with the support of UN Habitat) will increase their capacities for post-disaster recovery through training and professional/technical advisory services in post-disaster shelter/housing recovery planning and coordination,

35. Through project proposal submitted to TC PAM Recovery Framework, NDMO will strengthen (1) its emergency response with the support of IOM, regarding internal displacement and evacuation centres, including Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) implementation, identification/mapping of evacuation centres and standards; (2) Humanitarian logistic capacity, including warehousing construction/rebuilding, NFIs

distribution capacity building and operationalization at provincial level; and (3) Community resilience through reinforcement of Community Disaster Committees (CDCs), mitigation measures and safer housing promotion for the vulnerable groups

6.5 Annexe 5: QUALITY OF LIFE PAPER: SHORTEN VERSION

Resilience and Psychological Well-being in Vanuatu after Tropical Cyclone Pam

Using psychometrics to assess resilience and impact

Objective

In the Resilient Villages framework, well-being (social, economic, psychological, and physical) is both a core component and key 'lever' to enable community resilience, and can also influence social cohesion, another core component of the framework. In addition, objectively measuring well-being enables the effective identification of those most affected by disasters, as well as providing a proxy for measuring post-disaster resilience.

Gathering this individuals- and household-specific information is critical for measuring resilience and targeting aid, as covariate shocks that affect entire communities or regions (e.g. disasters) are often exacerbated or enhanced by idiosyncratic shocks that affect individuals or families (e.g. job loss, family deaths).



Context

Highly vulnerable to multiple natural hazards, including earthquakes, volcanoes, and cyclones, Vanuatu is regarded as the most disaster-prone country in the South Pacific¹, ranked first in Birkmann's disaster risk index.² Most local villages contain traditional buildings with special designs to withstand the extreme winds of tropical cyclones, a seasonal threat.

The population of Vanuatu is geographically divided—the archipelago contains 83 islands and only 279,400 people.³ This geographic division makes culture and customs hard to generalise across the country; even language is highly localised, with more than 100 different dialects.⁴ In more remote regions, chiefs have more control over daily life than the national or regional governments and local *kastom* and tradition carry more significance than law.¹ The population of Vanuatu is predominantly Christian.

Vanuatu has few social services and many informal settlements. Access to services such as running water and power is highly variable even within regions and dependent more on geography than individual or community vulnerability⁵.

Almost 50% of ni-Vanuatu household expenditure is on food.⁶ Food price spikes are the most prevalent type of shock to affect households in Vanuatu.⁷ ahead of natural disasters.

The national average household size is 4.9, and children under 15 account for 40% of the population.⁵ Access to secondary and tertiary education is uneven.

In March 2015, Tropical Cyclone Pam swept across Vanuatu, affecting 158,000 people on 23 islands, especially the more heavily populated Efate and Tanna. In June and July 2015, near the beginning of the transition from response to early recovery, our research team conducted a pilot observation of the small village of Laonkarai on northern Efate, with the goal of developing a localised Resilient Villages framework and identifying the needs of the affected population.




Figure 1: Path of Cyclone Pam⁸.

Methodology: Data Collection Tool

The team's approach utilises the DASS-42 psychometric assessment tool, combined with demographic data and simplified rankings of community concerns, to measure disaster impact and community resilience.

The DASS-42 survey asks respondents to rate the frequency with which they experience certain physical and psychological phenomena (e.g. shortness of breath, irritation) on a Likert scale of 0-3, in order to measure current levels of depression, anxiety, and stress (see Appendix 1). The DASS-42 was selected because:

- The tool has been widely used to measure psychological well-being in a variety of contexts (including past disasters as a resilience indicator), and is supported by a large volume of published research.^{9,10}
 - The survey's phenomenological nature makes it largely trans-cultural (across cultures).
 - The survey design also avoids creating expectations of specific aid amongst the surveyed population.¹⁰
 - The DASS severity index for interpreting scores (on a scale of normal, mild, moderate, severe, extremely severe) is effective for indicating the relative seriousness of the measured psychological states, regardless of cultural context and, critically for post-disaster assessment, without the need for baseline data.
 - The DASS is robust and designed for administration by nonprofessional staff.¹¹
- The DASS-42 has also been linked to the Disaster Life Continuum model (see Fig. 2), creating a useful indicator for the appropriate timing of aid and development.¹² Anxiety-dominant populations are more future-focused and exhibit a readiness for longer-term interventions, such as permanent shelter and livelihoods solutions.




Figure 2: Disaster Life Continuum Model

The team's approach also extends the DASS-42 to include additional demographic information commonly used in post-disaster to identify the relative vulnerability of population subsets, including information on age, household size, disabilities, pregnant and lactating mothers, infants in the household, and female or under-18 heads of household. Combining the DASS psychometric data and demographic information allows for the effective identification of the most vulnerable households. Comparative data from other post-disaster communities in different geographic and cultural contexts this context is available, as DASS has been used to quantify post-disaster resilience in Indonesia, Pakistan, China, Haiti, New Zealand, and the Philippines.¹⁰

The extension also includes self-reported rankings of primary concerns for households before and after the disaster (a simple 1-3 prioritisation of food, temperature security, health, debt/finances, shelter/housing, job/income, aging, and clothing), which can be used to identify specific needs, combined with the psychometric and demographic data to identify vulnerable groups, or use to draw conclusions about the impact of the disaster on the community's needs.

Thus, the comprehensive information generated by this approach can be utilised to identify (a) relative need and pre- or post-disaster vulnerability, (b) both the primary concerns and demographic attributes of target communities, (c) the readiness of communities for medium- and long-term interventions, (d) the effectiveness of aid and development interventions, and (e) measures of demonstrated resilience.

Localisation and Administration

The extended DASS-42 was translated to Bislama and validated by two separate linguists. Validation is necessary to prevent minor errors, ensure that the few DASS questions that are idiomatic in nature are translated to appropriate local equivalents, and review the survey for cultural fit (for example, debt and temperature security/heat are of less functional importance to ni-Vanuatu villagers than villagers in other countries).

The standard method for administering the survey as a post-disaster assessment tool is to do so in an interview style with individual respondents (not as family units or couples), after a training pilot to standardise the approach. The standard time for a trained administrator to deliver the survey is approximately 15 minutes.¹⁰

In this instance, time constraints due to the requirement for a translator for verbal interviews forced the team to use an abbreviated approach at the Laonkarai village: after several interviews conducted with single respondents, the remaining adults in the village completed the surveys individually by hand. The less-private, self-administered method may have affected the consistency of results, but should not invalidate the usefulness of the overall psychological indicators and demographic/concerns data.

A total of 14 adults from the Laonkarai village were interviewed (all of those present in the community at the time over the age of 18). Possible obfuscating factors include: the mixed method of interviews and individual completion, the non-private setting for some respondents, and the inability of some respondents to readily distinguish between the mid ranges of the Likert scale when the DASS was verbally administered (conservative tiebreakers were used).

Results and Analysis

The median household size for the Laonkarai village is 5 people, with one child under 5. The median age of respondents (adults over 18) is 45. Ten of the fourteen respondents were female, and one of the males is not a permanent resident of the village. The 30-year-old visitor was the only adult male present younger than 54. The absence of younger adult men appears to be due largely to absent fathers and husbands who have left the village to find employment in other regions or countries.

Overall, this community is highly resilient when compared to other post-disaster communities using the DASS results, which is consistent with the subjective observations of the research team. Women were more affected by Cyclone Pam—the median score on each indicator of psychological distress is at least one scale of severity higher for women when compared to scores for men (see Table 1).

Additionally, several women and the visiting man reported severe or extremely severe depression, anxiety, and stress:

Table 1 DASS Results by Gender

	Depression	Anxiety	Stress	n
Male	5.5 Normal	7.5 Normal	8 Normal	4
Female	11.5 Mild	13.5 Moderate	22.5 Moderate	10
Total	9 Normal	13 Moderate	18.5 Mild	14

Surprisingly, younger respondents were also more affected, especially two of the young women who are currently functioning as heads of household. Older members of the community were not as affected (see Table 2).

Table 2 DASS Results by Age

	Depression	Anxiety	Stress	n
Under 30	17 Moderate	20 Extremely Severe	31 Severe	3
30-39	21 Severe	13 Moderate	17 Mild	3
40-49	6 Normal	10.5 Moderate	10 Normal	2
50+	7.5 Normal	10.5 Moderate	15 Mild	6

The subjective evidence of a forward-facing mindset on the part of the villagers, exhibited by their eagerness to make long-term plans for the future, matches the future-orientation and preparedness for long-term interventions indicated by their consistently anxiety-dominant DASS results.




Figure 3: DASS severity indicators (frequency of responses)

Respondents self-reported a significant increase in needs and concerns after the cyclone, especially regarding food security (see Fig. 4). Housing was previously a top concern for aspirational reasons; before the cyclone, villagers wanted to upgrade their current functional shelters to more Western designs (concrete block construction and metal roofing, as opposed to traditional timber with banana leaf roofing).

However, despite their location (on Efate, near the capital, with directly adjoining transport access via the coastal road), the villagers were concerned about food supplies in the future (money concerns were also largely fuelled by the perception of food insecurity). The destruction of local traditional fruit crops by the cyclone, combined with country-wide agricultural devastation due to Pam and an oncoming dry season, will only increase pressure on the villagers' ability to procure food. Locals stated that they do not expect their agricultural capacity to fully recover for at least 3 years, even given optimal conditions (no dry season, no future cyclones).




Figure 4: Self-indicated needs and concerns of villagers after Cyclone Pam

The anecdotal observation of the research team is that money and jobs/income are critical concerns for the villagers; reliable income sources with the potential for growth were not identified by any of the villagers, and most families appeared to be relying on remittance from male family members working abroad or in other regions.




Figure 5: Self-indicated needs and concerns of villagers before Cyclone Pam. Some villagers reported no concerns before the cyclone.



Two mild physical disabilities identified did not seem to significantly affect household well-being. The only significant demographic factors with female heads and households with higher numbers of young children, both of which were correlated with slightly higher indicators for depression (see Tables 3 & 4).

Table 3 DASS Results by Head of Household

	Depression	Anxiety	Stress	n
Male Head of Household	7.5 Normal	11 Moderate	19 Moderate	10
Female Head of Household	11.5 Mild	13 Moderate	18.5 Mild	4

Table 4 DASS Results by Number of Young Children

# Children Under 5	Depression	Anxiety	Stress	n
0	9.5 Normal	10 Moderate	20 Moderate	4
1	7.5 Normal	11 Moderate	17.5 Mild	6
2	15 Moderate	16 Severe	18.5 Mild	4

Two households—one headed by a woman widowed in the past month, and one whose eldest female was bedridden with terminal cancer—leaped out as experiencing the most material hardship and psychological distress, both by observation and by measurement.

It should be noted that while aggregate measurements of psychological wellbeing for the village at large were below expected for a community in the response and early recovery phases following a disaster, 28% of the villagers surveyed scored ‘severe’ or ‘extremely severe’ on multiple indicators. Despite Laonkarai’s impressive resilience, there is still a long road to recovery: in a clinical setting, a respondent with such high indicators would likely be referred for extensive psychiatric evaluation and possible treatment.

Commentary

The psychological wellbeing of individuals is a critical component of the community’s resilience. Mentally healthy households with future-facing perspectives will be more likely to seek and negotiate for resources, and better equipped to do so. Psychological wellbeing will also affect the likelihood of villages to build on aid they receive after a disaster.

Several key observations may be useful to account for when applying the Resilient Villages framework to Vanuatu. The first of these is the significant cultural division among men and women that was evident in ni-Vanuatu daily life in the regions observed by the team. Men and women sat separately in churches and were rarely seen walking together, the large outdoor kitchen used by the community was a women’s area, men moved out of the village to seek work while the women stayed with the children, and the local culture of kava bars appeared to be male-dominated. This highly differentiated aspect of ni-Vanuatu work and culture may account in part for the uneven psychological effect measured by the DASS.

It is also important to note that even though Laonkarai village was not as severely affected by Cyclone Pam as it could have been (with intact homes and no deaths), they are now highly vulnerable to a secondary-onset disaster, such as an extended drought or another cyclone, and will be for some time. Food security will continue to be a concern for years to come unless income or agricultural capacity increases significantly.

Additionally, it was apparent to the team that secondary education access is critically lacking for many ni-Vanuatu, as has been noted by organisations operation in the area; up to 50% of ni-Vanuatu children may not have access to secondary education.¹ Uneven education access limits access to stable and higher-paying employment, leading to lower wellbeing and exacerbating disaster impacts, such as food insecurity.

A final observation of particular importance to applying the Resilient Villages framework to Vanuatu is the difference between urban and rural coping responses, especially in regards to food scarcity. Urban and semi-urban settlements have greater access to critical services, but may also be more vulnerable to food supply shocks. The most prevalent coping response to a food shock in Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands is sourcing more food from gardens.⁷ The average ni-Van household produced 58% of their own food consumption as of 2010, but urban dwellers produce drastically less.⁵ Additionally, rural dwellers after a disaster will prioritise feeding their own families before bringing food to market. As a result, disaster management plans and resilient community planning need to account for different food security strategies, which are of utmost importance in a geographically fragmented and isolated nation like Vanuatu.

Recommendations

Several key recommendations for enhancing future community resilience and for effective recovery and reconstruction are identified below:

Focus on food security and income interventions

Livelihood restoration, one of the key priorities for early recovery identified in the Tropical Cyclone Pam Humanitarian Action Plan, is extremely crucial for the continued recovery and future resilience of Laonkarai and similar villages.⁸ Concerns regarding steady income have forced family units to split and continues to be a source of stress and vulnerability for families. Income uncertainty also influences both the perception and reality of food security for villages—another priority, especially with the oncoming dry season.

While migrant working schemes disrupt family units, earlier research has shown that the least vulnerable South Pacific households are those with working members who can provide remittance.⁷ Since these workers are not co-located, their ability to work is not disrupted by local disasters. While this perceived reduction in vulnerability must be carefully balanced against the social costs of temporarily divided family units, and the resilience reduction due to absent community members, the migration of male heads of household to seek work is already a common pattern in Vanuatu and the Pacific. Improving access to and income through programmes such as New Zealand’s Regional Seasonal Employer scheme may increase resilience for some communities.

Monitor aspirational building for design safety

The Vanuatu Shelter Cluster reported that traditional ni-Van cyclone shelters withstood Pam very well. However, the research team, as well as humanitarian actors in the area, observed that in many villages, people often did not prefer to build or rebuild with traditional materials and designs—they often aimed to build houses with metal roofing and concrete blocks. However, when houses are constructed in this fashion without proper consideration to design and construction technique, they can be highly vulnerable to cyclones and dangerous to occupants (as demonstrated during Pam).

Prioritise aid to female-headed families with young children

Women, female-headed households, and homes with children under 5 years of age were demonstrably more affected by Cyclone Pam, and remain the most vulnerable. Early recovery interventions should prioritise these vulnerable subsets of the population. It is also important to distinguish that households nominally headed by men are functionally female headed if the men are working in other regions or nations.

Engage three key tiers of civil leadership: chiefs, regional government, and the NDMO

Any interventions to aid in recovery or increase future resilience on a village/community level must engage the local chiefs, who often carry more practical authority than national and regional governments. Additionally, the regional government cannot be bypassed or overlooked in a nation so geographically divided, and any resilience initiatives should be designed to fit well with the National Disaster Management Office’s operations. Of particular use are the Community Disaster Centres that served as hubs for providing shelter and coordinating information and aid after Cyclone Pam.

Consider the cultural appropriateness of interventions

Although cultural considerations are a common refrain in aid and development, in Vanuatu there were many anecdotal observations of inappropriate interventions. Of special note were poorly designed or poorly constructed housing using Western styles or materials, and the provisions of culturally inappropriate food aid.

Conclusion

While the ni-Vanuatu people appear to be highly resilient, women appear to have been more significantly affected by Tropical Cyclone Pam than men. There are also several key vulnerabilities, notably food and income security, that need to be addressed. In order to close these resilience gaps, and enable the ni-Vanuatu people to withstand future disasters, as well as to more fully develop the Resilient Villages framework in the Vanuatu context, pilot interventions should be tested in various regions, and more extensive data should be gathered from a variety of sites.



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